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From: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
To: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
	James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	"Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] SELinux: Fix possible NULL pointer dereference in selinux_inode_permission()
Date: Thu, 9 Jan 2014 22:13:03 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20140109221303.GI10323@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CACLa4pv+EUGHO+MKj8ckhmi8YKiTNVL9pSM+DDsjg+0jbjOCcA@mail.gmail.com>

On Thu, Jan 09, 2014 at 10:31:55AM -0500, Eric Paris wrote:
> Didn't Al find this/something very similar.  I really hate this
> solution.  Why should every LSM try to understand the intimate
> lifetime rules of the parent subsystems?  The real problem is that
> inode_free_security() is being called while the inode is still in use.
>  While I agree with the assessment, I disagree with the solution.  Let
> me try to find where Al and Christoph talked about this....

Because LSM has stuck its fingers into the guts of those filesystems,
obviously.

Just RCU-delay freeing the damn thing and treat NULL ->i_security in
->permission() (which can happen only with MAY_NOT_BLOCK in mask) as
"return -ECHILD and let the caller deal with that".

Modifying every ->destroy_inode() is obviously wrong - there's a lot more
filesystems than LSM buggers in the tree.

  parent reply	other threads:[~2014-01-09 22:13 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-01-09 15:19 [PATCH] SELinux: Fix possible NULL pointer dereference in selinux_inode_permission() Steven Rostedt
2014-01-09 15:31 ` Eric Paris
2014-01-09 15:51   ` Steven Rostedt
2014-01-09 15:57     ` Eric Paris
2014-01-09 16:05       ` Eric Paris
2014-01-09 16:05         ` Eric Paris
2014-01-09 16:10         ` Stephen Smalley
2014-01-09 16:10           ` Stephen Smalley
2014-01-09 16:22           ` Steven Rostedt
2014-01-09 16:22             ` Steven Rostedt
2014-01-09 16:25             ` Eric Paris
2014-01-09 16:25               ` Eric Paris
2014-01-09 20:20           ` Mimi Zohar
2014-01-09 20:20             ` Mimi Zohar
2014-01-09 20:24             ` Eric Paris
2014-01-09 20:24               ` Eric Paris
2014-01-09 22:28         ` Al Viro
2014-01-09 22:28           ` Al Viro
2014-01-09 22:17     ` Al Viro
2014-01-09 22:13   ` Al Viro [this message]
2014-01-09 22:18     ` Eric Paris
2014-01-09 22:25       ` Al Viro
2014-01-09 22:45     ` Eric Paris

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