From: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
To: Khalid Aziz <khalid.aziz@oracle.com>
Cc: tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, hpa@zytor.com,
peterz@infradead.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
andi.kleen@intel.com, rob@landley.net, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk,
venki@google.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC] [PATCH] Pre-emption control for userspace
Date: Wed, 5 Mar 2014 15:38:00 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20140305143800.GA29480@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <5316343B.2030404@oracle.com>
On 03/04, Khalid Aziz wrote:
>
> On 03/04/2014 12:03 PM, Oleg Nesterov wrote:
>>
>> 1. mremap() can move this vma, so do_exit() can't trust ->uaddr
>>
>> 2. Even worse, mremap() itself is not safe. It can do ->close()
>> too and create the new vma with the same vm_ops. Another
>> unmap from (say) exit_mm() won't be happy.
>
> I agree this looks like a potential spot for trouble. I was asking if
> removing sys_munmap() of uaddr from do_exit() solves both of the above
> problems?
How? Of course this won't solve the problems. And there are more problems.
> You have convinced me this sys_munmap() I added is unnecessary.
Cough ;) I didn't try to convince you that it should be removed. It is
necessary (but of course you should not use sys_munmap(), say vm_munmap
is better.
But you know, I think this all doesn't matter. Imho, this proc/mmap
interface is horrible. Perhaps something like tls area visible to kernel
make sense, but it should be more generic at least.
You added /proc/sched_preempt_delay to avoid the syscall. I think it
would be better to simply add vdso_sched_preempt_delay() instead.
But the main problem, of course, is that this feature is questionable.
Oleg.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-03-05 14:38 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 67+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-03-03 18:07 [RFC] [PATCH] Pre-emption control for userspace Khalid Aziz
2014-03-03 21:51 ` Davidlohr Bueso
2014-03-03 23:29 ` Khalid Aziz
2014-03-04 13:56 ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-03-04 17:44 ` Khalid Aziz
2014-03-04 18:38 ` Al Viro
2014-03-04 19:01 ` Khalid Aziz
2014-03-04 19:03 ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-03-04 20:14 ` Khalid Aziz
2014-03-05 14:38 ` Oleg Nesterov [this message]
2014-03-05 16:12 ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-03-05 17:10 ` Khalid Aziz
2014-03-04 21:12 ` H. Peter Anvin
2014-03-04 21:39 ` Khalid Aziz
2014-03-04 22:23 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-04 22:44 ` Khalid Aziz
2014-03-05 0:39 ` Thomas Gleixner
2014-03-05 0:51 ` Andi Kleen
2014-03-05 11:10 ` Peter Zijlstra
2014-03-05 17:29 ` Khalid Aziz
2014-03-05 19:58 ` Khalid Aziz
2014-03-06 9:57 ` Peter Zijlstra
2014-03-06 16:08 ` Khalid Aziz
2014-03-06 11:14 ` Thomas Gleixner
2014-03-06 16:32 ` Khalid Aziz
2014-03-05 14:54 ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-03-05 15:56 ` Andi Kleen
2014-03-05 16:36 ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-03-05 17:22 ` Khalid Aziz
2014-03-05 23:13 ` David Lang
2014-03-05 23:48 ` Khalid Aziz
2014-03-05 23:56 ` H. Peter Anvin
2014-03-06 0:02 ` Khalid Aziz
2014-03-06 0:13 ` H. Peter Anvin
2014-03-05 23:59 ` David Lang
2014-03-06 0:17 ` Khalid Aziz
2014-03-06 0:36 ` David Lang
2014-03-06 1:22 ` Khalid Aziz
2014-03-06 14:23 ` David Lang
2014-03-06 12:13 ` Kevin Easton
2014-03-06 13:59 ` Peter Zijlstra
2014-03-06 22:41 ` Andi Kleen
2014-03-06 14:25 ` David Lang
2014-03-06 16:12 ` Khalid Aziz
2014-03-06 13:24 ` Rasmus Villemoes
2014-03-06 13:34 ` Peter Zijlstra
2014-03-06 13:45 ` Rasmus Villemoes
2014-03-06 14:02 ` Peter Zijlstra
2014-03-06 14:33 ` Thomas Gleixner
2014-03-06 14:34 ` H. Peter Anvin
2014-03-06 14:04 ` Thomas Gleixner
2014-03-25 17:17 ` [PATCH v2] " Khalid Aziz
2014-03-25 17:44 ` Andrew Morton
2014-03-25 17:56 ` Khalid Aziz
2014-03-25 18:14 ` Andrew Morton
2014-03-25 17:46 ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-03-25 17:59 ` Khalid Aziz
2014-03-25 18:20 ` Andi Kleen
2014-03-25 18:47 ` Khalid Aziz
2014-03-25 19:47 ` Andi Kleen
2014-03-25 18:59 ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-03-25 19:15 ` Khalid Aziz
2014-03-25 20:31 ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-03-25 21:37 ` Khalid Aziz
2014-03-26 6:03 ` Mike Galbraith
2014-03-25 23:01 ` [RFC] [PATCH] " Davidlohr Bueso
2014-03-25 23:29 ` Khalid Aziz
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