[PATCHv2 net] vhost: fix total length when packets are too short

["Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>]

When mergeable buffers are disabled, and the
incoming packet is too large for the rx buffer,
get_rx_bufs returns success.

This was intentional in order for make recvmsg
truncate the packet and then handle_rx would
detect err != sock_len and drop it.

Unfortunately we pass the original sock_len to
recvmsg - which means we use parts of iov not fully
validated.

Fix this up by detecting this overrun and doing packet drop
immediately.

CVE-2014-0077

Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
---

Changes from v1:
	Fix CVE# in the commit log.
	Patch is unchanged.

Note: this is needed for -stable.

I wonder if this can still make the release.

 drivers/vhost/net.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/vhost/net.c b/drivers/vhost/net.c
index a0fa5de..026be58 100644
--- a/drivers/vhost/net.c
+++ b/drivers/vhost/net.c
@@ -532,6 +532,12 @@ static int get_rx_bufs(struct vhost_virtqueue *vq,
 	*iovcount = seg;
 	if (unlikely(log))
 		*log_num = nlogs;
+
+	/* Detect overrun */
+	if (unlikely(datalen > 0)) {
+		r = UIO_MAXIOV + 1;
+		goto err;
+	}
 	return headcount;
 err:
 	vhost_discard_vq_desc(vq, headcount);
@@ -587,6 +593,14 @@ static void handle_rx(struct vhost_net *net)
 		/* On error, stop handling until the next kick. */
 		if (unlikely(headcount < 0))
 			break;
+		/* On overrun, truncate and discard */
+		if (unlikely(headcount > UIO_MAXIOV)) {
+			msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
+			err = sock->ops->recvmsg(NULL, sock, &msg,
+						 1, MSG_DONTWAIT | MSG_TRUNC);
+			pr_debug("Discarded rx packet: len %zd\n", sock_len);
+			continue;
+		}
 		/* OK, now we need to know about added descriptors. */
 		if (!headcount) {
 			if (unlikely(vhost_enable_notify(&net->dev, vq))) {
-- 
MST