From: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Sean Pajot <sean.pajot@execulink.com>,
lxc-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [lxc-devel] Kernel bug? Setuid apps and user namespaces
Date: Wed, 2 Apr 2014 12:20:49 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20140402172049.GA13240@sergelap> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <874n89rsoc.fsf@xmission.com>
Hi Eric,
(sorry, I don't seem to have the email I actually wanted to reply
to in my mbox, but it is
https://lists.linuxcontainers.org/pipermail/lxc-devel/2013-October/005857.html)
You'd said,
> Someone needs to read and think through all of the corner cases and see
> if we can ever have a time when task_dumpable is false but root in the
> container would not or should not be able to see everything.
>
> In particular I am worried about the case of a setuid app calling setns,
> and entering a lesser privileged user namespace. In my foggy mind that
> might be a security problem. And there might be other similar crazy
> cases.
Can we make use of current->mm->exe_file->f_cred->user_ns?
So either always use
make_kgid(current->mm->exe_file->f_cred->user_ns, 0)
instead of make_kuid(cred->user_ns, 0), or check that
(current->mm->exe_file->f_cred->user_ns == cred->user_ns)
and, if not, assume that the caller has done a setns?
-serge
next parent reply other threads:[~2014-04-02 17:21 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <5266BEA3.6020008@execulink.com>
[not found] ` <20131022193718.GA18463@ac100>
[not found] ` <874n89rsoc.fsf@xmission.com>
2014-04-02 17:20 ` Serge Hallyn [this message]
2014-04-02 17:32 ` [lxc-devel] Kernel bug? Setuid apps and user namespaces Serge E. Hallyn
2014-04-04 18:13 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-04 18:30 ` Serge Hallyn
2014-04-04 19:03 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-04 19:10 ` Serge Hallyn
2014-04-04 19:28 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-07 18:13 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2014-04-10 19:50 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-11 21:52 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2014-04-11 22:11 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-11 22:29 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2014-04-11 22:32 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-11 22:46 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2014-04-11 23:00 ` Andy Lutomirski
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