From: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
To: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: luto@amacapital.net, jorge@dti2.net, ebiederm@xmission.com,
vgoyal@redhat.com, ssorce@redhat.com, security@kernel.org,
netdev@vger.kernel.org, serge@hallyn.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 5/5] net: Use netlink_ns_capable to verify the permisions of netlink messages
Date: Thu, 8 May 2014 14:21:21 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20140508142121.2c68bcc3@nehalam.linuxnetplumber.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20140507.194514.1312153135098382943.davem@davemloft.net>
On Wed, 07 May 2014 19:45:14 -0400 (EDT)
David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> wrote:
> From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
> Date: Wed, 7 May 2014 16:01:33 -0700
>
> > On Wed, May 7, 2014 at 3:52 PM, David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> wrote:
> >> From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
> >> Date: Wed, 7 May 2014 15:26:11 -0700
> >>
> >>> So what do we do? Check permissions on connect and then use the
> >>> cached result for send on a connected socket? Check permitted caps
> >>> instead of effective caps?
> >>
> >> It should create the socket after changing perms.
> >
> > I agree that it should, but it doesn't, and if these patches get
> > backported, things will break. OTOH, if the patches don't get
> > backported, things may still break, and we have a possibly rather
> > severe unfixed vulnerability.
>
> I think the kernel change is justified as the privilege allowance
> that happened before was very much unintentional and as you've
> shown us countless times a very real problem that we must fix.
One of the problems here is that Quagga may generate millions of
netlink messages to change routes in response to link flap.
Raising/lowering the permissions around each request would have
a significant performance impact.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-05-08 21:21 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 46+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <CALCETrUaYhh6Dkzn0TMEUz-GEO9-6ObByk5d_xRViSMBbp5Pkg@mail.gmail.com>
[not found] ` <cover.1397840611.git.luto@amacapital.net>
[not found] ` <6daf425e2023266d52d181e4d2ee18747d4f1fa8.1397840611.git.luto@amacapital.net>
[not found] ` <87tx9nuxf6.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org>
[not found] ` <CALCETrUqNVRBse4rUeUKfgYt0d+9x1JrEHGcZ_DnWyq7W6Yyzw@mail.gmail.com>
[not found] ` <87r44qtabz.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org>
[not found] ` <CALCETrWzUQ7QjykT85ExDfX-+9eDD-D-dcxofUMPvLK=ia9arg@mail.gmail.com>
[not found] ` <87r44qrt8v.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org>
2014-04-22 21:13 ` [PATCH 0/6]: Preventing abuse when passing file descriptors Eric W. Biederman
2014-04-22 21:14 ` [PATCH 1/6] netlink: Rename netlink_capable netlink_allowed Eric W. Biederman
2014-04-22 21:15 ` [PATCH 2/6] net: Move the permission check in sock_diag_put_filterinfo to packet_diag_dump Eric W. Biederman
2014-04-22 21:15 ` [PATCH 3/6] net: Fix ns_capable check in packet_diag_dump Eric W. Biederman
2014-04-22 21:16 ` [PATCH 4/6] net: Add variants of capable for use on on sockets Eric W. Biederman
2014-04-22 21:16 ` [PATCH 5/6] net: Add variants of capable for use on netlink messages Eric W. Biederman
2014-04-22 21:17 ` [PATCH 6/6] net: Use netlink_ns_capable to verify the permisions of " Eric W. Biederman
2014-04-23 19:32 ` [PATCH 0/6]: Preventing abuse when passing file descriptors David Miller
2014-04-23 21:24 ` [PATCH 0/5]: " Eric W. Biederman
2014-04-23 21:25 ` [PATCH 1/5] netlink: Rename netlink_capable netlink_allowed Eric W. Biederman
2014-04-23 21:26 ` [PATCH 2/5] net: Move the permission check in sock_diag_put_filterinfo to packet_diag_dump Eric W. Biederman
2014-04-23 21:26 ` [PATCH 3/5] net: Add variants of capable for use on on sockets Eric W. Biederman
2014-04-23 21:28 ` [PATCH 4/5] net: Add variants of capable for use on netlink messages Eric W. Biederman
2014-04-23 21:29 ` [PATCH 5/5] net: Use netlink_ns_capable to verify the permisions of " Eric W. Biederman
2014-05-07 22:18 ` Jorge Boncompte [DTI2]
2014-05-07 22:26 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-05-07 22:52 ` David Miller
2014-05-07 23:01 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-05-07 23:34 ` Linus Torvalds
2014-05-07 23:45 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-05-22 15:05 ` Jiri Benc
2014-05-23 23:25 ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-05-23 23:51 ` Linus Torvalds
2014-05-24 22:34 ` David Miller
2014-05-25 5:38 ` [RFC][PATCH] netlink: Only check file credentials for implicit destinations Eric W. Biederman
2014-05-25 16:50 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-05-25 23:44 ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-05-26 0:32 ` Linus Torvalds
2014-05-26 5:36 ` [RFC][PATCH 2/1] netlink: Use the credential at the time the destination address was set Eric W. Biederman
2014-05-26 17:19 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-05-27 4:24 ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-05-26 13:39 ` [RFC][PATCH] netlink: Only check file credentials for implicit destinations Willy Tarreau
2014-05-26 8:38 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2014-05-25 5:45 ` [PATCH 5/5] net: Use netlink_ns_capable to verify the permisions of netlink messages Eric W. Biederman
2014-05-25 16:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-05-08 21:29 ` Stephen Hemminger
2014-05-08 21:32 ` Andy Lutomirski
[not found] ` <CA+55aFzOHZcw2o6Cq6rSddSBDZvhgzYToBruak9SLCHxx-fA3Q@mail.gmail.com>
2014-05-08 21:49 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-05-08 22:07 ` Stephen Hemminger
2014-05-08 21:54 ` David Miller
2014-05-07 23:45 ` David Miller
2014-05-08 21:21 ` Stephen Hemminger [this message]
2014-05-08 21:52 ` David Miller
2014-05-08 21:54 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-24 17:45 ` [PATCH 0/5]: Preventing abuse when passing file descriptors David Miller
2014-06-13 1:31 [PATCH 0/5] Backport to 3.10.y for fix CVE-2014-0181 Xiangyu Lu
2014-06-13 1:31 ` [PATCH 5/5] net: Use netlink_ns_capable to verify the permisions of netlink messages Xiangyu Lu
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