From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S932546AbaELCHH (ORCPT ); Sun, 11 May 2014 22:07:07 -0400 Received: from 1wt.eu ([62.212.114.60]:34541 "EHLO 1wt.eu" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1752926AbaELBm0 (ORCPT ); Sun, 11 May 2014 21:42:26 -0400 Message-Id: <20140512003206.181991224@1wt.eu> User-Agent: quilt/0.48-1 Date: Mon, 12 May 2014 02:34:12 +0200 From: Willy Tarreau To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Neil Horman , Stephan Mueller , Petr Matousek , Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" , Willy Tarreau Subject: [ 132/143] crypto: ansi_cprng - Fix off by one error in non-block size request In-Reply-To: Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org 2.6.32-longterm review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Neil Horman commit 714b33d15130cbb5ab426456d4e3de842d6c5b8a upstream Stephan Mueller reported to me recently a error in random number generation in the ansi cprng. If several small requests are made that are less than the instances block size, the remainder for loop code doesn't increment rand_data_valid in the last iteration, meaning that the last bytes in the rand_data buffer gets reused on the subsequent smaller-than-a-block request for random data. The fix is pretty easy, just re-code the for loop to make sure that rand_data_valid gets incremented appropriately Signed-off-by: Neil Horman Reported-by: Stephan Mueller CC: Stephan Mueller CC: Petr Matousek CC: Herbert Xu CC: "David S. Miller" Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau --- crypto/ansi_cprng.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/crypto/ansi_cprng.c b/crypto/ansi_cprng.c index 3aa6e38..0ffd5995 100644 --- a/crypto/ansi_cprng.c +++ b/crypto/ansi_cprng.c @@ -232,11 +232,11 @@ remainder: */ if (byte_count < DEFAULT_BLK_SZ) { empty_rbuf: - for (; ctx->rand_data_valid < DEFAULT_BLK_SZ; - ctx->rand_data_valid++) { + while (ctx->rand_data_valid < DEFAULT_BLK_SZ) { *ptr = ctx->rand_data[ctx->rand_data_valid]; ptr++; byte_count--; + ctx->rand_data_valid++; if (byte_count == 0) goto done; } -- 1.7.12.2.21.g234cd45.dirty