From: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@opendz.org>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/9] procfs: use flags to deny or allow access to /proc/<pid>/$entry
Date: Mon, 26 May 2014 18:21:01 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20140526172101.GA6380@dztty> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALCETrUte7WRMi23+rp+XbgAoOcw=TPZe02YEuZRZyVroj+mfQ@mail.gmail.com>
On Mon, May 26, 2014 at 09:57:16AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Mon, May 26, 2014 at 6:27 AM, Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@opendz.org> wrote:
> > Add the deny or allow flags, so we can perform proper permission checks
> > and set the result accordingly. These flags are needed in case we have
> > to cache the result of permission checks that are done during ->open()
> > time. Later during ->read(), we can decide to allow or deny the read().
> >
> > The pid entries that need these flags are:
> > /proc/<pid>/stat
> > /proc/<pid>/wchan
> > /proc/<pid>/maps (will be handled in next patches).
> >
> > These files are world readable, userspace depend on that. To prevent
> > ASLR leaks and to avoid breaking userspace, we follow this scheme:
> >
> > a) Perform permission checks during ->open()
> > b) Cache the result of a) and return success
> > c) Recheck the cached result during ->read()
>
> Why is (c) needed?
In order to not break these entries, some of them are world readable.
So we perform the re-check that *single* cached integer, in order to
allow access for the non-sensitive, and block or pad with zeros the
sensitive.
> >
> > /*
> > + * Flags used to deny or allow current to access /proc/<pid>/$entry
> > + * after proper permission checks.
> > + */
> > +enum {
> > + PID_ENTRY_DENY = 0, /* Deny access */
> > + PID_ENTRY_ALLOW = 1, /* Allow access */
> > +};
>
> I think this would be less alarming if this were:
>
> #define PID_ENTRY_DENY ((void *)1UL)
> #define PID_ENTRY_ALLOW ((void *)2UL)
Hmm,
I would like to keep it enum, enum is type-safe and I want to follow the
semantics of /proc/pid/stat and others:
check the patches and you will see that by making the variable 1 or 0 it
follows what's currently done, and IMHO 0 or 1 is more intuitive in this
case!
> Also, I don't like DENY and ALLOW. It's not denying and allowing.
> How about PID_ENTRY_OPENER_MAY_PTRACE and
> PID_ENTRY_OPENER_MAY_NOT_PTRACE?
Hm, Ok I'll perhaps change this! will see what other thinks!
Thank you!
> --Andy
--
Djalal Harouni
http://opendz.org
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-05-26 17:21 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-05-26 13:27 [PATCH 0/9] procfs: smooth steps to secure some /proc/<pid>/* Djalal Harouni
2014-05-26 13:27 ` [PATCH 1/9] procfs: use flags to deny or allow access to /proc/<pid>/$entry Djalal Harouni
2014-05-26 16:57 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-05-26 17:21 ` Djalal Harouni [this message]
2014-05-26 18:06 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-05-26 19:13 ` Djalal Harouni
2014-05-26 19:17 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-05-27 13:42 ` Djalal Harouni
2014-05-27 18:38 ` Kees Cook
2014-05-28 11:42 ` Djalal Harouni
2014-05-28 16:59 ` Kees Cook
2014-05-28 19:11 ` Djalal Harouni
2014-05-26 13:27 ` [PATCH 2/9] procfs: add pid_entry_access() for proper checks on /proc/<pid>/* Djalal Harouni
2014-05-26 16:57 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-05-26 13:27 ` [PATCH 3/9] procfs: add proc_read_from_buffer() and pid_entry_read() helpers Djalal Harouni
2014-05-26 17:01 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-05-26 17:41 ` Djalal Harouni
2014-05-26 17:59 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-05-26 18:21 ` Djalal Harouni
2014-05-26 18:44 ` Djalal Harouni
2014-06-03 10:13 ` Alexey Dobriyan
2014-05-26 13:27 ` [PATCH 4/9] procfs: improve /proc/<pid>/wchan protection Djalal Harouni
2014-05-26 13:27 ` [PATCH 5/9] procfs: improve /proc/<pid>/syscall protection Djalal Harouni
2014-05-26 13:27 ` [PATCH 6/9] procfs: add pid_seq_private struct to handle /proc/<pid>/{stat|stack} Djalal Harouni
2014-05-26 17:02 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-05-27 11:18 ` Djalal Harouni
2014-05-26 13:27 ` [PATCH 7/9] procfs: add pid_entry_show() helper " Djalal Harouni
2014-05-26 13:27 ` [PATCH 8/9] procfs: improve /proc/<pid>/stat protection Djalal Harouni
2014-05-26 13:27 ` [PATCH 9/9] procfs: improve /proc/<pid>/stack protection Djalal Harouni
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