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From: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com>,
	David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>,
	Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	LSM List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
	Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
	Meredydd Luff <meredydd@senatehouse.org>,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>,
	Henrique de Moraes Holschuh <hmh@hmh.eng.br>,
	linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: General flags to turn things off (getrandom, pid lookup, etc)
Date: Fri, 25 Jul 2014 16:15:07 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20140725201507.GA23410@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALCETrWGvBfrX1W5XaFgJZhKHLf+oac9YrwPR3ppK=deQtu5hA@mail.gmail.com>

On Fri, Jul 25, 2014 at 11:30:48AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:

 > There is recent interest in having a way to turn generally-available
 > kernel features off.  Maybe we should add a good one so we can stop
 > bikeshedding and avoid proliferating dumb interfaces.
 > 
 > Things that might want to be turn-off-able include:
 >  - getrandom with GRND_RANDOM [from the getrandom threads]
 >  - Any lookup of a non-self pid [from the capsicum thread]
 >  - Any lookup of a pid outside the caller thread group [capsicum]
 >  - Various architectural things (personal wishlist), e.g.:
 >     - RDTSC and userspace HPET access
 >     - CPUID?
 >     - 32-bit GDT code segments [huge attack surface]
 >     - 64-bit GDT code segments [probably pointless]

I'm not sure there's value in disabling cpuid dev interface,
when the instruction is unprivileged.

 > I would propose a new syscall for this:
 > 
 > long restrict_userspace(int mode, int type, int value, int flags);

do the restrictions happen system-wide like in say SELinux,
or only within the calling process, like seccomp ?

	Dave

  reply	other threads:[~2014-07-25 20:15 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-07-25 18:30 General flags to turn things off (getrandom, pid lookup, etc) Andy Lutomirski
2014-07-25 20:15 ` Dave Jones [this message]
     [not found]   ` <20140725201507.GA23410-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2014-07-25 20:21     ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-07-25 20:21       ` Andy Lutomirski
     [not found] ` <CALCETrWGvBfrX1W5XaFgJZhKHLf+oac9YrwPR3ppK=deQtu5hA-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2014-07-25 21:35   ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-07-25 21:35     ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-07-25 21:41     ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-07-26 19:48       ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-07-26 19:48         ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-07-30 14:37       ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-07-25 23:43   ` H. Peter Anvin
2014-07-25 23:43     ` H. Peter Anvin
2014-07-25 23:54     ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-07-27 12:26   ` David Drysdale
2014-07-27 12:26     ` David Drysdale
2014-07-27 21:06 ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-07-27 22:17   ` Andy Lutomirski
     [not found]     ` <CALCETrXfzOZEC3mOKkm3_GvitvkEu4kAa3LowRv-fjHnzrQnBg-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2014-07-27 23:53       ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-07-27 23:53         ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-07-27 23:53         ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-07-30 14:37         ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-07-30 14:37           ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-07-30 18:41           ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-07-30 18:41             ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-07-30 21:29             ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-07-30 21:29               ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-07-31  2:37               ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-07-31  2:37                 ` Eric W. Biederman

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