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From: will.deacon@arm.com (Will Deacon)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH v5 1/3] arm64: ptrace: reload a syscall number after ptrace operations
Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2014 14:26:59 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20140729132659.GR9245@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <53D7440B.10006@linaro.org>

On Tue, Jul 29, 2014 at 07:49:47AM +0100, AKASHI Takahiro wrote:
> On 07/25/2014 08:03 PM, Will Deacon wrote:
> > On Fri, Jul 25, 2014 at 11:36:49AM +0100, AKASHI Takahiro wrote:
> >> On 07/25/2014 12:01 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> >>>>> If so, then you risk (at least) introducing
> >>>>>
> >>>>> a nice user-triggerable OOPS if audit is enabled.
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> Can you please elaborate this?
> >>>> Since I didn't find any definition of audit's behavior when syscall is
> >>>> rewritten to -1, I thought it is reasonable to skip "exit tracing" of
> >>>> "skipped" syscall.
> >>>> (otherwise, "fake" seems to be more appropriate :)
> >>>
> >>> The audit entry hook will oops if you call it twice in a row without
> >>> calling the exit hook in between.
> >>
> >> Thank you, I could reproduce this problem which hits BUG(in_syscall) in
> >> audit_syscall_entry(). Really bad, and I fixed it in my next version and
> >> now a "skipped" system call is also traced by audit.
> >
> > Can you reproduce this on arch/arm/ too? If so, we should also fix the code
> > there.
> 
> As far as I tried on arm with syscall auditing enabled,
> 
> 1) Changing a syscall number to -1 under seccomp doesn't hit BUG_ON(in_syscall).
> 2) But, in fact, audit_syscall_entry() is NOT called in this case because
>     __secure_computing() returns -1 and then it causes the succeeding tracing
>     in syscall_trace_enter(), including audit_syscall_entry(), skipped.

What happens if CONFIG_SECCOMP=n?

> 3) On the other hand, calling syscall(-1) from userspace hits BUG_ON because
>     the return path, ret_slow_syscall, doesn't contain syscall_trace_exit().
> 4) When we re-write a syscall number to -1 without seccomp, we will also see
>     BUG_ON hit, although I didn't try yet.
> 
> Fixing case 3 is easy, but should we also fix case 2?

I think so.

Will

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
To: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	Deepak Saxena <dsaxena@linaro.org>,
	Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	"linaro-kernel@lists.linaro.org" <linaro-kernel@lists.linaro.org>,
	"linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org" 
	<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
	Catalin Marinas <Catalin.Marinas@arm.com>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 1/3] arm64: ptrace: reload a syscall number after ptrace operations
Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2014 14:26:59 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20140729132659.GR9245@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <53D7440B.10006@linaro.org>

On Tue, Jul 29, 2014 at 07:49:47AM +0100, AKASHI Takahiro wrote:
> On 07/25/2014 08:03 PM, Will Deacon wrote:
> > On Fri, Jul 25, 2014 at 11:36:49AM +0100, AKASHI Takahiro wrote:
> >> On 07/25/2014 12:01 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> >>>>> If so, then you risk (at least) introducing
> >>>>>
> >>>>> a nice user-triggerable OOPS if audit is enabled.
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> Can you please elaborate this?
> >>>> Since I didn't find any definition of audit's behavior when syscall is
> >>>> rewritten to -1, I thought it is reasonable to skip "exit tracing" of
> >>>> "skipped" syscall.
> >>>> (otherwise, "fake" seems to be more appropriate :)
> >>>
> >>> The audit entry hook will oops if you call it twice in a row without
> >>> calling the exit hook in between.
> >>
> >> Thank you, I could reproduce this problem which hits BUG(in_syscall) in
> >> audit_syscall_entry(). Really bad, and I fixed it in my next version and
> >> now a "skipped" system call is also traced by audit.
> >
> > Can you reproduce this on arch/arm/ too? If so, we should also fix the code
> > there.
> 
> As far as I tried on arm with syscall auditing enabled,
> 
> 1) Changing a syscall number to -1 under seccomp doesn't hit BUG_ON(in_syscall).
> 2) But, in fact, audit_syscall_entry() is NOT called in this case because
>     __secure_computing() returns -1 and then it causes the succeeding tracing
>     in syscall_trace_enter(), including audit_syscall_entry(), skipped.

What happens if CONFIG_SECCOMP=n?

> 3) On the other hand, calling syscall(-1) from userspace hits BUG_ON because
>     the return path, ret_slow_syscall, doesn't contain syscall_trace_exit().
> 4) When we re-write a syscall number to -1 without seccomp, we will also see
>     BUG_ON hit, although I didn't try yet.
> 
> Fixing case 3 is easy, but should we also fix case 2?

I think so.

Will

  reply	other threads:[~2014-07-29 13:26 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 72+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-07-22  9:14 [PATCH v5 0/3] arm64: Add seccomp support AKASHI Takahiro
2014-07-22  9:14 ` AKASHI Takahiro
2014-07-22  9:14 ` [PATCH v5 1/3] arm64: ptrace: reload a syscall number after ptrace operations AKASHI Takahiro
2014-07-22  9:14   ` AKASHI Takahiro
2014-07-22 20:15   ` Kees Cook
2014-07-22 20:15     ` Kees Cook
2014-07-23  7:03     ` AKASHI Takahiro
2014-07-23  7:03       ` AKASHI Takahiro
2014-07-23  8:25       ` Will Deacon
2014-07-23  8:25         ` Will Deacon
2014-07-23  9:09         ` AKASHI Takahiro
2014-07-23  9:09           ` AKASHI Takahiro
2014-07-23 15:13       ` Kees Cook
2014-07-23 15:13         ` Kees Cook
2014-07-24  3:54   ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-07-24  3:54     ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-07-24  5:57     ` AKASHI Takahiro
2014-07-24  5:57       ` AKASHI Takahiro
2014-07-24 15:01       ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-07-24 15:01         ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-07-25 10:36         ` AKASHI Takahiro
2014-07-25 10:36           ` AKASHI Takahiro
2014-07-25 11:03           ` Will Deacon
2014-07-25 11:03             ` Will Deacon
2014-07-29  6:49             ` AKASHI Takahiro
2014-07-29  6:49               ` AKASHI Takahiro
2014-07-29 13:26               ` Will Deacon [this message]
2014-07-29 13:26                 ` Will Deacon
2014-07-22  9:14 ` [PATCH v5 2/3] asm-generic: Add generic seccomp.h for secure computing mode 1 AKASHI Takahiro
2014-07-22  9:14   ` AKASHI Takahiro
2014-07-24  3:40   ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-07-24  3:40     ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-07-24  4:41     ` Kees Cook
2014-07-24  4:41       ` Kees Cook
2014-07-24  5:17       ` AKASHI Takahiro
2014-07-24  5:17         ` AKASHI Takahiro
2014-07-24 14:57         ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-07-24 14:57           ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-07-25  8:52           ` AKASHI Takahiro
2014-07-25  8:52             ` AKASHI Takahiro
2014-07-22  9:14 ` [PATCH v5 3/3] arm64: Add seccomp support AKASHI Takahiro
2014-07-22  9:14   ` AKASHI Takahiro
2014-07-24  3:52   ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-07-24  3:52     ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-07-24  5:40     ` AKASHI Takahiro
2014-07-24  5:40       ` AKASHI Takahiro
2014-07-24 15:00       ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-07-24 15:00         ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-07-24 15:16         ` Catalin Marinas
2014-07-24 15:16           ` Catalin Marinas
2014-07-25  9:37         ` AKASHI Takahiro
2014-07-25  9:37           ` AKASHI Takahiro
2014-08-05 15:08           ` Kees Cook
2014-08-05 15:08             ` Kees Cook
2014-08-08  7:35             ` AKASHI Takahiro
2014-08-08  7:35               ` AKASHI Takahiro
2014-08-11  9:24               ` Will Deacon
2014-08-11  9:24                 ` Will Deacon
2014-08-12  6:57                 ` AKASHI Takahiro
2014-08-12  6:57                   ` AKASHI Takahiro
2014-08-12  9:40                   ` Will Deacon
2014-08-12  9:40                     ` Will Deacon
2014-08-12 11:17                     ` AKASHI Takahiro
2014-08-12 11:17                       ` AKASHI Takahiro
2014-08-15 14:33                       ` Will Deacon
2014-08-15 14:33                         ` Will Deacon
2014-07-22 20:16 ` [PATCH v5 0/3] " Kees Cook
2014-07-22 20:16   ` Kees Cook
2014-07-23  7:09   ` AKASHI Takahiro
2014-07-23  7:09     ` AKASHI Takahiro
2014-07-23 15:36     ` Kees Cook
2014-07-23 15:36       ` Kees Cook

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