From: Arno Wagner <arno@wagner.name>
To: dm-crypt@saout.de
Subject: Re: [dm-crypt] LUKS disk encryption with remote boot authentication
Date: Mon, 20 Oct 2014 15:36:32 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20141020133632.GA13119@tansi.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1f99e52cf8115c362d80163f96abf45a.squirrel@ssl.verfeiert.org>
On Mon, Oct 20, 2014 at 12:09:32 CEST, Sven Eschenberg wrote:
> On Mon, October 20, 2014 00:10, Arno Wagner wrote:
> > On Sun, Oct 19, 2014 at 22:59:21 CEST, Cpp wrote:
> >> On 10/19/14, Arno Wagner <arno@wagner.name> wrote:
> >> > Actually, it has a pretty good chance of working well. Once.
> >> > And if it is not too obvious and nowhere documented that the
> >> > attacker can get at beforehand.
> >>
> >> So basically if a device like this is meant to be used and distributed
> >> widely, one security requirement would be that each and every device
> >> uses a custom anti-tampering circuitry setup so that no two setups are
> >> identical. After one device has been compromised, a new custom setup
> >> has to be made, possibly at a new location.
> >
> > For DIY, yes. Commercial HSMs have another protection, namely
> > they are priced at EUR 50k+. That discourages most attackers from
> > buying a few to leant how to break into them.
> >
>
> Would an attacker really spent 50k+ or would he/she spend 10% of that to
> break into the company building the HSM? Or even less pricier, break
> 'into' one or more employees?
I think you have no idea what professional, traceless B&E costs
for companies secured like this, if it is possible at all. And
then all you would be able to steal is some encrypted data.
And the Employee? You first need to find one that has the required
knowledge and that you can make sure will not talk to his employer.
Sorry, but that does not sound like a valid approach at all.
Arno
--
Arno Wagner, Dr. sc. techn., Dipl. Inform., Email: arno@wagner.name
GnuPG: ID: CB5D9718 FP: 12D6 C03B 1B30 33BB 13CF B774 E35C 5FA1 CB5D 9718
----
A good decision is based on knowledge and not on numbers. -- Plato
If it's in the news, don't worry about it. The very definition of
"news" is "something that hardly ever happens." -- Bruce Schneier
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-10-20 13:36 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-10-14 11:42 [dm-crypt] LUKS disk encryption with remote boot authentication Cpp
2014-10-14 12:42 ` Ralf Ramsauer
2014-10-14 13:12 ` Arno Wagner
2014-10-14 21:16 ` Jonas Meurer
2014-10-14 21:51 ` Arno Wagner
2014-10-15 6:49 ` Cpp
2014-10-15 11:37 ` Sam Rakowski
2014-10-17 23:47 ` Alex Elsayed
2014-10-17 23:51 ` Alex Elsayed
2014-10-18 3:37 ` Arno Wagner
2014-10-19 19:13 ` Cpp
2014-10-19 19:40 ` Ralf Ramsauer
2014-10-19 20:12 ` Arno Wagner
2014-10-19 20:59 ` Cpp
2014-10-19 22:10 ` Arno Wagner
2014-10-20 10:09 ` Sven Eschenberg
2014-10-20 13:36 ` Arno Wagner [this message]
2014-10-21 4:37 ` Alex Elsayed
2014-10-21 10:01 ` Sven Eschenberg
2014-10-21 13:46 ` Arno Wagner
2014-10-21 14:50 ` Sven Eschenberg
2014-10-21 16:18 ` Arno Wagner
2014-10-21 13:42 ` Arno Wagner
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