From: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
To: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com>,
DaeSeok Youn <daeseok.youn@gmail.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
vdavydov@parallels.com, Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] [RFC] Deter exploit bruteforcing
Date: Fri, 2 Jan 2015 23:29:36 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20150102222936.GA29018@amd> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <54A7103E.6020500@nod.at>
On Fri 2015-01-02 22:40:14, Richard Weinberger wrote:
> Am 02.01.2015 um 20:46 schrieb Pavel Machek:
> >>> Does this break trinity, crashme, and similar programs?
> >>
> >> If they fork() without execve() and a child dies very fast the next fork()
> >> will be throttled.
> >> This is why I'd like to make this feature disabled by default.
> >>
> >>> Can you detect it died due to the stack canary? Then, the patch might
> >>> be actually acceptable.
> >>
> >> I don't think so as this is glibc specific.
> >
> > Can the slowdown be impelmented in glibc, then?
>
> glibc has a lot of asserts where it can detect stack smashing and kills the
> current process using abort(). Here it could of course also call
> sleep().
Please do it in glibc, then.
> > If not, can glibc provide enough information to the kernel to allow us
> > to do the right thing?
>
> IMHO we should not strictly focus on the stack canary.
IMO we should. We want it enabled by default.
Pavel
--
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-01-02 22:29 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-12-24 21:39 [PATCH] [RFC] Deter exploit bruteforcing Richard Weinberger
2014-12-30 18:40 ` Kees Cook
2014-12-30 18:49 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-30 18:50 ` Richard Weinberger
2015-01-02 5:11 ` Pavel Machek
2015-01-02 11:00 ` Richard Weinberger
2015-01-02 19:46 ` Pavel Machek
2015-01-02 21:40 ` Richard Weinberger
2015-01-02 22:29 ` Pavel Machek [this message]
2015-01-02 22:32 ` Jiri Kosina
2015-01-02 22:46 ` Pavel Machek
2015-01-02 22:49 ` Jiri Kosina
2015-01-02 22:53 ` Jiri Kosina
2015-01-02 22:54 ` Pavel Machek
2015-01-02 23:00 ` Richard Weinberger
2015-01-02 23:08 ` Pavel Machek
2015-01-03 9:45 ` Richard Weinberger
2015-01-03 22:36 ` Pavel Machek
2015-01-03 22:44 ` Richard Weinberger
2015-01-03 23:01 ` Pavel Machek
2015-01-03 23:07 ` Richard Weinberger
2015-01-03 23:06 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-01-03 23:19 ` Richard Weinberger
2015-01-05 22:56 ` Kees Cook
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