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From: "Daniel P. Berrange" <berrange@redhat.com>
To: Marcel Apfelbaum <marcel@redhat.com>
Cc: Marcel Apfelbaum <marcel.a@redhat.com>,
	quintela@redhat.com,
	"Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>,
	qemu-devel@nongnu.org, amit.shah@redhat.com,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [Qemu-devel] RFC: Universal encryption on QEMU I/O channels
Date: Wed, 4 Feb 2015 14:50:53 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20150204145053.GW3032@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <54D2314C.7010501@redhat.com>

On Wed, Feb 04, 2015 at 04:48:44PM +0200, Marcel Apfelbaum wrote:
> On 02/04/2015 04:28 PM, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> >
> >
> >On 04/02/2015 15:02, Daniel P. Berrange wrote:
> >>>I'm not sure if it makes sense for RDMA; it already has a couple of hooks
> >>>that go around the back of QEMUFile in migration, and it's transferring the
> >>>data via DMA so the page data doesn't go through the same path.
> >>
> >>Could you ever anticipate any need for authentication or encryption in
> >>the RDMA based channel ? I don't know enough about RDMA myself to know
> >>if it makes sense or not, other than the fact that any channel between
> >>two separate hosts needs security at some level in the stack.
> >
> >Authentication, possibly; but I don't think encryption makes sense.  Marcel?
> I personally think that the protocol is safe enough, but as always there are holes
> and I am not a security expert:
> 
>     "RDMA mechanisms can create a potential security vulnerability. A node may access another nodes
>      memory region that was supposed to be banned.
>      In order to protect remote memory access to unauthorized memory areas, InfiniBand defines memory
>      protection mechanisms, where a remote memory access requires a special key (R_Key). The R_Key is
>      negotiated between the peers and is validated at the target’s system HCA card. In case of illegal key the
>      packet is dropped. The R_Key requirement is built into silicon and driver code and cannot be disabled
>      even when attacker compromises root/admin/superuser account on one or multiple servers."
> 
> More on Layer 2 attacks and how Infiniband handle those:
>     http://www.mellanox.com/related-docs/whitepapers/WP_Secuirty_In_InfiniBand_Fabrics_Final.pdf
>

Ok I guess we could probably just assume RDMA is sufficient as is for now.
We can fairly easily revisit it later if we find it it needs more work

Regards,
Daniel
-- 
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  reply	other threads:[~2015-02-04 14:51 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-02-04 11:32 [Qemu-devel] RFC: Universal encryption on QEMU I/O channels Daniel P. Berrange
2015-02-04 12:43 ` Paolo Bonzini
2015-02-04 13:00   ` Daniel P. Berrange
2015-02-04 13:42     ` Paolo Bonzini
2015-02-04 14:08       ` Daniel P. Berrange
2015-02-04 14:23         ` Paolo Bonzini
2015-02-04 14:34           ` Daniel P. Berrange
2015-02-04 15:04             ` Paolo Bonzini
2015-02-04 15:11               ` Daniel P. Berrange
2015-02-04 15:22                 ` Paolo Bonzini
2015-02-04 15:26                   ` Daniel P. Berrange
2015-02-04 16:46                     ` Paolo Bonzini
2015-02-05 14:38       ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2015-02-05 14:44         ` Cornelia Huck
2015-02-05 14:45         ` Peter Maydell
2015-02-04 13:49     ` Markus Armbruster
2015-02-04 13:55       ` Peter Maydell
2015-02-04 16:33         ` Markus Armbruster
2015-02-04 16:41           ` Daniel P. Berrange
2015-02-04 20:41           ` Peter Maydell
2015-02-04 21:06             ` Paolo Bonzini
2015-02-05  7:57             ` Markus Armbruster
2015-02-04 13:08 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2015-02-04 14:02   ` Daniel P. Berrange
2015-02-04 14:28     ` Paolo Bonzini
2015-02-04 14:48       ` Marcel Apfelbaum
2015-02-04 14:50         ` Daniel P. Berrange [this message]
2015-02-04 18:34     ` Eric Blake
2015-02-05  9:11       ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2015-02-04 14:27   ` Paolo Bonzini
2015-02-04 14:37     ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2015-03-06 17:18 ` Daniel P. Berrange

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