All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Arno Wagner <arno@wagner.name>
To: dm-crypt@saout.de
Subject: Re: [dm-crypt] Using a removable-device-recorded passphrase to decrypt a system
Date: Sat, 27 Jun 2015 01:06:00 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20150626230600.GA18785@tansi.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1638e76a6b55aec08157088393e451c0.squirrel@ssl.verfeiert.org>

On Fri, Jun 26, 2015 at 15:53:01 CEST, Sven Eschenberg wrote:
> On Fri, June 26, 2015 15:19, Arno Wagner wrote:
[...]
> > - I have no idea whether locked memory can end up in a
> >   core-dump, but usually these are disabled anyways.
> 
> There certainly is a debug option to get coredumps including locked pages,
> I presume.

I would expect so as well. But debugging is not a concern IMO,
unless it is too easy to leace on accidentally.

> > - In-kernel keys are protected against leaking to disk.
> 
> Again, I presume, since I did not check the kernel's source, that the
> relevant kernel pages are marked as unswappable. I guess when you dump the
> kernel for debugging you'll get the locked pages aswell - Doesn't make to
> much sense if all locked pages are missing from the dump.
> 
> >
> > The thing is, system encryption is not easy to do and conceptually
> > does not help a lot. If it was necessary to prevent having
> > passphrases/keys to disk, that would be a major security flaw
> > in the handling of said passphrases/keys and it would affect
> > other things as well, like GnuPG, OpenSSL, etc. and so I hope
> > somebody would have complained by now if that was a real issue.
> 
> It is quite difficult to i.e. encrypt /etc (which might include
> passphrases for services or something) by it's own, so doing a system
> encryption is quite tempting. Otherwhise you'll have to relocate specific
> files from /etc to other places and maintain a pile of config changes,
> which can be quite an effort aswell.

Well, yes. It is a trade-off that depends on the specific situation 
and distribution. Personally, I avoid putting credentials into /etc,
but I do have some in my home, mostly ssh-keys allowing passwordless
logins.

I do realize this will not always be possible.

Gr"usse,
Arno
-- 
Arno Wagner,     Dr. sc. techn., Dipl. Inform.,    Email: arno@wagner.name
GnuPG: ID: CB5D9718  FP: 12D6 C03B 1B30 33BB 13CF  B774 E35C 5FA1 CB5D 9718
----
A good decision is based on knowledge and not on numbers. -- Plato

If it's in the news, don't worry about it.  The very definition of 
"news" is "something that hardly ever happens." -- Bruce Schneier

  reply	other threads:[~2015-06-26 23:06 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-06-25 14:57 [dm-crypt] Using a removable-device-recorded passphrase to decrypt a system Arbiel (gmx)
2015-06-26 12:30 ` Arno Wagner
2015-06-26 12:59   ` Heinz Diehl
2015-06-26 13:19     ` Arno Wagner
2015-06-26 13:53       ` Sven Eschenberg
2015-06-26 23:06         ` Arno Wagner [this message]
2015-06-26 14:00   ` Sven Eschenberg

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20150626230600.GA18785@tansi.org \
    --to=arno@wagner.name \
    --cc=dm-crypt@saout.de \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.