From: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
To: Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>,
Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>,
Olivier Mauras <olivier@mauras.ch>,
PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Subject: Re: List corruption on epoll_ctl(EPOLL_CTL_DEL) an AF_UNIX socket
Date: Tue, 15 Sep 2015 20:15:40 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20150915181540.GA14826@jig.fritz.box> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <878u87ipc6.fsf@doppelsaurus.mobileactivedefense.com>
On Tue, Sep 15, 2015 at 06:07:05PM +0100, Rainer Weikusat wrote:
> --- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
> +++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
> <at> <at> -2233,10 +2233,14 <at> <at> static unsigned int unix_dgram_poll(struct file *file, struct socket *sock,
> writable = unix_writable(sk);
> other = unix_peer_get(sk);
> if (other) {
> - if (unix_peer(other) != sk) {
> + unix_state_lock(other);
> + if (!sock_flag(other, SOCK_DEAD) && unix_peer(other) != sk) {
> + unix_state_unlock(other);
> sock_poll_wait(file, &unix_sk(other)->peer_wait, wait);
> if (unix_recvq_full(other))
> writable = 0;
> + } else {
> + unix_state_unlock(other);
> }
> sock_put(other);
> }
>
> That's obviously not going to help you when 'racing with
> unix_release_sock' as the socket might be released immediately after the
> unix_state_unlock, ie, before sock_poll_wait is called. Provided I
> understand this correctly, the problem is that the socket reference
> count may have become 1 by the time sock_put is called but the
> sock_poll_wait has created a new reference to it which isn't accounted
> for.
>
> A simple way to fix that could be to do something like
>
> unix_state_lock(other);
> if (!sock_flag(other, SOCK_DEAD)) sock_poll_wait(...)
> unix_state_unlock(other);
Sorry, but that does not fix the bug. I get the same GPF as before.
> This would imply that unix_release_sock either marked the socket as dead
> before the sock_poll_wait was executed or that the wake_up_interruptible
> call in there will run after ->peer_wait was used (and it will thus
> 'unpollwait' it again).
It must be something else as I also tried the following patch, which
moves the wake_up_interruptible_all() call into the locked code section:
diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index 03ee4d359f6a..58570a7680ce 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -360,10 +360,12 @@ static void unix_dgram_disconnected(struct sock *sk, struct sock *other)
* we signal error. Messages are lost. Do not make this,
* when peer was not connected to us.
*/
+ unix_state_lock(other);
if (!sock_flag(other, SOCK_DEAD) && unix_peer(other) == sk) {
other->sk_err = ECONNRESET;
other->sk_error_report(other);
}
+ unix_state_unlock(other);
}
}
@@ -413,11 +415,13 @@ static void unix_release_sock(struct sock *sk, int embrion)
u->path.mnt = NULL;
state = sk->sk_state;
sk->sk_state = TCP_CLOSE;
- unix_state_unlock(sk);
-
- wake_up_interruptible_all(&u->peer_wait);
skpair = unix_peer(sk);
+ unix_peer(sk) = NULL;
+
+ wake_up_interruptible_all(&u->peer_wait);
+
+ unix_state_unlock(sk);
if (skpair != NULL) {
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM || sk->sk_type == SOCK_SEQPACKET) {
@@ -431,7 +435,6 @@ static void unix_release_sock(struct sock *sk, int embrion)
sk_wake_async(skpair, SOCK_WAKE_WAITD, POLL_HUP);
}
sock_put(skpair); /* It may now die */
- unix_peer(sk) = NULL;
}
/* Try to flush out this socket. Throw out buffers at least */
@@ -2440,10 +2443,18 @@ static unsigned int unix_dgram_poll(struct file *file, struct socket *sock,
writable = unix_writable(sk);
other = unix_peer_get(sk);
if (other) {
- if (unix_peer(other) != sk) {
+ unix_state_lock(other);
+
+ if (sock_flag(other, SOCK_DEAD) || (other->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN)) {
+ unix_state_unlock(other);
+ writable = 0;
+ } else if (unix_peer(other) != sk) {
sock_poll_wait(file, &unix_sk(other)->peer_wait, wait);
+ unix_state_unlock(other);
if (unix_recvq_full(other))
writable = 0;
+ } else {
+ unix_state_unlock(other);
}
sock_put(other);
}
prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-09-15 18:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-09-13 19:53 List corruption on epoll_ctl(EPOLL_CTL_DEL) an AF_UNIX socket Mathias Krause
2015-09-14 2:39 ` Eric Wong
2015-09-29 18:09 ` Mathias Krause
2015-09-29 19:09 ` Jason Baron
2015-09-30 5:54 ` Mathias Krause
2015-09-30 7:34 ` Michal Kubecek
2015-10-01 2:55 ` Jason Baron
2015-09-30 10:56 ` Rainer Weikusat
2015-09-30 11:55 ` Mathias Krause
2015-09-30 13:25 ` Rainer Weikusat
2015-09-30 13:38 ` Mathias Krause
2015-09-30 13:51 ` Rainer Weikusat
2015-10-01 2:39 ` Jason Baron
2015-10-01 10:33 ` Rainer Weikusat
2015-10-01 12:10 ` Rainer Weikusat
2015-10-01 12:58 ` Rainer Weikusat
2015-09-15 17:07 ` Rainer Weikusat
2015-09-15 18:15 ` Mathias Krause [this message]
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