From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1752527AbbJMTtX (ORCPT ); Tue, 13 Oct 2015 15:49:23 -0400 Received: from mga09.intel.com ([134.134.136.24]:56217 "EHLO mga09.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751529AbbJMTtV (ORCPT ); Tue, 13 Oct 2015 15:49:21 -0400 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.17,679,1437462000"; d="scan'208";a="663662186" Date: Tue, 13 Oct 2015 22:49:15 +0300 From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: Jason Gunthorpe Cc: tpmdd-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, peterhuewe@gmx.de, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org, mjg59@srcf.ucam.org, Marcel Selhorst , David Safford , Mimi Zohar , David Howells , "open list:KEYS-TRUSTED" , "open list:KEYS-TRUSTED" Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/4] tpm: seal/unseal for TPM 2.0 Message-ID: <20151013194915.GB3669@intel.com> References: <1443775102-9727-1-git-send-email-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> <1443775102-9727-4-git-send-email-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> <20151013173442.GB22160@obsidianresearch.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20151013173442.GB22160@obsidianresearch.com> Organization: Intel Finland Oy - BIC 0357606-4 - Westendinkatu 7, 02160 Espoo User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.23 (2014-03-12) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 11:34:42AM -0600, Jason Gunthorpe wrote: > On Fri, Oct 02, 2015 at 11:38:17AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > Added tpm_trusted_seal() and tpm_trusted_unseal() API for sealing > > trusted keys. > > > > This patch implements basic sealing and unsealing functionality for > > TPM 2.0: > > We really need to stop using chip id's as a handle - the caller should > be using a pointer, it is just a horrible API, and the TPM_ANY_NUM > business is awful too.. TPM's are stateful devices! Eventually this needs to be refactored out. I don't see it in the scope of these patches or as high priority ATM. > Is it feasible to introduce new APIs with a saner scheme? > > The api layering also seems really weird to me. At a minimum the > tpm_seal_trusted should be called within key_seal, but really, should > key_seal be migrated into the TPM core? I'm not sure it makes alot of > sense to have a tpm_seal_trusted which uses the high level key structs > when other tpm functions are all low level RPC wrappers... I think tpm_seal() inside trusted.c is not a very good API. It takes the ad hoc version of the structs given to key_seal from stack. I don't see a problem here. My viewpoint has been that key_seal/unseal in trusted.c should be refactored out and TPM1 implementations seal/unseal should be moved to the TPM subsystem. There's so little amount of in-kernel low-level TPM code that IMHO it makes sense to keep in one place (as are all the other TPM utility functions). I can work on the TPM1 migration when we have the basic TPM2 stuff in place. > Jason /Jakrkko