From: Yuanhan Liu <yuanhan.liu@linux.intel.com>
To: "Xie, Huawei" <huawei.xie@intel.com>
Cc: "dev@dpdk.org" <dev@dpdk.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] vhost: avoid buffer overflow in update_secure_len
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2015 16:48:07 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20151118084807.GD2326@yliu-dev.sh.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <C37D651A908B024F974696C65296B57B4B196B26@SHSMSX101.ccr.corp.intel.com>
On Wed, Nov 18, 2015 at 07:53:24AM +0000, Xie, Huawei wrote:
...
> > do {
> > + if (vec_id >= BUF_VECTOR_MAX)
> > + break;
> > +
> > next_desc = 0;
> > len += vq->desc[idx].len;
> > vq->buf_vec[vec_id].buf_addr = vq->desc[idx].addr;
> > @@ -519,6 +526,8 @@ virtio_dev_merge_rx(struct virtio_net *dev, uint16_t queue_id,
> > goto merge_rx_exit;
> > } else {
> > update_secure_len(vq, res_cur_idx, &secure_len, &vec_idx);
> > + if (secure_len == 0)
> > + goto merge_rx_exit;
> Why do we exit when secure_len is 0 rather than 1? :). Malicious guest
I confess it's not a proper fix. Making it return an error code, as Rich
suggested in early email, is better. It's generic enough, as we have to
check the vec_buf overflow here.
BTW, can we move the vec_buf outside `struct vhost_virtqueue'? It makes
the structure huge.
> could easily forge the desc len so that secure_len never reach pkt_len
> even it is not zero so that host enters into dead loop here.
> Generally speaking, we shouldn't fix for a specific issue,
Agreed.
> and the
> security checks should be as few as possible.
Idealy, yes.
> We need to consider
> refactor the code here for the generic fix.
What's your thougths?
--yliu
>
> > res_cur_idx++;
> > }
> > } while (pkt_len > secure_len);
> > @@ -631,6 +640,8 @@ rte_vhost_dequeue_burst(struct virtio_net *dev, uint16_t queue_id,
> > uint8_t alloc_err = 0;
> >
> > desc = &vq->desc[head[entry_success]];
> > + if (desc->len == 0)
> > + break;
> >
> > /* Discard first buffer as it is the virtio header */
> > if (desc->flags & VRING_DESC_F_NEXT) {
> > @@ -638,6 +649,8 @@ rte_vhost_dequeue_burst(struct virtio_net *dev, uint16_t queue_id,
> > vb_offset = 0;
> > vb_avail = desc->len;
> > } else {
> > + if (desc->len < vq->vhost_hlen)
> > + break;
> > vb_offset = vq->vhost_hlen;
> > vb_avail = desc->len - vb_offset;
> > }
> >
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-11-18 8:47 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-11-12 8:02 [PATCH] vhost: avoid buffer overflow in update_secure_len Rich Lane
2015-11-12 9:23 ` Yuanhan Liu
2015-11-12 21:46 ` Rich Lane
2015-11-17 13:23 ` Yuanhan Liu
2015-11-17 16:39 ` Rich Lane
2015-11-18 2:56 ` Yuanhan Liu
2015-11-18 5:23 ` Wang, Zhihong
2015-11-18 5:26 ` Rich Lane
2015-11-18 5:32 ` Yuanhan Liu
2015-11-18 6:13 ` Xie, Huawei
2015-11-18 6:25 ` Yuanhan Liu
2015-11-18 8:13 ` Xie, Huawei
2015-11-18 15:53 ` Stephen Hemminger
2015-11-18 16:00 ` Xie, Huawei
2015-11-18 7:53 ` Xie, Huawei
2015-11-18 8:48 ` Yuanhan Liu [this message]
2015-11-18 11:15 ` Xie, Huawei
2015-11-19 5:51 ` Yuanhan Liu
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