From: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: "Al Viro" <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
"Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
"Richard Weinberger" <richard@nod.at>,
"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@amacapital.net>,
"Robert Święcki" <robert@swiecki.net>,
"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>,
"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
"Miklos Szeredi" <mszeredi@suse.cz>,
"Kostya Serebryany" <kcc@google.com>,
"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
"Eric Dumazet" <edumazet@google.com>,
"Sasha Levin" <sasha.levin@oracle.com>,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 1/2] sysctl: expand use of proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin
Date: Sun, 24 Jan 2016 07:32:29 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160124063229.GA21717@pc.thejh.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87wpqzv7jy.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org>
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On Sun, Jan 24, 2016 at 12:02:41AM -0600, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> writes:
>
> > On Sun, Jan 24, 2016 at 01:43:42AM +0000, Al Viro wrote:
> >> On Sat, Jan 23, 2016 at 07:20:17PM -0600, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> >>
> >> > Yep. That is about the size of it. file * used to be passed to the
> >> > sysctl methods but it was removed several years ago because no one was
> >> > using it.
> >>
> >> Generally cred would be better...
> >
> >> Alternatively we could eat one more
> >> pointer in task_struct and stash a reference to that sucker there, rather
> >> than adding an explicit argument (again, with cred instead of file).
> >> Not sure...
> >
> > I think it makes sense to do this the same way as the rest of the VFS code
> > here (which passes the creds down through an argument).
> >
> > And adding the arguments everywhere doesn't really mean more work - either
> > way, someone should probably go through all of those sysctl handlers and
> > fix them up to use the file creds.
>
> Not all of them need it. It might be worth figuring out the necessary
> rigamarole to hook into sysctl_perm the way the networking code does and
> have that require the capability at open time.
>
> The advantage is that open time is when it is actually appropraite to
> check permissions. I could be wrong but I doubt there is enough madness
> with the handful of sysctl users that call capable to require the checks
> to happen on write and not on open.
That would work - if all sysctls know whether a capability will be needed
for writing later on and don't decide it based on the written data. Is that
always true?
Looking through some of the sysctl handlers, I found proc_do_uts_string and
pid_ns_ctl_handler, which operate on a namespace looked up through current
at write time. I think that's buggy and ought to be done using the file
opener creds and on the file opener's namespaces, but where can those be
stored?
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-01-24 6:32 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 78+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-01-22 22:39 [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 0/2] sysctl: allow CLONE_NEWUSER to be disabled Kees Cook
2016-01-22 22:39 ` Kees Cook
2016-01-22 22:39 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/2] sysctl: expand use of proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin Kees Cook
2016-01-22 22:39 ` Kees Cook
2016-01-23 3:10 ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric W. Biederman
2016-01-23 3:10 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-01-23 22:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jann Horn
2016-01-24 1:20 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-01-24 1:43 ` Al Viro
2016-01-24 1:56 ` Jann Horn
2016-01-24 6:02 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-01-24 6:32 ` Jann Horn [this message]
2016-01-24 6:44 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-01-22 22:39 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/2] sysctl: allow CLONE_NEWUSER to be disabled Kees Cook
2016-01-22 22:39 ` Kees Cook
2016-01-22 22:47 ` [kernel-hardening] " Robert Święcki
2016-01-22 22:47 ` Robert Święcki
2016-01-22 22:50 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-01-22 22:50 ` Kees Cook
2016-01-22 22:55 ` [kernel-hardening] " Robert Święcki
2016-01-22 22:55 ` Robert Święcki
2016-01-22 23:00 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-01-22 23:00 ` Kees Cook
2016-01-23 0:44 ` [kernel-hardening] " Serge Hallyn
2016-01-23 0:44 ` Serge Hallyn
2016-01-23 0:44 ` [kernel-hardening] " Serge Hallyn
2016-01-23 0:44 ` Serge Hallyn
2016-01-23 0:59 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ben Hutchings
2016-01-24 20:59 ` Kees Cook
2016-01-24 22:20 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-01-25 18:51 ` Kees Cook
2016-01-22 22:49 ` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 0/2] " Richard Weinberger
2016-01-22 22:49 ` Richard Weinberger
2016-01-23 3:02 ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric W. Biederman
2016-01-23 3:02 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-01-24 20:57 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-01-24 20:57 ` Kees Cook
2016-01-26 7:38 ` [kernel-hardening] " Serge Hallyn
2016-01-24 22:22 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-01-24 22:22 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-01-25 18:51 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-01-25 18:51 ` Kees Cook
2016-01-25 18:53 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-01-25 18:53 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-01-25 18:56 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-01-25 18:56 ` Kees Cook
2016-01-25 19:33 ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric W. Biederman
2016-01-25 19:33 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-01-25 22:34 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-01-25 22:34 ` Kees Cook
2016-01-25 23:33 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-01-25 23:33 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-01-26 2:27 ` [kernel-hardening] " Daniel Micay
2016-01-26 4:57 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-01-26 4:57 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-01-26 14:38 ` [kernel-hardening] " Josh Boyer
2016-01-26 14:38 ` Josh Boyer
2016-01-26 14:46 ` [kernel-hardening] " Austin S. Hemmelgarn
2016-01-26 14:46 ` Austin S. Hemmelgarn
2016-01-26 14:56 ` [kernel-hardening] " Josh Boyer
2016-01-26 14:56 ` Josh Boyer
2016-01-26 17:20 ` [kernel-hardening] " Serge Hallyn
2016-01-26 19:56 ` Josh Boyer
2016-01-26 20:11 ` Austin S. Hemmelgarn
2016-01-26 17:15 ` Serge Hallyn
2016-01-26 18:09 ` Austin S. Hemmelgarn
2016-01-26 18:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-01-26 18:45 ` Austin S. Hemmelgarn
2016-01-26 23:15 ` Kees Cook
2016-01-26 23:13 ` Kees Cook
2016-01-27 10:27 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-01-27 12:32 ` Austin S. Hemmelgarn
2016-01-28 14:41 ` Robert Święcki
2016-01-26 23:47 ` Josh Boyer
2016-01-26 16:37 ` Kees Cook
2016-01-26 16:37 ` Kees Cook
2016-01-28 8:56 ` [kernel-hardening] " Serge E. Hallyn
2016-01-28 12:53 ` Austin S. Hemmelgarn
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