From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from v6.tansi.org (mail.tansi.org [87.118.116.4]) by mail.server123.net (Postfix) with ESMTP for ; Fri, 5 Feb 2016 22:09:59 +0100 (CET) Received: from gatewagner.dyndns.org (77-57-36-72.dclient.hispeed.ch [77.57.36.72]) by v6.tansi.org (Postfix) with ESMTPA id DD1B420DC530 for ; Fri, 5 Feb 2016 22:09:58 +0100 (CET) Date: Fri, 5 Feb 2016 22:09:58 +0100 From: Arno Wagner Message-ID: <20160205210958.GA2958@tansi.org> References: <1454603376.4241.5.camel@debian.org> <20160204171753.GA20874@tansi.org> <1454653850.3573.2.camel@debian.org> <20160205110232.GD29709@tansi.org> <1454678001.21086.24.camel@debian.org> <20160205133123.GA31320@tansi.org> <1454684474.21086.30.camel@debian.org> <20160205152440.GC32199@tansi.org> <1454691014.21086.37.camel@debian.org> <20160205195344.GB2073@tansi.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit In-Reply-To: <20160205195344.GB2073@tansi.org> Subject: Re: [dm-crypt] The future of disk encryption with LUKS2 List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , To: dm-crypt@saout.de On Fri, Feb 05, 2016 at 20:53:44 CET, Arno Wagner wrote: > On Fri, Feb 05, 2016 at 17:50:14 CET, Yves-Alexis Perez wrote: > > On ven., 2016-02-05 at 16:24 +0100, Arno Wagner wrote: > > > Then why are you asking about integrity protection on a list > > > dedicated to a block-layer encryption system? That does not make > > > any sense. If you state things that do not make sense then I > > > will point that out, because there is a real possibility that > > > your reasoning process (I am not implying there was none) was  > > > flawed.  > > > > > Because integrity protection *does* make sense on block layer encryption? > > The fact that you don't have a 1:1 mapping is indeed an issue, and that's > > why I was asking in the context of the LUKS2 thread (where supposedly new > > ideas could be thrown), because solving the involved challenges would be > > useful in the context of dm-crypt. I think. You could store all ICV in a > > specific place in the block device, or have one block of ICVs every once > > in a while, or something else. It'd involve some clever calculation > > indeed but it might be doable. > > > > But I can perfectly understand if it's not something which interest > > developers here, and I can perfectly take “no” as an answer :) > > Well, as they plan to *experiment* with it anyways (and I assume > "they" will be the dm-crypt people), we will see how viable it is. > > > > > > And second, who says anything abot the "evil maid" changing > > > > > things in the encrypted container? > > > >  > > > > I'm not following you here. > > > > > > Attacks on hardware, replacement of the disk with something that > > > attacks the boot process, Firewire, USB, etc. vulnerabilities,  > > > changes in non-encrypted areas, etc. > > > > > This is about your external disk drive or usb where you put data on it. > > This is not about boot integrity or something, really. > > I am well aware of that. Have a look at what types of "evil maid" > attacks are possible today. If somebody competent had access to > your storage device, chances are they will be able to successfully > attack the next machine you plug it into. Sure, may be expensive, > may take hardware modification, but do not think just because it > is "only" a storage device it is always safe to plug it into a > computer. > > Regards, > Arno P.S. Also, I apologize, I think I over-reacted. Regards, Arno -- Arno Wagner, Dr. sc. techn., Dipl. Inform., Email: arno@wagner.name GnuPG: ID: CB5D9718 FP: 12D6 C03B 1B30 33BB 13CF B774 E35C 5FA1 CB5D 9718 ---- A good decision is based on knowledge and not on numbers. -- Plato If it's in the news, don't worry about it. The very definition of "news" is "something that hardly ever happens." -- Bruce Schneier