From: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
To: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>,
stable@vger.kernel.org, linux-rdma@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] IB/security: restrict use of the write() interface
Date: Fri, 20 May 2016 22:32:21 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160521053221.GA4771@kroah.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160518204012.GA4268@whence.com>
On Wed, May 18, 2016 at 01:40:13PM -0700, Kamal Mostafa wrote:
> On Wed, May 18, 2016 at 12:46:11PM -0400, Doug Ledford wrote:
> > Upstream commit e6bd18f57aad (IB/security: Restrict use of the write()
> > interface) handled the cases for all drivers in the current upstream
> > kernel. The ipath driver had recently been deprecated and moved to
> > staging, and then removed entirely. It had the same security flaw as
> > the qib driver. Fix that up with this separate patch.
> >
> > Note: The ipath driver only supports hardware that ended production
> > over 10 years ago, so there should be none of this hardware still
> > present in the wild.
> >
> > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4.x
> > Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
> > ---
> > drivers/staging/rdma/ipath/ipath_file_ops.c | 5 +++++
> > 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/drivers/staging/rdma/ipath/ipath_file_ops.c b/drivers/staging/rdma/ipath/ipath_file_ops.c
> > index 13c3cd11ab92..f237a2e2a086 100644
> > --- a/drivers/staging/rdma/ipath/ipath_file_ops.c
> > +++ b/drivers/staging/rdma/ipath/ipath_file_ops.c
> > @@ -45,6 +45,8 @@
> > #include <linux/uio.h>
> > #include <asm/pgtable.h>
> >
> > +#include <rdma/ib.h>
> > +
> > #include "ipath_kernel.h"
> > #include "ipath_common.h"
> > #include "ipath_user_sdma.h"
> > @@ -2243,6 +2245,9 @@ static ssize_t ipath_write(struct file *fp, const char __user *data,
> > ssize_t ret = 0;
> > void *dest;
> >
> > + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!ib_safe_file_access(fp)))
> > + return -EACCESS;
>
> This needs to be "EACCES" (one fewer 'S').
And so goes the "if it isn't in Linus's tree, and it is asked to be
merged into -stable, it is almost always wrong" proof :(
Doug, why did you send these if you didn't even build them? Because of
that, I _know_ you didn't test them, how do I know these are safe to
apply?
ugh.
greg k-h
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-05-21 5:32 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-05-18 16:46 [PATCH] IB/security: restrict use of the write() interface Doug Ledford
2016-05-18 20:40 ` Kamal Mostafa
2016-05-21 5:32 ` Greg KH [this message]
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2016-05-18 16:58 [PATCH] IB/security: Restrict " Doug Ledford
[not found] ` <02bf2ebafbc5d757c0d250d8e5fba3ebdc7393fd.1463590718.git.dledford-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2016-05-18 17:20 ` Greg KH
2016-05-18 17:20 ` Greg KH
2016-05-18 17:57 ` Doug Ledford
2016-05-18 18:59 ` Or Gerlitz
2016-05-18 19:05 ` Doug Ledford
2016-05-18 19:47 ` Or Gerlitz
2016-05-18 19:59 ` Doug Ledford
2016-05-18 20:36 ` Or Gerlitz
2016-05-18 21:42 ` Doug Ledford
2016-05-18 16:41 [PATCH] IB/security: restrict " Doug Ledford
2016-05-18 16:41 ` Doug Ledford
2016-05-18 20:42 ` Kamal Mostafa
2016-05-18 21:40 ` Doug Ledford
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20160521053221.GA4771@kroah.com \
--to=greg@kroah.com \
--cc=dledford@redhat.com \
--cc=kamal@canonical.com \
--cc=linux-rdma@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.