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Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2016 22:41:49 +0200
From: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>,
        Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>,
        Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>, Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>,
        Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
        Daniel Cashman <dcashman@google.com>,
        Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>,
        "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
        Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] kernel/sysctl.c: avoid overflow
Message-ID: <20160614204149.GA2723@1wt.eu>
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On Tue, Jun 14, 2016 at 01:19:06PM -0700, Andrew Morton wrote:
> On Sat, 11 Jun 2016 03:33:08 +0200 Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de> wrote:
> 
> > An undetected overflow may occur in do_proc_dointvec_minmax_conv_param.
> > 
> > ...
> >
> > --- a/kernel/sysctl.c
> > +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
> > @@ -2313,7 +2313,17 @@ static int do_proc_dointvec_minmax_conv(bool *negp, unsigned long *lvalp,
> >  {
> >  	struct do_proc_dointvec_minmax_conv_param *param = data;
> >  	if (write) {
> > -		int val = *negp ? -*lvalp : *lvalp;
> > +		int val;
> > +
> > +		if (*negp) {
> > +			if (*lvalp > (unsigned long) INT_MAX + 1)
> > +				return -EINVAL;
> > +			val = -*lvalp;
> > +		} else {
> > +			if (*lvalp > (unsigned long) INT_MAX)
> > +				return -EINVAL;
> > +			val = *lvalp;
> > +		}
> >  		if ((param->min && *param->min > val) ||
> >  		    (param->max && *param->max < val))
> >  			return -EINVAL;
> 
> hm.
> 
> What happens if someone does
> 
> 	echo -1 > /proc/foo
> 
> expecting to get 0xffffffff?  That's a reasonable shorthand, and if we
> change that to spit out EINVAL then people's stuff may break.

I'd go even further, I don't see anymore how it becomes possible
to actually *write* 0xffffffff at all! This function is used by
proc_dointvec_minmax() which is used with extra1=&zero and extra2
not set with some unsigned ints to allow the full range to be
configured (eg: dirty_expire_interval is the first I found by a
quick random look).

So for me this change is bogus.

Willy