From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
"linux-doc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/2] security,perf: Allow further restriction of perf_event_open
Date: Fri, 17 Jun 2016 08:54:27 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160617065427.GL30154@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5j+D00zz7dVPX4LpW41Gk=m7G_h25vZgOyYdVbW+wyvj6Q@mail.gmail.com>
On Thu, Jun 16, 2016 at 03:27:55PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> Hi guys,
>
> This patch wasn't originally CCed to you (I'm fixing that now). Would
> you consider taking this into the perf tree?
No.
> It's been in active use
> in both Debian and Android for a while now.
Very nice of you all to finally inform us I suppose :/
> >>> When kernel.perf_event_open is set to 3 (or greater), disallow all
> >>> access to performance events by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
> >>> Add a Kconfig symbol CONFIG_SECURITY_PERF_EVENTS_RESTRICT that
> >>> makes this value the default.
> >>>
> >>> This is based on a similar feature in grsecurity
> >>> (CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PERF_HARDEN). This version doesn't include making
> >>> the variable read-only. It also allows enabling further restriction
> >>> at run-time regardless of whether the default is changed.
This Changelog is completely devoid of information. _WHY_ are you doing
this?
Also, hate the CONFIG.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-06-17 6:54 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-01-11 15:19 [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 0/2] Document and extend kernel.perf_event_paranoid Ben Hutchings
2016-01-11 15:19 ` Ben Hutchings
2016-01-11 15:21 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/2] Documentation,perf: Document the perf sysctls Ben Hutchings
2016-01-11 15:21 ` Ben Hutchings
2016-01-11 15:23 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/2] security,perf: Allow further restriction of perf_event_open Ben Hutchings
2016-01-11 15:23 ` Ben Hutchings
2016-04-13 16:12 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-06-04 20:49 ` Jeffrey Vander Stoep
2016-06-16 22:27 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-17 6:54 ` Peter Zijlstra [this message]
2016-06-17 16:16 ` Daniel Micay
2016-06-17 20:00 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2016-06-18 0:51 ` Daniel Micay
2016-06-04 20:56 ` Jeffrey Vander Stoep
2016-06-17 5:56 ` [kernel-hardening] " Alexander Shishkin
2016-06-17 5:56 ` Alexander Shishkin
2016-06-17 12:18 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ben Hutchings
2016-06-17 12:18 ` Ben Hutchings
2016-06-17 15:24 ` [kernel-hardening] " Daniel Micay
2016-01-19 21:35 ` [PATCH RESEND] perf: Document the perf sysctls Ben Hutchings
2016-01-21 14:25 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2016-02-03 10:08 ` [tip:perf/core] perf tools: " tip-bot for Ben Hutchings
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