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From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
To: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
	Linux Kernel Developers List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, andi@firstfloor.org,
	sandyinchina@gmail.com, jsd@av8n.com, hpa@zytor.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 5/7] random: replace non-blocking pool with a Chacha20-based CRNG
Date: Mon, 20 Jun 2016 19:48:19 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160620234819.GF9848@thunk.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <2101992.L9gKN5cFdv@tauon.atsec.com>

On Mon, Jun 20, 2016 at 05:49:17PM +0200, Stephan Mueller wrote:
> 
> Is speed everything we should care about? What about:
> 
> - offloading of crypto operation from the CPU

In practice CPU offland is not helpful, and in fact, in most cases is
harmful, when one is only encrypting a tiny amount of data.  That's
because the cost of setup and teardown, not to mention key scheduling,
dominate.  This is less of the case in the case of the SIMD / AVX
optimizations --- but that's because these are CPU instructions, and
there really isn't any CPU offloading going on.

> - potentially additional security features a hardware cipher may provide like 
> cache coloring attack resistance?

Um.... have you even taken a *look* at how ChaCha20 is implemented?
*What* cache coloring attack is possible at all, period?

Hint: where are the lookup tables?  Where are the data-dependent
memory accesses in the ChaCha20 core?

						- Ted

  parent reply	other threads:[~2016-06-20 23:48 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-06-13 15:48 [PATCH-v4 0/7] random: replace urandom pool with a CRNG Theodore Ts'o
2016-06-13 15:48 ` [PATCH 1/7] random: initialize the non-blocking pool via add_hwgenerator_randomness() Theodore Ts'o
2016-06-13 15:48 ` [PATCH 2/7] random: print a warning for the first ten uninitialized random users Theodore Ts'o
2016-06-13 15:48 ` [PATCH 3/7] random: add interrupt callback to VMBus IRQ handler Theodore Ts'o
2016-06-13 15:48 ` [PATCH 4/7] random: properly align get_random_int_hash Theodore Ts'o
2016-06-13 15:48 ` [PATCH 5/7] random: replace non-blocking pool with a Chacha20-based CRNG Theodore Ts'o
2016-06-13 18:00   ` Stephan Mueller
2016-06-13 19:03     ` Theodore Ts'o
2016-06-15 14:59   ` Herbert Xu
2016-06-19 23:18     ` Theodore Ts'o
2016-06-20  1:25       ` Herbert Xu
2016-06-20  5:02         ` Theodore Ts'o
2016-06-20  5:19           ` Herbert Xu
2016-06-20 15:01             ` Theodore Ts'o
2016-06-20 15:49               ` Stephan Mueller
2016-06-20 18:52                 ` H. Peter Anvin
2016-06-20 23:48                 ` Theodore Ts'o [this message]
2016-06-26 18:47       ` Pavel Machek
2016-06-26 19:10         ` Stephan Mueller
2016-06-26 22:51         ` Theodore Ts'o
2016-06-13 15:48 ` [PATCH 6/7] random: make /dev/urandom scalable for silly userspace programs Theodore Ts'o
2016-08-21  9:53   ` Jan Varho
2016-08-21 11:36     ` Theodore Ts'o
2016-06-13 15:48 ` [PATCH 7/7] random: add backtracking protection to the CRNG Theodore Ts'o
2016-06-26 18:47   ` Pavel Machek
2016-06-26 23:05     ` Theodore Ts'o

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