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From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
To: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>,
	tpmdd-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] tpm: vtpm_proxy: Introduce flag to prevent sysfs entries
Date: Mon, 27 Jun 2016 21:32:20 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160627183220.GD7268@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <576D7F34.50201@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

On Fri, Jun 24, 2016 at 02:43:00PM -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:
> On 06/24/2016 01:48 PM, Jason Gunthorpe wrote:
> >On Fri, Jun 24, 2016 at 10:36:55AM -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:
> >>Introduce TPM_VTPM_PROXY_NO_SYSFS flag that prevents a vtpm_proxy driver
> >>instance from having the typical sysfs entries that shows the state of the
> >>TPM. The flag is to be set in the ioctl creating the vtpm_proxy device
> >>pair and maps on a new chip flags TPM_CHIP_FLAG_NO_SYSFS.
> >No other subsystem does something so goofy, this really needs to be
> >part of namespace support for TPM.
> 
> And I am not sure how to go about this. TPM2 by the way doesn't have such
> entries, so it's much better from that perspective.
> 
> >
> >Why can't you just make the sysfs files unreadable in user space?
> 
> There are actually ways to go about this. Likely bind-mounting over
> /sys/device/virtual/tpm would be one solution to hide all virtual TPM
> device. Another is applying an AppArmor policy to the container denying
> access to tpm directories or entries. SELinux would not be so easy.
> 
> The flag in this patch seemed like a 'cheap' way to eliminate that problem
> as well.

Does it have any other qualities that would make this better than bind
mounting?

/Jarkko

  parent reply	other threads:[~2016-06-27 18:32 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-06-24 14:36 [PATCH] tpm: vtpm_proxy: Introduce flag to prevent sysfs entries Stefan Berger
2016-06-24 14:36 ` Stefan Berger
     [not found] ` <1466779015-26965-1-git-send-email-stefanb-23VcF4HTsmIX0ybBhKVfKdBPR1lH4CV8@public.gmane.org>
2016-06-24 17:48   ` Jason Gunthorpe
2016-06-24 17:48     ` Jason Gunthorpe
     [not found]     ` <20160624174803.GA14506-ePGOBjL8dl3ta4EC/59zMFaTQe2KTcn/@public.gmane.org>
2016-06-24 18:43       ` Stefan Berger
2016-06-24 18:43         ` Stefan Berger
     [not found]         ` <576D7F34.50201-23VcF4HTsmIX0ybBhKVfKdBPR1lH4CV8@public.gmane.org>
2016-06-24 19:47           ` Jason Gunthorpe
2016-06-24 19:47             ` Jason Gunthorpe
2016-06-27 18:32         ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
     [not found]           ` <20160627183220.GD7268-ral2JQCrhuEAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
2016-06-30 16:17             ` Stefan Berger
2016-06-30 16:17               ` Stefan Berger

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