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From: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
To: Oleg Drokin <green@linuxhacker.ru>
Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@poochiereds.net>,
	linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] nfsd: Make creates return EEXIST correctly instead of EPERM
Date: Fri, 22 Jul 2016 06:55:27 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160722105527.GA3512@fieldses.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <DF70D00E-95F9-4632-B501-2BA00A9DF9B6@linuxhacker.ru>

On Fri, Jul 22, 2016 at 02:35:26AM -0400, Oleg Drokin wrote:
> 
> On Jul 21, 2016, at 9:57 PM, J. Bruce Fields wrote:
> 
> > On Thu, Jul 21, 2016 at 04:37:40PM -0400, Oleg Drokin wrote:
> >> 
> >> On Jul 21, 2016, at 4:34 PM, J. Bruce Fields wrote:
> >> 
> >>> On Fri, Jul 08, 2016 at 05:53:19PM -0400, Oleg Drokin wrote:
> >>>> 
> >>>> On Jul 8, 2016, at 4:54 PM, J. Bruce Fields wrote:
> >>>> 
> >>>>> On Thu, Jul 07, 2016 at 09:47:46PM -0400, Oleg Drokin wrote:
> >>>>>> It looks like we are bit overzealous about failing mkdir/create/mknod
> >>>>>> with permission denied if the parent dir is not writeable.
> >>>>>> Need to make sure the name does not exist first, because we need to
> >>>>>> return EEXIST in that case.
> >>>>>> 
> >>>>>> Signed-off-by: Oleg Drokin <green@linuxhacker.ru>
> >>>>>> ---
> >>>>>> A very similar problem exists with symlinks, but the patch is more
> >>>>>> involved, so assuming this one is ok, I'll send a symlink one separately.
> >>>>>> fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c |  6 +++++-
> >>>>>> fs/nfsd/vfs.c      | 11 ++++++++++-
> >>>>>> 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> >>>>>> 
> >>>>>> diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c
> >>>>>> index de1ff1d..0067520 100644
> >>>>>> --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c
> >>>>>> +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c
> >>>>>> @@ -605,8 +605,12 @@ nfsd4_create(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct nfsd4_compound_state *cstate,
> >>>>>> 
> >>>>>> 	fh_init(&resfh, NFS4_FHSIZE);
> >>>>>> 
> >>>>>> +	/*
> >>>>>> +	 * We just check thta parent is accessible here, nfsd_* do their
> >>>>>> +	 * own access permission checks
> >>>>>> +	 */
> >>>>>> 	status = fh_verify(rqstp, &cstate->current_fh, S_IFDIR,
> >>>>>> -			   NFSD_MAY_CREATE);
> >>>>>> +			   NFSD_MAY_EXEC);
> >>>>>> 	if (status)
> >>>>>> 		return status;
> >>>>>> 
> >>>>>> diff --git a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
> >>>>>> index 6fbd81e..6a45ec6 100644
> >>>>>> --- a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
> >>>>>> +++ b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
> >>>>>> @@ -1161,7 +1161,11 @@ nfsd_create(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp,
> >>>>>> 	if (isdotent(fname, flen))
> >>>>>> 		goto out;
> >>>>>> 
> >>>>>> -	err = fh_verify(rqstp, fhp, S_IFDIR, NFSD_MAY_CREATE);
> >>>>>> +	/*
> >>>>>> +	 * Even though it is a create, first we see if we are even allowed
> >>>>>> +	 * to peek inside the parent
> >>>>>> +	 */
> >>>>>> +	err = fh_verify(rqstp, fhp, S_IFDIR, NFSD_MAY_EXEC);
> >>>>> 
> >>>>> Looks like in the v3 case we haven't actually locked the directory yet
> >>>>> at this point so this check is a little race-prone.
> >>>> 
> >>>> In reality this check is not really needed, I suspect.
> >>>> When we call vfs_create/mknod/mkdir later on, it has it's own permission check
> >>>> anyway so if there was a race and somebody changed dir access in the middle,
> >>>> there's going to be another check anyway and it would be caught.
> >>>> Unless there's some weird server-side permission wiggling as well that makes it
> >>>> ineffective, but I imagine that one cannot really change in a racy way?
> >>> 
> >>> Yeah, I think I'll just change those NFSD_MAY_EXEC's to NFSD_MAY_NOP's.
> >>> We still need the fh_verify there since it's also what does the
> >>> filehandle->dentry translation, but we don't need permission checking
> >>> here yet.
> >> 
> >> This will likely need an extra test to ensure that when you
> >> do mkdir where you do not have exec permissions, you would get EACCES instead
> >> of EEXIST, otherwise that would be information leakage, no?
> >> Or do you think the second time we do nfsd_permission, that would be covered?
> > 
> > No, you're right, for some reason I thought that the check for a
> > positive inode didn't happen till later.  But actually the logic is
> > basically:
> > 
> > 	lock inode
> > 	lookup_one_len
> > 	return nfserr_exist if looked up dentry is positive.
> > 	check for create permission
> > 	vfs_create
> > 
> > So, yes, the initial MAY_EXEC test's needed to prevent that information
> > leak.
> > 
> > That said... I wonder why it's done that way?  Seems to me we could just
> > tremove that nfserr_exist check and the vfs would handle it for us....
> > I'll try that.
> 
> It won't work because the very first thing vfs_create does is may_create(),
> and so you get EACCES right there instead of the EEXIST.

static inline int may_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *child)
{
        audit_inode_child(dir, child, AUDIT_TYPE_CHILD_CREATE);
        if (child->d_inode)
                return -EEXIST;
	...

So it looks OK to me.

--b.

  reply	other threads:[~2016-07-22 10:55 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 38+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-07-08  1:47 [PATCH] nfsd: Make creates return EEXIST correctly instead of EPERM Oleg Drokin
2016-07-08 11:02 ` Jeff Layton
2016-07-08 15:14   ` Oleg Drokin
2016-07-08 15:53     ` Jeff Layton
2016-07-08 15:59       ` Oleg Drokin
2016-07-08 16:17         ` Jeff Layton
2016-07-08 16:28           ` Oleg Drokin
2016-07-09  2:52         ` Al Viro
2016-07-09  2:58           ` Oleg Drokin
2016-07-09  3:13             ` Al Viro
2016-07-08 16:04       ` J. Bruce Fields
2016-07-08 16:16         ` Oleg Drokin
2016-07-08 20:49           ` J. Bruce Fields
2016-07-08 21:47             ` Oleg Drokin
2016-07-08 21:47               ` Oleg Drokin
2016-07-09  3:10               ` Al Viro
2016-07-09  3:41                 ` Oleg Drokin
2016-07-13 19:00                   ` J. Bruce Fields
2016-07-08 20:54 ` J. Bruce Fields
2016-07-08 21:53   ` Oleg Drokin
2016-07-21 20:34     ` J. Bruce Fields
2016-07-21 20:37       ` Oleg Drokin
2016-07-22  1:57         ` J. Bruce Fields
2016-07-22  6:35           ` Oleg Drokin
2016-07-22 10:55             ` J. Bruce Fields [this message]
2016-07-22 15:13               ` Oleg Drokin
2016-07-22 17:48                 ` J. Bruce Fields
2016-07-22 17:48                   ` [PATCH 1/7] nfsd: Make creates return EEXIST instead of EACCES J. Bruce Fields
2016-07-22 17:48                   ` [PATCH 2/7] nfsd: remove redundant zero-length check from create J. Bruce Fields
2016-07-22 17:48                   ` [PATCH 3/7] nfsd: remove redundant i_lookup check J. Bruce Fields
2016-07-24  0:22                     ` Al Viro
2016-07-24 12:10                       ` J. Bruce Fields
2016-07-24 14:23                         ` Al Viro
2016-07-24 20:21                           ` J. Bruce Fields
2016-07-22 17:48                   ` [PATCH 4/7] nfsd: reorganize nfsd_create J. Bruce Fields
2016-07-22 17:48                   ` [PATCH 5/7] nfsd: remove unnecessary positive-dentry check J. Bruce Fields
2016-07-22 17:48                   ` [PATCH 6/7] nfsd: clean up bad-type check in nfsd_create_locked J. Bruce Fields
2016-07-22 17:48                   ` [PATCH 7/7] nfsd: drop unnecessary MAY_EXEC check from create J. Bruce Fields

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