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From: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
To: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: "Charles (Chas) Williams" <ciwillia@brocade.com>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org, Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>,
	Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3.10.y] tcp: make challenge acks less predictable
Date: Tue, 16 Aug 2016 22:51:35 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160816205135.GC11908@kroah.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CANn89iLbMzZvUjW08OqOjupyeNYppkjw18pZ3owz2dtxNRv==g@mail.gmail.com>

On Tue, Aug 16, 2016 at 04:36:40PM -0400, Eric Dumazet wrote:
> On Tue, Aug 16, 2016 at 4:31 PM, Charles (Chas) Williams
> <ciwillia@brocade.com> wrote:
> > From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
> >
> > [ Upstream commit 75ff39ccc1bd5d3c455b6822ab09e533c551f758 ]
> >
> > Yue Cao claims that current host rate limiting of challenge ACKS
> > (RFC 5961) could leak enough information to allow a patient attacker
> > to hijack TCP sessions. He will soon provide details in an academic
> > paper.
> >
> > This patch increases the default limit from 100 to 1000, and adds
> > some randomization so that the attacker can no longer hijack
> > sessions without spending a considerable amount of probes.
> >
> > Based on initial analysis and patch from Linus.
> >
> > Note that we also have per socket rate limiting, so it is tempting
> > to remove the host limit in the future.
> >
> > v2: randomize the count of challenge acks per second, not the period.
> >
> > Fixes: 282f23c6ee34 ("tcp: implement RFC 5961 3.2")
> > Reported-by: Yue Cao <ycao009@ucr.edu>
> > Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
> > Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
> > Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
> > Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
> > Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
> > Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
> > Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
> > [ ciwillia: backport to 3.10-stable ]
> > Signed-off-by: Chas Williams <ciwillia@brocade.com>
> > ---
> >  net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 14 +++++++++++---
> >  1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
> > index f89087c..36df4d8 100644
> > --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
> > +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
> > @@ -68,6 +68,7 @@
> >  #include <linux/module.h>
> >  #include <linux/sysctl.h>
> >  #include <linux/kernel.h>
> > +#include <linux/reciprocal_div.h>
> >  #include <net/dst.h>
> >  #include <net/tcp.h>
> >  #include <net/inet_common.h>
> > @@ -87,7 +88,7 @@ int sysctl_tcp_adv_win_scale __read_mostly = 1;
> >  EXPORT_SYMBOL(sysctl_tcp_adv_win_scale);
> >
> >  /* rfc5961 challenge ack rate limiting */
> > -int sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit = 100;
> > +int sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit = 1000;
> >
> >  int sysctl_tcp_stdurg __read_mostly;
> >  int sysctl_tcp_rfc1337 __read_mostly;
> > @@ -3288,12 +3289,19 @@ static void tcp_send_challenge_ack(struct sock *sk)
> >         static u32 challenge_timestamp;
> >         static unsigned int challenge_count;
> >         u32 now = jiffies / HZ;
> > +       u32 count;
> >
> >         if (now != challenge_timestamp) {
> > +               u32 half = (sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit + 1) >> 1;
> > +
> >                 challenge_timestamp = now;
> > -               challenge_count = 0;
> > +               challenge_count = half +
> > +                                 reciprocal_divide(prandom_u32(),
> > +                                       sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit);
> 
> 
> ACCESS_ONCE(challenge_count) = half + reciprocal_divide(...)
> 
> >         }
> > -       if (++challenge_count <= sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit) {
> > +       count = challenge_count;
> 
>             count = ACCESS_ONCE(challenge_count);
> 
> > +       if (count > 0) {
> > +               challenge_count = count - 1;
> 
>               ACCESS_ONCE(challenge_count) = count - 1;

Crap, I didn't use that for my 3.14 backport :(

I'll go update that in the next release, worse case, it's just a bit
slower than it needs to be...

thanks,

greg k-h

      parent reply	other threads:[~2016-08-16 20:51 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-08-16 20:31 [PATCH 3.10.y] tcp: make challenge acks less predictable Charles (Chas) Williams
2016-08-16 20:36 ` Eric Dumazet
2016-08-16 20:48   ` Charles (Chas) Williams
2016-08-16 20:51   ` Greg KH [this message]

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