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From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
To: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Cc: qemu-devel@nongnu.org, Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>,
	Felix Wilhelm <fwilhelm@ernw.de>, P J P <ppandit@redhat.com>,
	"Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v4 0/3] 9pfs security fixes
Date: Tue, 30 Aug 2016 21:19:57 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160830211936-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <147257704749.28515.17213711886150247423.stgit@bahia.lab.toulouse-stg.fr.ibm.com>

On Tue, Aug 30, 2016 at 07:10:47PM +0200, Greg Kurz wrote:
> As reported by Felix Wilhelm, at various places in 9pfs, full paths are
> created by concatenating a guest originated string to the export path. A
> malicious guest could forge a relative path and access files outside the
> export path.
> 
> A tentative fix was sent recently by Prasad J Pandit, but it was only
> focused on the local backend and did not get a positive review. This series
> tries to address the issue more globally, based on the official 9P spec.
> 
> I wasn't running the TUXERA test suite correctly and overlooked a failure
> with symbolic links (thanks Aneesh for your assistance). This v4 is basically
> the same as v3 with a change in patch 1/3.

Looks good to me.

Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>



> ---
> 
> Greg Kurz (3):
>       9pfs: forbid illegal path names
>       9pfs: forbid . and .. in file names
>       9pfs: handle walk of ".." in the root directory
> 
> 
>  hw/9pfs/9p.c |  147 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
>  hw/9pfs/9p.h |    1 
>  2 files changed, 139 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
> 
> --
> Greg

  parent reply	other threads:[~2016-08-30 18:20 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-08-30 17:10 [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v4 0/3] 9pfs security fixes Greg Kurz
2016-08-30 17:11 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v4 1/3] 9pfs: forbid illegal path names Greg Kurz
2016-08-30 18:03   ` Eric Blake
2016-08-30 19:27     ` Greg Kurz
2016-08-31  2:42     ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2016-08-30 17:13 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v4 2/3] 9pfs: forbid . and .. in file names Greg Kurz
2016-08-30 18:06   ` Eric Blake
2016-08-30 19:03     ` Greg Kurz
2016-08-30 18:19 ` Michael S. Tsirkin [this message]
2016-08-30 18:29 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v4 0/3] 9pfs security fixes Peter Maydell
2016-08-30 19:39   ` Peter Maydell
2016-08-31  9:33     ` Greg Kurz
2016-08-30 18:40 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v4 3/3] 9pfs: handle walk of ".." in the root directory Greg Kurz
2016-09-15 22:22   ` Paolo Bonzini

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