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From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
To: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	ehabkost@redhat.com, crosthwaite.peter@gmail.com,
	armbru@redhat.com, p.fedin@samsung.com, qemu-devel@nongnu.org,
	lcapitulino@redhat.com, rth@twiddle.net
Subject: Re: [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 10/22] sev: add SEV debug decrypt command
Date: Thu, 15 Sep 2016 00:38:29 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160915001018-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <0ffd7f15-50c5-618d-e8bd-2c711035314b@redhat.com>

On Wed, Sep 14, 2016 at 10:44:58PM +0200, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> 
> 
> On 14/09/2016 22:36, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> > Specifically with debug, if you have debug then clearly you
> > can dump guest memory. This is what this feature is about.
> > If we want a hypervisor that can not dump guest memory, let's
> > add a flag like that. Does everyone have to disable debugging
> > by default? I don't see why. Does everyone using encryption
> > have to do this? I don't see why either.
> 
> If you can explain what's the point in doing encryption that can be
> defeated with a single ioctl, perhaps I'll agree with you.

Discussed offline, I hope I clarified things.  Hypervisor (host kernel)
can decrypt but it is already possible for it to cause guest info leaks.
But no one else on the host can.

> It's okay
> that we leave out features.  But every feature left out is an
> anti-feature baked in.  Force-enable debug?  You've provided a loophole
> for everyone.

It's already baked in by default. Let's switch it to off by default for
everyone if we are worried about using monitor to leak guest secrets?
Btw with a TCP socket monitor, this seems like a legitimate worry.

We can do it when the new security policy object is created.

> Force-disable debug?  Well, of course you've blocked
> debug for everyone.
> 
> I agree that they are distinct features on the command line, but I think
> you're underestimating the importance of choosing a sane default, that's it.

We can safely leave that for management, but I won't object
to switching the default too, let's just do it for everyone,
consistently.

> >>  -object sev-policy-unencrypted,debug=false,id=mypolicy \
> >>  -machine ...,sev-policy=mypolicy
> > 
> > I wouldn't say sev on the command line. SEV seems to be
> > a group of AMD technologies implemening memory encryption,
> > measurement etc.
> > 
> > Let's have flags for individual components:
> > 
> > -machine ...,debug=false,memory-encryption=on,...
> 
> I think it makes sense to have a separate -object for the policy.  Let's
> just make it security-policy instead of sev-policy.  Brijesh, is that okay?
> 
> Paolo

OK. And some parts like blocking debug are easy enough to implement for everyone.

-- 
MST

  parent reply	other threads:[~2016-09-14 21:38 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 125+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-09-13 14:46 [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 00/22] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2016-09-13 14:46 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 01/22] exec: add guest RAM read/write ops Brijesh Singh
2016-09-13 14:47 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 02/22] cpu-common: add debug version of physical memory read/write Brijesh Singh
2016-09-13 14:47 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 03/22] monitor: use debug version of physical memory read api Brijesh Singh
2016-09-13 14:47 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 04/22] memattrs: add SEV debug attrs Brijesh Singh
2016-09-13 23:00   ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-14 20:30     ` Brijesh Singh
2016-09-13 14:47 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 05/22] i386: add new option to enable SEV guest Brijesh Singh
2016-09-13 22:41   ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-14  8:41     ` Daniel P. Berrange
2016-09-14  9:11       ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-13 14:47 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 06/22] sev: add initial SEV support Brijesh Singh
2016-09-13 15:58   ` Eduardo Habkost
2016-09-13 19:54     ` Brijesh Singh
2016-09-13 20:10       ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-09-13 22:00       ` Eduardo Habkost
2016-09-14  8:30         ` Daniel P. Berrange
2016-09-14 11:54           ` Eduardo Habkost
2016-09-14 11:58             ` Daniel P. Berrange
2016-09-14 16:10         ` Brijesh Singh
2016-09-14 16:13           ` Daniel P. Berrange
2016-09-14 16:20           ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-09-14 18:46             ` Brijesh Singh
2016-09-14 20:23               ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-09-14  8:37   ` Daniel P. Berrange
2016-09-13 14:47 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 07/22] sev: add SEV launch start command Brijesh Singh
2016-09-13 14:48 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 08/22] sev: add SEV launch update command Brijesh Singh
2016-09-13 14:48 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 09/22] sev: add SEV launch finish command Brijesh Singh
2016-09-13 22:15   ` Eduardo Habkost
2016-09-13 14:48 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 10/22] sev: add SEV debug decrypt command Brijesh Singh
2016-09-14  2:28   ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-09-14  8:57     ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-14 13:05       ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-09-14 13:07         ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-14 13:23           ` Daniel P. Berrange
2016-09-14 13:32             ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-09-14 13:37               ` Daniel P. Berrange
2016-09-14 13:50                 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-09-14 14:08                   ` Eduardo Habkost
2016-09-14 14:14                     ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-14 14:38                       ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-09-14 15:17                     ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-09-14 14:15                   ` Daniel P. Berrange
2016-09-14 14:48                     ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-09-14 15:06                       ` Daniel P. Berrange
2016-09-14 15:46                         ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-09-14 17:35                           ` Eduardo Habkost
2016-09-14 22:05                             ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-09-15 14:58                               ` Eduardo Habkost
2016-09-14 13:27           ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2] virtio_pci: Limit DMA mask to 44 bits for legacy virtio devices Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-09-14 13:36     ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 10/22] sev: add SEV debug decrypt command Brijesh Singh
2016-09-14 13:48       ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-09-14 14:19         ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-14 15:02           ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-09-14 16:53             ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-14 18:15               ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-09-14 18:45                 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-14 19:24                   ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-09-14 19:58                     ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-14 20:36                       ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-09-14 20:44                         ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-14 21:25                           ` Brijesh Singh
2016-09-14 21:38                           ` Michael S. Tsirkin [this message]
2016-09-13 14:48 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 11/22] sev: add SEV debug encrypt command Brijesh Singh
2016-09-13 14:48 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 12/22] sev: add SEV guest status command Brijesh Singh
2016-09-13 14:48 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 13/22] hmp: update 'info kvm' to display SEV status Brijesh Singh
2016-09-13 16:09   ` Eric Blake
2016-09-14 16:16     ` Brijesh Singh
2016-09-15  4:13       ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-09-13 23:01   ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-13 14:49 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 14/22] sev: provide SEV-enabled guest RAM read/write ops Brijesh Singh
2016-09-13 14:49 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 15/22] i386: sev: register RAM read/write ops for BIOS and PC.RAM region Brijesh Singh
2016-09-13 23:05   ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-14 20:59     ` Brijesh Singh
2016-09-14 21:00       ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-14 21:47         ` Brijesh Singh
2016-09-14 21:52           ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-14 22:06             ` Brijesh Singh
2016-09-14 22:17               ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-14 22:26                 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-09-15 14:13                 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-09-15 15:19                   ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-13 14:49 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 17/22] target-i386: add cpuid Fn8000_001f Brijesh Singh
2016-09-13 23:07   ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-21 16:20     ` Brijesh Singh
2016-09-21 16:24       ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-21 18:21       ` Eduardo Habkost
2016-09-13 14:49 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 18/22] i386: clear C-bit in SEV guest page table walk Brijesh Singh
2016-09-13 14:49 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 19/22] exec: set debug attribute in SEV-enabled guest Brijesh Singh
2016-09-13 23:06   ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-13 14:50 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 20/22] fw_cfg: sev: disable dma in real mode Brijesh Singh
2016-09-13 18:39   ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-09-13 20:46     ` Brijesh Singh
2016-09-13 20:55       ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-09-13 22:53   ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-14  2:33     ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-09-14  8:58       ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-21 18:00         ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 20/22] fw_cfg: sev: disable dma in real mode Message-ID: <20160921205731-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org> Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-09-14 12:09       ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 20/22] fw_cfg: sev: disable dma in real mode Eduardo Habkost
2016-09-14 13:01         ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-14 13:14           ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-09-14 13:51             ` Eduardo Habkost
2016-09-14 16:10               ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-09-14 17:25                 ` Eduardo Habkost
2016-09-21 18:03         ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-09-21 18:19           ` Brijesh Singh
2016-09-13 14:50 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 21/22] hw: add pre and post system reset callback Brijesh Singh
2016-09-13 22:47   ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-14 16:19     ` Brijesh Singh
2016-09-13 14:50 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 22/22] loader: reload bios image on ROM reset in SEV-enabled guest Brijesh Singh
2016-09-13 18:47   ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-09-13 22:59   ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-14  2:38     ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-09-14 20:29     ` Brijesh Singh
2016-09-14 20:38       ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-14 21:09         ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-09-14 21:11           ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-14 21:24         ` Brijesh Singh
2016-09-13 15:20 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 00/22] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Eduardo Habkost
     [not found] ` <147377816978.11859.942423377333907417.stgit@brijesh-build-machine>
2016-09-13 18:37   ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 16/22] i386: pc: load OS images at fixed location in SEV-enabled guest Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-09-21 15:55     ` Brijesh Singh
2016-09-21 15:58       ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-21 16:08         ` Brijesh Singh
2016-09-21 16:17           ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-14  2:55 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 00/22] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Michael S. Tsirkin

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