From: "Stéphane Graber" <stgraber-GeWIH/nMZzLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
To: lxc-devel-cunTk1MwBs9qMoObBWhMNEqPaTDuhLve2LY78lusg7I@public.gmane.org,
lxc-users-cunTk1MwBs9qMoObBWhMNEqPaTDuhLve2LY78lusg7I@public.gmane.org,
containers-cunTk1MwBs9QetFLy7KEm3xJsTq8ys+cHZ5vskTnxNA@public.gmane.org
Subject: LXC 1.0.9, LXC 2.0.6, LXCFS 2.0.5 and LXD 2.0.6 have been released!
Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2016 17:08:23 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20161123220823.GG3374@dakara> (raw)
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Hello everyone,
Today the LXC project is pleased to announce the release of:
- LXC 1.0.9 (includes fix for CVE-2016-8649)
- LXC 2.0.6 (includes fix for CVE-2016-8649)
- LXD 2.0.6
- LXCFS 2.0.5
They each contain the accumulated bugfixes since the previous round of
bugfix releases. LXC 1.0.9 and LXC 2.0.6 also fix CVE-2016-8649.
CVE-2016-8649 was reported by Roman Fiedler from AIT and is a way to
access the host filesystem and therefore escaping the container through
an inherited dirfd to the host's /proc.
This issue is possible because the Linux kernel doesn't prevent root in
the container from attaching (with ptrace) to the lxc-attach process
then running as real root.
Eric Biederman submitted a set of ptrace fixes to the Linux kernel which
will prevent this kind of attack from being possible in the future.
The fix we're releasing today, simply stops passing a full dirfd to
/proc and instead only passes the one file we actually care about,
reducing the impact from an attacker attaching to the process.
The detailed changelogs can be found at:
- https://linuxcontainers.org/lxc/news/
- https://linuxcontainers.org/lxcfs/news/
- https://linuxcontainers.org/lxd/news/
As a reminder, the 2.0 series of all of those is supported for bugfix
and security updates up until June 2021.
The LXC 1.0.x branch is supported until June 2019 with critical bugfixes
and security updates only from this point on.
Thanks to everyone who contributed to those projects and helped make
this possible!
Stéphane Graber
On behalf of the LXC, LXCFS and LXD development teams
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