From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
To: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@gmail.com>
Cc: Gonglei <arei.gonglei@huawei.com>, qemu-devel@nongnu.org
Subject: Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH for-2.8] virtio-crypto: zeroize the key material before free
Date: Tue, 6 Dec 2016 21:22:43 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20161206211034-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20161206173337.GB30363@stefanha-x1.localdomain>
On Tue, Dec 06, 2016 at 05:33:37PM +0000, Stefan Hajnoczi wrote:
> On Tue, Dec 06, 2016 at 03:40:49PM +0200, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> > On Tue, Dec 06, 2016 at 05:29:13PM +0800, Gonglei wrote:
> > > Zeroize the memory of CryptoDevBackendSymOpInfo structure pointed
> > > for key material security.
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Gonglei <arei.gonglei@huawei.com>
> > > ---
> > > hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c | 13 ++++++++++++-
> > > 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c b/hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c
> > > index 2f2467e..ecb19b6 100644
> > > --- a/hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c
> > > +++ b/hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c
> > > @@ -337,7 +337,18 @@ static void virtio_crypto_free_request(VirtIOCryptoReq *req)
> > > {
> > > if (req) {
> > > if (req->flags == CRYPTODEV_BACKEND_ALG_SYM) {
> > > - g_free(req->u.sym_op_info);
> > > + size_t max_len;
> > > + CryptoDevBackendSymOpInfo *op_info = req->u.sym_op_info;
> > > +
> > > + max_len = op_info->iv_len +
> > > + op_info->aad_len +
> > > + op_info->src_len +
> > > + op_info->dst_len +
> > > + op_info->digest_result_len;
> > > +
> > > + /* Zeroize and free request data structure */
> > > + memset(op_info, 0, sizeof(*op_info) + max_len);
> > > + g_free(op_info);
> >
> > Write into memory, then free it? This looks rather strange. Why are we
> > doing this?
>
> Common practice with sensitive information (key material, passwords,
> etc).
Some kind of explanation about what makes this one
more sensitive than others would be nice.
Also, what makes it 2.8 material? Considering the pointer math
involved, it's not risk-free.
> coredumps, memory disclosure bugs when heap memory is reused, etc.
>
> Sensitive information is sometimes also held in mlocked pages to prevent
> it being swapped to disk but that's not being done here.
>
> Perhaps the comment should be more explicit but this patch seems
> reasonable.
Right. One can see memset and free at a glance.
The comment and the commit log should explain the why,
not the what.
> Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-12-06 19:22 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-12-06 9:29 [Qemu-devel] [PATCH for-2.8] virtio-crypto: zeroize the key material before free Gonglei
2016-12-06 13:40 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-12-06 17:33 ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2016-12-06 19:22 ` Michael S. Tsirkin [this message]
2016-12-06 19:30 ` Eric Blake
2016-12-06 20:18 ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2016-12-07 0:57 ` Gonglei (Arei)
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