All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: aranea@aixah.de (Luis Ressel)
To: refpolicy@oss.tresys.com
Subject: [refpolicy] [PATCH] init: run sysvinit without the dangerous unconfined_domain() call
Date: Tue, 27 Dec 2016 23:38:46 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20161227233846.6ed0ebf0@gentp.lnet> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1425370720.18751.1482877006863.JavaMail.open-xchange@popper10.register.it>

On Tue, 27 Dec 2016 23:16:46 +0100 (CET)
Guido Trentalancia via refpolicy <refpolicy@oss.tresys.com> wrote:

> The aim of this patch is to start securing the init module so
> that it can run in confined mode instead of in the most unsafe
> unconfined mode.
> 
> At the moment it has been fully tested only with sysvinit.
> 
> Testing with other init daemons is needed before this is
> released, so a "permissive" statement has been added in
> order to log further needed permissions during this testing
> phase (with systemd, upstart, and so on).
> 
> [...]
>
> +permissive init_t;

Please don't add that. Debugging statements such as this one should
only be added to local policies, not to refpol's master branch. This
statement would be a huge step backwards for everyone who isn't using
the 'unconfined' module.

Regards,
Luis

  reply	other threads:[~2016-12-27 22:38 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-12-27 22:16 [refpolicy] [PATCH] init: run sysvinit without the dangerous unconfined_domain() call Guido Trentalancia
2016-12-27 22:38 ` Luis Ressel [this message]
2016-12-27 22:54   ` Guido Trentalancia
2016-12-27 23:02     ` Luis Ressel
2016-12-28 20:45       ` [refpolicy] [PATCH v2] init: support sysvinit (was "run sysvinit without the dangerous unconfined_domain() call") Guido Trentalancia
2016-12-30 19:24         ` Chris PeBenito
2016-12-30 21:10           ` Guido Trentalancia
2016-12-30 21:13             ` Dominick Grift
2016-12-31 17:42             ` Guido Trentalancia
2017-01-02 17:55               ` Chris PeBenito
2017-01-02 18:05                 ` Guido Trentalancia
2017-01-02 18:13                   ` Jason Zaman
2017-01-02 18:19                     ` Guido Trentalancia
2017-01-02 18:19                   ` Dominick Grift
2017-01-02 18:26                     ` Guido Trentalancia
2016-12-31 19:52         ` [refpolicy] [PATCH v3] init: support sysvinit Guido Trentalancia
2017-01-02  0:04           ` [refpolicy] [PATCH v4] " Guido Trentalancia
2017-01-02 21:11             ` [refpolicy] [PATCH v5] " Guido Trentalancia
2017-01-04  0:36               ` Chris PeBenito

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20161227233846.6ed0ebf0@gentp.lnet \
    --to=aranea@aixah.de \
    --cc=refpolicy@oss.tresys.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.