From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, keescook@chromium.org,
arnd@arndb.de, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com,
h.peter.anvin@intel.com, will.deacon@arm.com, dwindsor@gmail.com,
gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, ishkamiel@gmail.com,
Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 06/19] Provide refcount_t, an atomic_t like primitive built just for refcounting.
Date: Wed, 4 Jan 2017 12:36:01 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170104203601.GB21696@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170103132136.GV3107@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net>
On Tue, Jan 03, 2017 at 02:21:36PM +0100, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 29, 2016 at 07:06:27PM -0600, Eric Biggers wrote:
> >
> > ... and refcount_inc() compiles to over 100 bytes of instructions on x86_64.
> > This is the wrong approach. We need a low-overhead solution, otherwise no one
> > will turn on refcount protection and the feature will be useless.
>
> Its not something that can be turned on or off, refcount_t is
> unconditional code. But you raise a good point on the size of the thing.
...
> Doing an unconditional INC on INT_MAX gives a temporarily visible
> artifact of INT_MAX+1 (or INT_MIN) in the best case.
>
> This is fundamentally not an atomic operation and therefore does not
> belong in the atomic_* family, full stop.
Again I feel this is going down the wrong track. The point of the PaX feature
this is based on is to offer protection against *exploits* involving abuse of
refcount leak bugs. If the overflow logic triggers then there is a kernel *bug*
and the rules have already been broken. The question of whether the exploit
mitigation is "atomic" is not important unless it allows the mitigation to be
circumvented.
And yes this should be a config option just like other hardening options like
CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY. Making it unconditional only makes it harder to get
merged and hurts users who, for whatever reason, don't want/need extra
protections against kernel exploits. This is especially true if an
implementation with significant performance and code size overhead is chosen.
> Now as to why refcount cannot be implemented using that scheme you
> outlined:
>
> vCPU0 vCPU1
>
> lock inc %[r]
> jo
>
> <vcpu preempt-out>
>
> for lots
> refcount_dec_and_test(&obj->ref)
> /* hooray, we hit 0 */
> kfree(obj);
>
> <vcpu preempt-in>
>
> mov $0xFFFFFFFF, %[r] /* OOPS use-after-free */
This scenario doesn't make sense. If there's no bug that causes extra refcount
decrements, then it would be impossible to generate the INT_MAX+1 decrements
needed to free the object. Or if there *is* a bug that causes extra refcount
decrements, then it could already be abused at any time in any of the proposed
solutions to trivially cause a use-after-free.
Eric
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-01-04 20:36 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 55+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-12-29 6:55 [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 00/19] refcount_t API + usage Elena Reshetova
2016-12-29 6:55 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 01/19] Since we need to change the implementation, stop exposing internals. Provide kref_read() to read the current reference count; typically used for debug messages Elena Reshetova
2016-12-29 16:41 ` [kernel-hardening] " Greg KH
2016-12-29 16:49 ` Reshetova, Elena
2016-12-30 7:58 ` Greg KH
2016-12-30 12:50 ` Reshetova, Elena
2016-12-29 6:55 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 02/19] By general sentiment kref_sub() is a bad interface, make it go away Elena Reshetova
2016-12-29 6:55 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 03/19] For some obscure reason apparmor thinks its needs to locally implement kref primitives that already exist. Stop doing this Elena Reshetova
2016-12-29 6:55 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 04/19] Because home-rolling your own is _awesome_, stop doing it. Provide kref_put_lock(), just like kref_put_mutex() but for a spinlock Elena Reshetova
2016-12-29 6:55 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 05/19] Leak references by unbalanced get, instead of poking at kref implementation details Elena Reshetova
2016-12-29 6:55 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 06/19] Provide refcount_t, an atomic_t like primitive built just for refcounting Elena Reshetova
2016-12-30 1:06 ` Eric Biggers
2016-12-30 13:17 ` Reshetova, Elena
2016-12-30 19:52 ` Eric Biggers
2017-01-03 13:21 ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-01-04 20:36 ` Eric Biggers [this message]
2017-01-05 10:44 ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-01-05 21:21 ` PaX Team
2017-01-20 10:35 ` Greg KH
2017-01-20 13:10 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-12-29 6:55 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 07/19] mixed: kref fixes Elena Reshetova
2016-12-29 6:56 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 08/19] kernel, mm: convert from atomic_t to refcount_t Elena Reshetova
2017-01-05 2:25 ` AKASHI Takahiro
2017-01-05 9:56 ` Reshetova, Elena
2017-01-05 19:33 ` Kees Cook
2017-01-10 11:57 ` Reshetova, Elena
2017-01-10 20:34 ` Kees Cook
2017-01-11 9:30 ` Reshetova, Elena
2017-01-11 21:42 ` Kees Cook
2017-01-11 22:55 ` Kees Cook
2017-01-12 2:55 ` Kees Cook
2017-01-12 8:02 ` Reshetova, Elena
2017-01-12 5:11 ` AKASHI Takahiro
2017-01-12 8:18 ` Reshetova, Elena
2017-01-12 8:57 ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-01-16 16:16 ` Reshetova, Elena
2017-01-17 17:15 ` Kees Cook
2017-01-17 17:44 ` Reshetova, Elena
2017-01-17 17:50 ` David Windsor
2017-01-18 8:41 ` Reshetova, Elena
2017-01-18 9:03 ` gregkh
2017-01-18 9:14 ` Reshetova, Elena
2017-01-17 18:26 ` gregkh
2017-01-12 7:57 ` Reshetova, Elena
2017-01-12 7:54 ` Reshetova, Elena
2016-12-29 6:56 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 09/19] net: " Elena Reshetova
2016-12-29 6:56 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 10/19] fs: " Elena Reshetova
2016-12-29 6:56 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 11/19] security: " Elena Reshetova
2016-12-29 6:56 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 12/19] sound: " Elena Reshetova
2016-12-29 6:56 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 13/19] ipc: covert " Elena Reshetova
2016-12-29 6:56 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 14/19] tools: convert " Elena Reshetova
2016-12-29 6:56 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 15/19] block: " Elena Reshetova
2016-12-29 6:56 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 16/19] drivers: net " Elena Reshetova
2016-12-29 6:56 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 17/19] drivers: misc " Elena Reshetova
2016-12-29 6:56 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 18/19] drivers: infiniband " Elena Reshetova
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