From: Ingo Molnar <mingo-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>
To: Linus Torvalds
<torvalds-de/tnXTf+JLsfHDXvbKv3WD2FQJk+8+b@public.gmane.org>
Cc: linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
Ard Biesheuvel
<ard.biesheuvel-QSEj5FYQhm4dnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>,
Matt Fleming
<matt-mF/unelCI9GS6iBeEJttW/XRex20P6io@public.gmane.org>,
linux-efi-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx-hfZtesqFncYOwBW4kG4KsQ@public.gmane.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa-YMNOUZJC4hwAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>,
Peter Zijlstra
<a.p.zijlstra-/NLkJaSkS4VmR6Xm/wNWPw@public.gmane.org>,
Andrew Morton
<akpm-de/tnXTf+JLsfHDXvbKv3WD2FQJk+8+b@public.gmane.org>
Subject: [GIT PULL] EFI changes for v4.11
Date: Mon, 20 Feb 2017 10:40:17 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170220094017.GA9846@gmail.com> (raw)
Linus,
Please pull the latest efi-core-for-linus git tree from:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git efi-core-for-linus
# HEAD: b3879a4d3a31ef14265a52e8d941cf4b0f6627ae efi/libstub: Make file I/O chunking x86-specific
The main changes in this cycle were:
- Changes to the EFI init code to establish whether secure boot authentication
was performed at boot time. (Josh Boyer, David Howells)
- Wire up the UEFI memory attributes table for x86. This eliminates any
runtime memory regions that are both writable and executable, on recent
firmware versions. (Sai Praneeth)
- Move the BGRT init code to an earlier stage so that we can still use
efi_mem_reserve(). (Dave Young)
- Preserve debug symbols in the ARM/arm64 UEFI stub (Ard Biesheuvel)
- Code deduplication work and various other cleanups (Lukas Wunner)
- ... plus various other fixes and cleanups.
Thanks,
Ingo
------------------>
Ard Biesheuvel (3):
efi: Use typed function pointers for the runtime services table
efi/libstub: Preserve .debug sections after absolute relocation check
efi/libstub: Make file I/O chunking x86-specific
Colin Ian King (1):
efi/esrt: Fix typo in pr_err() message
Dave Young (2):
efi/x86: Move the EFI BGRT init code to early init code
efi/x86: Add debug code to print cooked memmap
David Howells (4):
x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services
arm/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services
efi: Get and store the secure boot status
efi: Print the secure boot status in x86 setup_arch()
Josh Boyer (2):
efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions
efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode
Lukas Wunner (2):
efi: Deduplicate efi_file_size() / _read() / _close()
x86/efi: Deduplicate efi_char16_printk()
Sai Praneeth (3):
efi: Make EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE initialization common across all architectures
efi: Introduce the EFI_MEM_ATTR bit and set it from the memory attributes table
x86/efi: Add support for EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE
Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt | 2 +
arch/arm/include/asm/efi.h | 1 +
arch/arm64/include/asm/efi.h | 1 +
arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c | 182 ++-----------------------
arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S | 6 +-
arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S | 8 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h | 5 +
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h | 3 +-
arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c | 9 ++
arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 14 ++
arch/x86/platform/efi/efi-bgrt.c | 59 ++++----
arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c | 10 +-
arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c | 64 +++++++--
drivers/acpi/bgrt.c | 28 ++--
drivers/firmware/efi/arm-init.c | 1 -
drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 2 +
drivers/firmware/efi/esrt.c | 2 +-
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile | 26 ++--
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c | 132 +-----------------
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub-helper.c | 74 +++++++++-
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h | 8 --
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c | 84 ++++++++++++
drivers/firmware/efi/memattr.c | 6 +-
include/linux/efi-bgrt.h | 11 +-
include/linux/efi.h | 56 +++++---
init/main.c | 1 -
27 files changed, 383 insertions(+), 413 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c
diff --git a/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt b/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt
index 95a4d34af3fd..b8527c6b7646 100644
--- a/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt
+++ b/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt
@@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ Offset Proto Name Meaning
1E9/001 ALL eddbuf_entries Number of entries in eddbuf (below)
1EA/001 ALL edd_mbr_sig_buf_entries Number of entries in edd_mbr_sig_buffer
(below)
+1EB/001 ALL kbd_status Numlock is enabled
+1EC/001 ALL secure_boot Secure boot is enabled in the firmware
1EF/001 ALL sentinel Used to detect broken bootloaders
290/040 ALL edd_mbr_sig_buffer EDD MBR signatures
2D0/A00 ALL e820_map E820 memory map table
diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/efi.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/efi.h
index 0b06f5341b45..e4e6a9d6a825 100644
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/efi.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/efi.h
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ void efi_virtmap_unload(void);
#define efi_call_early(f, ...) sys_table_arg->boottime->f(__VA_ARGS__)
#define __efi_call_early(f, ...) f(__VA_ARGS__)
+#define efi_call_runtime(f, ...) sys_table_arg->runtime->f(__VA_ARGS__)
#define efi_is_64bit() (false)
#define efi_call_proto(protocol, f, instance, ...) \
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/efi.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/efi.h
index 0b6b1633017f..e7445281e534 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/efi.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/efi.h
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ int efi_set_mapping_permissions(struct mm_struct *mm, efi_memory_desc_t *md);
#define efi_call_early(f, ...) sys_table_arg->boottime->f(__VA_ARGS__)
#define __efi_call_early(f, ...) f(__VA_ARGS__)
+#define efi_call_runtime(f, ...) sys_table_arg->runtime->f(__VA_ARGS__)
#define efi_is_64bit() (true)
#define efi_call_proto(protocol, f, instance, ...) \
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
index ff01c8fc76f7..801c7a158e55 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
@@ -32,160 +32,13 @@ static void setup_boot_services##bits(struct efi_config *c) \
\
table = (typeof(table))sys_table; \
\
+ c->runtime_services = table->runtime; \
c->boot_services = table->boottime; \
c->text_output = table->con_out; \
}
BOOT_SERVICES(32);
BOOT_SERVICES(64);
-void efi_char16_printk(efi_system_table_t *, efi_char16_t *);
-
-static efi_status_t
-__file_size32(void *__fh, efi_char16_t *filename_16,
- void **handle, u64 *file_sz)
-{
- efi_file_handle_32_t *h, *fh = __fh;
- efi_file_info_t *info;
- efi_status_t status;
- efi_guid_t info_guid = EFI_FILE_INFO_ID;
- u32 info_sz;
-
- status = efi_early->call((unsigned long)fh->open, fh, &h, filename_16,
- EFI_FILE_MODE_READ, (u64)0);
- if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
- efi_printk(sys_table, "Failed to open file: ");
- efi_char16_printk(sys_table, filename_16);
- efi_printk(sys_table, "\n");
- return status;
- }
-
- *handle = h;
-
- info_sz = 0;
- status = efi_early->call((unsigned long)h->get_info, h, &info_guid,
- &info_sz, NULL);
- if (status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
- efi_printk(sys_table, "Failed to get file info size\n");
- return status;
- }
-
-grow:
- status = efi_call_early(allocate_pool, EFI_LOADER_DATA,
- info_sz, (void **)&info);
- if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
- efi_printk(sys_table, "Failed to alloc mem for file info\n");
- return status;
- }
-
- status = efi_early->call((unsigned long)h->get_info, h, &info_guid,
- &info_sz, info);
- if (status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
- efi_call_early(free_pool, info);
- goto grow;
- }
-
- *file_sz = info->file_size;
- efi_call_early(free_pool, info);
-
- if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
- efi_printk(sys_table, "Failed to get initrd info\n");
-
- return status;
-}
-
-static efi_status_t
-__file_size64(void *__fh, efi_char16_t *filename_16,
- void **handle, u64 *file_sz)
-{
- efi_file_handle_64_t *h, *fh = __fh;
- efi_file_info_t *info;
- efi_status_t status;
- efi_guid_t info_guid = EFI_FILE_INFO_ID;
- u64 info_sz;
-
- status = efi_early->call((unsigned long)fh->open, fh, &h, filename_16,
- EFI_FILE_MODE_READ, (u64)0);
- if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
- efi_printk(sys_table, "Failed to open file: ");
- efi_char16_printk(sys_table, filename_16);
- efi_printk(sys_table, "\n");
- return status;
- }
-
- *handle = h;
-
- info_sz = 0;
- status = efi_early->call((unsigned long)h->get_info, h, &info_guid,
- &info_sz, NULL);
- if (status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
- efi_printk(sys_table, "Failed to get file info size\n");
- return status;
- }
-
-grow:
- status = efi_call_early(allocate_pool, EFI_LOADER_DATA,
- info_sz, (void **)&info);
- if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
- efi_printk(sys_table, "Failed to alloc mem for file info\n");
- return status;
- }
-
- status = efi_early->call((unsigned long)h->get_info, h, &info_guid,
- &info_sz, info);
- if (status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
- efi_call_early(free_pool, info);
- goto grow;
- }
-
- *file_sz = info->file_size;
- efi_call_early(free_pool, info);
-
- if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
- efi_printk(sys_table, "Failed to get initrd info\n");
-
- return status;
-}
-efi_status_t
-efi_file_size(efi_system_table_t *sys_table, void *__fh,
- efi_char16_t *filename_16, void **handle, u64 *file_sz)
-{
- if (efi_early->is64)
- return __file_size64(__fh, filename_16, handle, file_sz);
-
- return __file_size32(__fh, filename_16, handle, file_sz);
-}
-
-efi_status_t
-efi_file_read(void *handle, unsigned long *size, void *addr)
-{
- unsigned long func;
-
- if (efi_early->is64) {
- efi_file_handle_64_t *fh = handle;
-
- func = (unsigned long)fh->read;
- return efi_early->call(func, handle, size, addr);
- } else {
- efi_file_handle_32_t *fh = handle;
-
- func = (unsigned long)fh->read;
- return efi_early->call(func, handle, size, addr);
- }
-}
-
-efi_status_t efi_file_close(void *handle)
-{
- if (efi_early->is64) {
- efi_file_handle_64_t *fh = handle;
-
- return efi_early->call((unsigned long)fh->close, handle);
- } else {
- efi_file_handle_32_t *fh = handle;
-
- return efi_early->call((unsigned long)fh->close, handle);
- }
-}
-
static inline efi_status_t __open_volume32(void *__image, void **__fh)
{
efi_file_io_interface_t *io;
@@ -249,30 +102,8 @@ efi_open_volume(efi_system_table_t *sys_table, void *__image, void **__fh)
void efi_char16_printk(efi_system_table_t *table, efi_char16_t *str)
{
- unsigned long output_string;
- size_t offset;
-
- if (efi_early->is64) {
- struct efi_simple_text_output_protocol_64 *out;
- u64 *func;
-
- offset = offsetof(typeof(*out), output_string);
- output_string = efi_early->text_output + offset;
- out = (typeof(out))(unsigned long)efi_early->text_output;
- func = (u64 *)output_string;
-
- efi_early->call(*func, out, str);
- } else {
- struct efi_simple_text_output_protocol_32 *out;
- u32 *func;
-
- offset = offsetof(typeof(*out), output_string);
- output_string = efi_early->text_output + offset;
- out = (typeof(out))(unsigned long)efi_early->text_output;
- func = (u32 *)output_string;
-
- efi_early->call(*func, out, str);
- }
+ efi_call_proto(efi_simple_text_output_protocol, output_string,
+ efi_early->text_output, str);
}
static efi_status_t
@@ -1157,6 +988,13 @@ struct boot_params *efi_main(struct efi_config *c,
else
setup_boot_services32(efi_early);
+ /*
+ * If the boot loader gave us a value for secure_boot then we use that,
+ * otherwise we ask the BIOS.
+ */
+ if (boot_params->secure_boot == efi_secureboot_mode_unset)
+ boot_params->secure_boot = efi_get_secureboot(sys_table);
+
setup_graphics(boot_params);
setup_efi_pci(boot_params);
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S
index fd0b6a272dd5..d85b9625e836 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ ENTRY(efi_pe_entry)
/* Relocate efi_config->call() */
leal efi32_config(%esi), %eax
- add %esi, 32(%eax)
+ add %esi, 40(%eax)
pushl %eax
call make_boot_params
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ ENTRY(efi32_stub_entry)
/* Relocate efi_config->call() */
leal efi32_config(%esi), %eax
- add %esi, 32(%eax)
+ add %esi, 40(%eax)
pushl %eax
2:
call efi_main
@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ ENDPROC(startup_32)
#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_STUB
.data
efi32_config:
- .fill 4,8,0
+ .fill 5,8,0
.long efi_call_phys
.long 0
.byte 0
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
index 4d85e600db78..d2ae1f821e0c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ ENTRY(efi_pe_entry)
/*
* Relocate efi_config->call().
*/
- addq %rbp, efi64_config+32(%rip)
+ addq %rbp, efi64_config+40(%rip)
movq %rax, %rdi
call make_boot_params
@@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ ENTRY(efi_pe_entry)
* Relocate efi_config->call().
*/
movq efi_config(%rip), %rax
- addq %rbp, 32(%rax)
+ addq %rbp, 40(%rax)
2:
movq efi_config(%rip), %rdi
call efi_main
@@ -456,14 +456,14 @@ ENDPROC(efi64_stub_entry)
#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_MIXED
.global efi32_config
efi32_config:
- .fill 4,8,0
+ .fill 5,8,0
.quad efi64_thunk
.byte 0
#endif
.global efi64_config
efi64_config:
- .fill 4,8,0
+ .fill 5,8,0
.quad efi_call
.byte 1
#endif /* CONFIG_EFI_STUB */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h
index e99675b9c861..2f77bcefe6b4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h
@@ -191,6 +191,7 @@ static inline efi_status_t efi_thunk_set_virtual_address_map(
struct efi_config {
u64 image_handle;
u64 table;
+ u64 runtime_services;
u64 boot_services;
u64 text_output;
efi_status_t (*call)(unsigned long, ...);
@@ -226,6 +227,10 @@ static inline bool efi_is_64bit(void)
#define __efi_call_early(f, ...) \
__efi_early()->call((unsigned long)f, __VA_ARGS__);
+#define efi_call_runtime(f, ...) \
+ __efi_early()->call(efi_table_attr(efi_runtime_services, f, \
+ __efi_early()->runtime_services), __VA_ARGS__)
+
extern bool efi_reboot_required(void);
#else
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h
index b10bf319ed20..5138dacf8bb8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h
@@ -135,7 +135,8 @@ struct boot_params {
__u8 eddbuf_entries; /* 0x1e9 */
__u8 edd_mbr_sig_buf_entries; /* 0x1ea */
__u8 kbd_status; /* 0x1eb */
- __u8 _pad5[3]; /* 0x1ec */
+ __u8 secure_boot; /* 0x1ec */
+ __u8 _pad5[2]; /* 0x1ed */
/*
* The sentinel is set to a nonzero value (0xff) in header.S.
*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c
index 64422f850e95..7ff007ed899d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
#include <linux/bootmem.h>
#include <linux/ioport.h>
#include <linux/pci.h>
+#include <linux/efi-bgrt.h>
#include <asm/irqdomain.h>
#include <asm/pci_x86.h>
@@ -1557,6 +1558,12 @@ int __init early_acpi_boot_init(void)
return 0;
}
+static int __init acpi_parse_bgrt(struct acpi_table_header *table)
+{
+ efi_bgrt_init(table);
+ return 0;
+}
+
int __init acpi_boot_init(void)
{
/* those are executed after early-quirks are executed */
@@ -1581,6 +1588,8 @@ int __init acpi_boot_init(void)
acpi_process_madt();
acpi_table_parse(ACPI_SIG_HPET, acpi_parse_hpet);
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ACPI_BGRT))
+ acpi_table_parse(ACPI_SIG_BGRT, acpi_parse_bgrt);
if (!acpi_noirq)
x86_init.pci.init = pci_acpi_init;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c
index c62e015b126c..de827d6ac8c2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c
@@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ void common(void) {
BLANK();
OFFSET(BP_scratch, boot_params, scratch);
+ OFFSET(BP_secure_boot, boot_params, secure_boot);
OFFSET(BP_loadflags, boot_params, hdr.loadflags);
OFFSET(BP_hardware_subarch, boot_params, hdr.hardware_subarch);
OFFSET(BP_version, boot_params, hdr.version);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
index 4cfba947d774..69780edf0dde 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
@@ -1176,6 +1176,20 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
/* Allocate bigger log buffer */
setup_log_buf(1);
+ if (efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT)) {
+ switch (boot_params.secure_boot) {
+ case efi_secureboot_mode_disabled:
+ pr_info("Secure boot disabled\n");
+ break;
+ case efi_secureboot_mode_enabled:
+ pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n");
+ break;
+ default:
+ pr_info("Secure boot could not be determined\n");
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
reserve_initrd();
acpi_table_upgrade();
diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi-bgrt.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi-bgrt.c
index 6aad870e8962..04ca8764f0c0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi-bgrt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi-bgrt.c
@@ -19,8 +19,7 @@
#include <linux/efi.h>
#include <linux/efi-bgrt.h>
-struct acpi_table_bgrt *bgrt_tab;
-void *__initdata bgrt_image;
+struct acpi_table_bgrt bgrt_tab;
size_t __initdata bgrt_image_size;
struct bmp_header {
@@ -28,66 +27,58 @@ struct bmp_header {
u32 size;
} __packed;
-void __init efi_bgrt_init(void)
+void __init efi_bgrt_init(struct acpi_table_header *table)
{
- acpi_status status;
void *image;
struct bmp_header bmp_header;
+ struct acpi_table_bgrt *bgrt = &bgrt_tab;
if (acpi_disabled)
return;
- status = acpi_get_table("BGRT", 0,
- (struct acpi_table_header **)&bgrt_tab);
- if (ACPI_FAILURE(status))
- return;
-
- if (bgrt_tab->header.length < sizeof(*bgrt_tab)) {
+ if (table->length < sizeof(bgrt_tab)) {
pr_notice("Ignoring BGRT: invalid length %u (expected %zu)\n",
- bgrt_tab->header.length, sizeof(*bgrt_tab));
+ table->length, sizeof(bgrt_tab));
return;
}
- if (bgrt_tab->version != 1) {
+ *bgrt = *(struct acpi_table_bgrt *)table;
+ if (bgrt->version != 1) {
pr_notice("Ignoring BGRT: invalid version %u (expected 1)\n",
- bgrt_tab->version);
- return;
+ bgrt->version);
+ goto out;
}
- if (bgrt_tab->status & 0xfe) {
+ if (bgrt->status & 0xfe) {
pr_notice("Ignoring BGRT: reserved status bits are non-zero %u\n",
- bgrt_tab->status);
- return;
+ bgrt->status);
+ goto out;
}
- if (bgrt_tab->image_type != 0) {
+ if (bgrt->image_type != 0) {
pr_notice("Ignoring BGRT: invalid image type %u (expected 0)\n",
- bgrt_tab->image_type);
- return;
+ bgrt->image_type);
+ goto out;
}
- if (!bgrt_tab->image_address) {
+ if (!bgrt->image_address) {
pr_notice("Ignoring BGRT: null image address\n");
- return;
+ goto out;
}
- image = memremap(bgrt_tab->image_address, sizeof(bmp_header), MEMREMAP_WB);
+ image = early_memremap(bgrt->image_address, sizeof(bmp_header));
if (!image) {
pr_notice("Ignoring BGRT: failed to map image header memory\n");
- return;
+ goto out;
}
memcpy(&bmp_header, image, sizeof(bmp_header));
- memunmap(image);
+ early_memunmap(image, sizeof(bmp_header));
if (bmp_header.id != 0x4d42) {
pr_notice("Ignoring BGRT: Incorrect BMP magic number 0x%x (expected 0x4d42)\n",
bmp_header.id);
- return;
+ goto out;
}
bgrt_image_size = bmp_header.size;
+ efi_mem_reserve(bgrt->image_address, bgrt_image_size);
- bgrt_image = memremap(bgrt_tab->image_address, bmp_header.size, MEMREMAP_WB);
- if (!bgrt_image) {
- pr_notice("Ignoring BGRT: failed to map image memory\n");
- bgrt_image = NULL;
- return;
- }
-
- efi_mem_reserve(bgrt_tab->image_address, bgrt_image_size);
+ return;
+out:
+ memset(bgrt, 0, sizeof(bgrt_tab));
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c
index 274dfc481849..565dff3c9a12 100644
--- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c
+++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c
@@ -542,11 +542,6 @@ void __init efi_init(void)
efi_print_memmap();
}
-void __init efi_late_init(void)
-{
- efi_bgrt_init();
-}
-
void __init efi_set_executable(efi_memory_desc_t *md, bool executable)
{
u64 addr, npages;
@@ -960,6 +955,11 @@ static void __init __efi_enter_virtual_mode(void)
return;
}
+ if (efi_enabled(EFI_DBG)) {
+ pr_info("EFI runtime memory map:\n");
+ efi_print_memmap();
+ }
+
BUG_ON(!efi.systab);
if (efi_setup_page_tables(pa, 1 << pg_shift)) {
diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
index 2f25a363068c..a4695da42d77 100644
--- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
@@ -414,10 +414,44 @@ void __init parse_efi_setup(u64 phys_addr, u32 data_len)
efi_setup = phys_addr + sizeof(struct setup_data);
}
-void __init efi_runtime_update_mappings(void)
+static int __init efi_update_mappings(efi_memory_desc_t *md, unsigned long pf)
{
unsigned long pfn;
pgd_t *pgd = efi_pgd;
+ int err1, err2;
+
+ /* Update the 1:1 mapping */
+ pfn = md->phys_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+ err1 = kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd, pfn, md->phys_addr, md->num_pages, pf);
+ if (err1) {
+ pr_err("Error while updating 1:1 mapping PA 0x%llx -> VA 0x%llx!\n",
+ md->phys_addr, md->virt_addr);
+ }
+
+ err2 = kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd, pfn, md->virt_addr, md->num_pages, pf);
+ if (err2) {
+ pr_err("Error while updating VA mapping PA 0x%llx -> VA 0x%llx!\n",
+ md->phys_addr, md->virt_addr);
+ }
+
+ return err1 || err2;
+}
+
+static int __init efi_update_mem_attr(struct mm_struct *mm, efi_memory_desc_t *md)
+{
+ unsigned long pf = 0;
+
+ if (md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_XP)
+ pf |= _PAGE_NX;
+
+ if (!(md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_RO))
+ pf |= _PAGE_RW;
+
+ return efi_update_mappings(md, pf);
+}
+
+void __init efi_runtime_update_mappings(void)
+{
efi_memory_desc_t *md;
if (efi_enabled(EFI_OLD_MEMMAP)) {
@@ -426,6 +460,24 @@ void __init efi_runtime_update_mappings(void)
return;
}
+ /*
+ * Use the EFI Memory Attribute Table for mapping permissions if it
+ * exists, since it is intended to supersede EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE.
+ */
+ if (efi_enabled(EFI_MEM_ATTR)) {
+ efi_memattr_apply_permissions(NULL, efi_update_mem_attr);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE is intended to replace
+ * EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE. So, use EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE to update
+ * permissions only if EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE is not
+ * published by the firmware. Even if we find a buggy implementation of
+ * EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE, don't fall back to
+ * EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE, because of the same reason.
+ */
+
if (!efi_enabled(EFI_NX_PE_DATA))
return;
@@ -446,15 +498,7 @@ void __init efi_runtime_update_mappings(void)
(md->type != EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE))
pf |= _PAGE_RW;
- /* Update the 1:1 mapping */
- pfn = md->phys_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
- if (kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd, pfn, md->phys_addr, md->num_pages, pf))
- pr_warn("Error mapping PA 0x%llx -> VA 0x%llx!\n",
- md->phys_addr, md->virt_addr);
-
- if (kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd, pfn, md->virt_addr, md->num_pages, pf))
- pr_warn("Error mapping PA 0x%llx -> VA 0x%llx!\n",
- md->phys_addr, md->virt_addr);
+ efi_update_mappings(md, pf);
}
}
diff --git a/drivers/acpi/bgrt.c b/drivers/acpi/bgrt.c
index 75f128e766a9..ca28aa572aa9 100644
--- a/drivers/acpi/bgrt.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/bgrt.c
@@ -15,40 +15,41 @@
#include <linux/sysfs.h>
#include <linux/efi-bgrt.h>
+static void *bgrt_image;
static struct kobject *bgrt_kobj;
static ssize_t show_version(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
- return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", bgrt_tab->version);
+ return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", bgrt_tab.version);
}
static DEVICE_ATTR(version, S_IRUGO, show_version, NULL);
static ssize_t show_status(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
- return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", bgrt_tab->status);
+ return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", bgrt_tab.status);
}
static DEVICE_ATTR(status, S_IRUGO, show_status, NULL);
static ssize_t show_type(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
- return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", bgrt_tab->image_type);
+ return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", bgrt_tab.image_type);
}
static DEVICE_ATTR(type, S_IRUGO, show_type, NULL);
static ssize_t show_xoffset(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
- return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", bgrt_tab->image_offset_x);
+ return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", bgrt_tab.image_offset_x);
}
static DEVICE_ATTR(xoffset, S_IRUGO, show_xoffset, NULL);
static ssize_t show_yoffset(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
- return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", bgrt_tab->image_offset_y);
+ return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", bgrt_tab.image_offset_y);
}
static DEVICE_ATTR(yoffset, S_IRUGO, show_yoffset, NULL);
@@ -84,15 +85,24 @@ static int __init bgrt_init(void)
{
int ret;
- if (!bgrt_image)
+ if (!bgrt_tab.image_address)
return -ENODEV;
+ bgrt_image = memremap(bgrt_tab.image_address, bgrt_image_size,
+ MEMREMAP_WB);
+ if (!bgrt_image) {
+ pr_notice("Ignoring BGRT: failed to map image memory\n");
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
bin_attr_image.private = bgrt_image;
bin_attr_image.size = bgrt_image_size;
bgrt_kobj = kobject_create_and_add("bgrt", acpi_kobj);
- if (!bgrt_kobj)
- return -EINVAL;
+ if (!bgrt_kobj) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_memmap;
+ }
ret = sysfs_create_group(bgrt_kobj, &bgrt_attribute_group);
if (ret)
@@ -102,6 +112,8 @@ static int __init bgrt_init(void)
out_kobject:
kobject_put(bgrt_kobj);
+out_memmap:
+ memunmap(bgrt_image);
return ret;
}
device_initcall(bgrt_init);
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/arm-init.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/arm-init.c
index f853ad2c4ca0..1027d7b44358 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/arm-init.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/arm-init.c
@@ -250,7 +250,6 @@ void __init efi_init(void)
}
reserve_regions();
- efi_memattr_init();
efi_esrt_init();
efi_memmap_unmap();
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c
index 92914801e388..e7d404059b73 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c
@@ -529,6 +529,8 @@ int __init efi_config_parse_tables(void *config_tables, int count, int sz,
}
}
+ efi_memattr_init();
+
/* Parse the EFI Properties table if it exists */
if (efi.properties_table != EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR) {
efi_properties_table_t *tbl;
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/esrt.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/esrt.c
index 14914074f716..08b026864d4e 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/esrt.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/esrt.c
@@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ void __init efi_esrt_init(void)
max -= efi.esrt;
if (max < size) {
- pr_err("ESRT header doen't fit on single memory map entry. (size: %zu max: %zu)\n",
+ pr_err("ESRT header doesn't fit on single memory map entry. (size: %zu max: %zu)\n",
size, max);
return;
}
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
index d564d25df8ab..f7425960f6a5 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ cflags-$(CONFIG_X86) += -m$(BITS) -D__KERNEL__ -O2 \
-mno-mmx -mno-sse
cflags-$(CONFIG_ARM64) := $(subst -pg,,$(KBUILD_CFLAGS))
-cflags-$(CONFIG_ARM) := $(subst -pg,,$(KBUILD_CFLAGS)) -g0 \
+cflags-$(CONFIG_ARM) := $(subst -pg,,$(KBUILD_CFLAGS)) \
-fno-builtin -fpic -mno-single-pic-base
cflags-$(CONFIG_EFI_ARMSTUB) += -I$(srctree)/scripts/dtc/libfdt
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD := y
# Prevents link failures: __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() is not linked in.
KCOV_INSTRUMENT := n
-lib-y := efi-stub-helper.o gop.o
+lib-y := efi-stub-helper.o gop.o secureboot.o
# include the stub's generic dependencies from lib/ when building for ARM/arm64
arm-deps := fdt_rw.c fdt_ro.c fdt_wip.c fdt.c fdt_empty_tree.c fdt_sw.c sort.c
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ CFLAGS_arm64-stub.o := -DTEXT_OFFSET=$(TEXT_OFFSET)
extra-$(CONFIG_EFI_ARMSTUB) := $(lib-y)
lib-$(CONFIG_EFI_ARMSTUB) := $(patsubst %.o,%.stub.o,$(lib-y))
-STUBCOPY_FLAGS-y := -R .debug* -R *ksymtab* -R *kcrctab*
+STUBCOPY_RM-y := -R *ksymtab* -R *kcrctab*
STUBCOPY_FLAGS-$(CONFIG_ARM64) += --prefix-alloc-sections=.init \
--prefix-symbols=__efistub_
STUBCOPY_RELOC-$(CONFIG_ARM64) := R_AARCH64_ABS
@@ -68,17 +68,25 @@ STUBCOPY_RELOC-$(CONFIG_ARM64) := R_AARCH64_ABS
$(obj)/%.stub.o: $(obj)/%.o FORCE
$(call if_changed,stubcopy)
+#
+# Strip debug sections and some other sections that may legally contain
+# absolute relocations, so that we can inspect the remaining sections for
+# such relocations. If none are found, regenerate the output object, but
+# this time, use objcopy and leave all sections in place.
+#
quiet_cmd_stubcopy = STUBCPY $@
- cmd_stubcopy = if $(OBJCOPY) $(STUBCOPY_FLAGS-y) $< $@; then \
- $(OBJDUMP) -r $@ | grep $(STUBCOPY_RELOC-y) \
- && (echo >&2 "$@: absolute symbol references not allowed in the EFI stub"; \
- rm -f $@; /bin/false); else /bin/false; fi
+ cmd_stubcopy = if $(STRIP) --strip-debug $(STUBCOPY_RM-y) -o $@ $<; \
+ then if $(OBJDUMP) -r $@ | grep $(STUBCOPY_RELOC-y); \
+ then (echo >&2 "$@: absolute symbol references not allowed in the EFI stub"; \
+ rm -f $@; /bin/false); \
+ else $(OBJCOPY) $(STUBCOPY_FLAGS-y) $< $@; fi \
+ else /bin/false; fi
#
# ARM discards the .data section because it disallows r/w data in the
# decompressor. So move our .data to .data.efistub, which is preserved
# explicitly by the decompressor linker script.
#
-STUBCOPY_FLAGS-$(CONFIG_ARM) += --rename-section .data=.data.efistub \
- -R ___ksymtab+sort -R ___kcrctab+sort
+STUBCOPY_FLAGS-$(CONFIG_ARM) += --rename-section .data=.data.efistub
+STUBCOPY_RM-$(CONFIG_ARM) += -R ___ksymtab+sort -R ___kcrctab+sort
STUBCOPY_RELOC-$(CONFIG_ARM) := R_ARM_ABS
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c
index b4f7d78f9e8b..d4056c6be1ec 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c
@@ -20,52 +20,6 @@
bool __nokaslr;
-static int efi_get_secureboot(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
-{
- static efi_char16_t const sb_var_name[] = {
- 'S', 'e', 'c', 'u', 'r', 'e', 'B', 'o', 'o', 't', 0 };
- static efi_char16_t const sm_var_name[] = {
- 'S', 'e', 't', 'u', 'p', 'M', 'o', 'd', 'e', 0 };
-
- efi_guid_t var_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID;
- efi_get_variable_t *f_getvar = sys_table_arg->runtime->get_variable;
- u8 val;
- unsigned long size = sizeof(val);
- efi_status_t status;
-
- status = f_getvar((efi_char16_t *)sb_var_name, (efi_guid_t *)&var_guid,
- NULL, &size, &val);
-
- if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
- goto out_efi_err;
-
- if (val == 0)
- return 0;
-
- status = f_getvar((efi_char16_t *)sm_var_name, (efi_guid_t *)&var_guid,
- NULL, &size, &val);
-
- if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
- goto out_efi_err;
-
- if (val == 1)
- return 0;
-
- return 1;
-
-out_efi_err:
- switch (status) {
- case EFI_NOT_FOUND:
- return 0;
- case EFI_DEVICE_ERROR:
- return -EIO;
- case EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION:
- return -EACCES;
- default:
- return -EINVAL;
- }
-}
-
efi_status_t efi_open_volume(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg,
void *__image, void **__fh)
{
@@ -91,75 +45,6 @@ efi_status_t efi_open_volume(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg,
return status;
}
-efi_status_t efi_file_close(void *handle)
-{
- efi_file_handle_t *fh = handle;
-
- return fh->close(handle);
-}
-
-efi_status_t
-efi_file_read(void *handle, unsigned long *size, void *addr)
-{
- efi_file_handle_t *fh = handle;
-
- return fh->read(handle, size, addr);
-}
-
-
-efi_status_t
-efi_file_size(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg, void *__fh,
- efi_char16_t *filename_16, void **handle, u64 *file_sz)
-{
- efi_file_handle_t *h, *fh = __fh;
- efi_file_info_t *info;
- efi_status_t status;
- efi_guid_t info_guid = EFI_FILE_INFO_ID;
- unsigned long info_sz;
-
- status = fh->open(fh, &h, filename_16, EFI_FILE_MODE_READ, (u64)0);
- if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
- efi_printk(sys_table_arg, "Failed to open file: ");
- efi_char16_printk(sys_table_arg, filename_16);
- efi_printk(sys_table_arg, "\n");
- return status;
- }
-
- *handle = h;
-
- info_sz = 0;
- status = h->get_info(h, &info_guid, &info_sz, NULL);
- if (status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
- efi_printk(sys_table_arg, "Failed to get file info size\n");
- return status;
- }
-
-grow:
- status = sys_table_arg->boottime->allocate_pool(EFI_LOADER_DATA,
- info_sz, (void **)&info);
- if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
- efi_printk(sys_table_arg, "Failed to alloc mem for file info\n");
- return status;
- }
-
- status = h->get_info(h, &info_guid, &info_sz,
- info);
- if (status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
- sys_table_arg->boottime->free_pool(info);
- goto grow;
- }
-
- *file_sz = info->file_size;
- sys_table_arg->boottime->free_pool(info);
-
- if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
- efi_printk(sys_table_arg, "Failed to get initrd info\n");
-
- return status;
-}
-
-
-
void efi_char16_printk(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg,
efi_char16_t *str)
{
@@ -226,7 +111,7 @@ unsigned long efi_entry(void *handle, efi_system_table_t *sys_table,
efi_guid_t loaded_image_proto = LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL_GUID;
unsigned long reserve_addr = 0;
unsigned long reserve_size = 0;
- int secure_boot = 0;
+ enum efi_secureboot_mode secure_boot;
struct screen_info *si;
/* Check if we were booted by the EFI firmware */
@@ -296,19 +181,14 @@ unsigned long efi_entry(void *handle, efi_system_table_t *sys_table,
pr_efi_err(sys_table, "Failed to parse EFI cmdline options\n");
secure_boot = efi_get_secureboot(sys_table);
- if (secure_boot > 0)
- pr_efi(sys_table, "UEFI Secure Boot is enabled.\n");
-
- if (secure_boot < 0) {
- pr_efi_err(sys_table,
- "could not determine UEFI Secure Boot status.\n");
- }
/*
- * Unauthenticated device tree data is a security hazard, so
- * ignore 'dtb=' unless UEFI Secure Boot is disabled.
+ * Unauthenticated device tree data is a security hazard, so ignore
+ * 'dtb=' unless UEFI Secure Boot is disabled. We assume that secure
+ * boot is enabled if we can't determine its state.
*/
- if (secure_boot != 0 && strstr(cmdline_ptr, "dtb=")) {
+ if (secure_boot != efi_secureboot_mode_disabled &&
+ strstr(cmdline_ptr, "dtb=")) {
pr_efi(sys_table, "Ignoring DTB from command line.\n");
} else {
status = handle_cmdline_files(sys_table, image, cmdline_ptr,
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub-helper.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub-helper.c
index 757badc1debb..919822b7773d 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub-helper.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub-helper.c
@@ -338,6 +338,69 @@ void efi_free(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg, unsigned long size,
efi_call_early(free_pages, addr, nr_pages);
}
+static efi_status_t efi_file_size(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg, void *__fh,
+ efi_char16_t *filename_16, void **handle,
+ u64 *file_sz)
+{
+ efi_file_handle_t *h, *fh = __fh;
+ efi_file_info_t *info;
+ efi_status_t status;
+ efi_guid_t info_guid = EFI_FILE_INFO_ID;
+ unsigned long info_sz;
+
+ status = efi_call_proto(efi_file_handle, open, fh, &h, filename_16,
+ EFI_FILE_MODE_READ, (u64)0);
+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
+ efi_printk(sys_table_arg, "Failed to open file: ");
+ efi_char16_printk(sys_table_arg, filename_16);
+ efi_printk(sys_table_arg, "\n");
+ return status;
+ }
+
+ *handle = h;
+
+ info_sz = 0;
+ status = efi_call_proto(efi_file_handle, get_info, h, &info_guid,
+ &info_sz, NULL);
+ if (status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
+ efi_printk(sys_table_arg, "Failed to get file info size\n");
+ return status;
+ }
+
+grow:
+ status = efi_call_early(allocate_pool, EFI_LOADER_DATA,
+ info_sz, (void **)&info);
+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
+ efi_printk(sys_table_arg, "Failed to alloc mem for file info\n");
+ return status;
+ }
+
+ status = efi_call_proto(efi_file_handle, get_info, h, &info_guid,
+ &info_sz, info);
+ if (status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
+ efi_call_early(free_pool, info);
+ goto grow;
+ }
+
+ *file_sz = info->file_size;
+ efi_call_early(free_pool, info);
+
+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
+ efi_printk(sys_table_arg, "Failed to get initrd info\n");
+
+ return status;
+}
+
+static efi_status_t efi_file_read(void *handle, unsigned long *size, void *addr)
+{
+ return efi_call_proto(efi_file_handle, read, handle, size, addr);
+}
+
+static efi_status_t efi_file_close(void *handle)
+{
+ return efi_call_proto(efi_file_handle, close, handle);
+}
+
/*
* Parse the ASCII string 'cmdline' for EFI options, denoted by the efi=
* option, e.g. efi=nochunk.
@@ -351,6 +414,14 @@ efi_status_t efi_parse_options(char *cmdline)
char *str;
/*
+ * Currently, the only efi= option we look for is 'nochunk', which
+ * is intended to work around known issues on certain x86 UEFI
+ * versions. So ignore for now on other architectures.
+ */
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86))
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+
+ /*
* If no EFI parameters were specified on the cmdline we've got
* nothing to do.
*/
@@ -523,7 +594,8 @@ efi_status_t handle_cmdline_files(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg,
size = files[j].size;
while (size) {
unsigned long chunksize;
- if (size > __chunk_size)
+
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86) && size > __chunk_size)
chunksize = __chunk_size;
else
chunksize = size;
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h
index 0e2a96b12cb3..71c4d0e3c4ed 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h
@@ -29,14 +29,6 @@ void efi_char16_printk(efi_system_table_t *, efi_char16_t *);
efi_status_t efi_open_volume(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg, void *__image,
void **__fh);
-efi_status_t efi_file_size(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg, void *__fh,
- efi_char16_t *filename_16, void **handle,
- u64 *file_sz);
-
-efi_status_t efi_file_read(void *handle, unsigned long *size, void *addr);
-
-efi_status_t efi_file_close(void *handle);
-
unsigned long get_dram_base(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg);
efi_status_t allocate_new_fdt_and_exit_boot(efi_system_table_t *sys_table,
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..6def402bf569
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+/*
+ * Secure boot handling.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2013,2014 Linaro Limited
+ * Roy Franz <roy.franz-QSEj5FYQhm4dnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org
+ * Copyright (C) 2013 Red Hat, Inc.
+ * Mark Salter <msalter-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
+ *
+ * This file is part of the Linux kernel, and is made available under the
+ * terms of the GNU General Public License version 2.
+ */
+#include <linux/efi.h>
+#include <asm/efi.h>
+
+/* BIOS variables */
+static const efi_guid_t efi_variable_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID;
+static const efi_char16_t const efi_SecureBoot_name[] = {
+ 'S', 'e', 'c', 'u', 'r', 'e', 'B', 'o', 'o', 't', 0
+};
+static const efi_char16_t const efi_SetupMode_name[] = {
+ 'S', 'e', 't', 'u', 'p', 'M', 'o', 'd', 'e', 0
+};
+
+/* SHIM variables */
+static const efi_guid_t shim_guid = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID;
+static efi_char16_t const shim_MokSBState_name[] = {
+ 'M', 'o', 'k', 'S', 'B', 'S', 't', 'a', 't', 'e', 0
+};
+
+#define get_efi_var(name, vendor, ...) \
+ efi_call_runtime(get_variable, \
+ (efi_char16_t *)(name), (efi_guid_t *)(vendor), \
+ __VA_ARGS__);
+
+/*
+ * Determine whether we're in secure boot mode.
+ */
+enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
+{
+ u32 attr;
+ u8 secboot, setupmode, moksbstate;
+ unsigned long size;
+ efi_status_t status;
+
+ size = sizeof(secboot);
+ status = get_efi_var(efi_SecureBoot_name, &efi_variable_guid,
+ NULL, &size, &secboot);
+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
+ goto out_efi_err;
+
+ size = sizeof(setupmode);
+ status = get_efi_var(efi_SetupMode_name, &efi_variable_guid,
+ NULL, &size, &setupmode);
+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
+ goto out_efi_err;
+
+ if (secboot == 0 || setupmode == 1)
+ return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled;
+
+ /*
+ * See if a user has put the shim into insecure mode. If so, and if the
+ * variable doesn't have the runtime attribute set, we might as well
+ * honor that.
+ */
+ size = sizeof(moksbstate);
+ status = get_efi_var(shim_MokSBState_name, &shim_guid,
+ &attr, &size, &moksbstate);
+
+ /* If it fails, we don't care why. Default to secure */
+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
+ goto secure_boot_enabled;
+ if (!(attr & EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS) && moksbstate == 1)
+ return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled;
+
+secure_boot_enabled:
+ pr_efi(sys_table_arg, "UEFI Secure Boot is enabled.\n");
+ return efi_secureboot_mode_enabled;
+
+out_efi_err:
+ pr_efi_err(sys_table_arg, "Could not determine UEFI Secure Boot status.\n");
+ if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND)
+ return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled;
+ return efi_secureboot_mode_unknown;
+}
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/memattr.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/memattr.c
index 236004b9a50d..8986757eafaf 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/memattr.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/memattr.c
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ int __init efi_memattr_init(void)
tbl_size = sizeof(*tbl) + tbl->num_entries * tbl->desc_size;
memblock_reserve(efi.mem_attr_table, tbl_size);
+ set_bit(EFI_MEM_ATTR, &efi.flags);
unmap:
early_memunmap(tbl, sizeof(*tbl));
@@ -174,8 +175,11 @@ int __init efi_memattr_apply_permissions(struct mm_struct *mm,
md.phys_addr + size - 1,
efi_md_typeattr_format(buf, sizeof(buf), &md));
- if (valid)
+ if (valid) {
ret = fn(mm, &md);
+ if (ret)
+ pr_err("Error updating mappings, skipping subsequent md's\n");
+ }
}
memunmap(tbl);
return ret;
diff --git a/include/linux/efi-bgrt.h b/include/linux/efi-bgrt.h
index 051b21fedf68..2fd3993c370b 100644
--- a/include/linux/efi-bgrt.h
+++ b/include/linux/efi-bgrt.h
@@ -1,20 +1,19 @@
#ifndef _LINUX_EFI_BGRT_H
#define _LINUX_EFI_BGRT_H
-#ifdef CONFIG_ACPI_BGRT
-
#include <linux/acpi.h>
-void efi_bgrt_init(void);
+#ifdef CONFIG_ACPI_BGRT
+
+void efi_bgrt_init(struct acpi_table_header *table);
/* The BGRT data itself; only valid if bgrt_image != NULL. */
-extern void *bgrt_image;
extern size_t bgrt_image_size;
-extern struct acpi_table_bgrt *bgrt_tab;
+extern struct acpi_table_bgrt bgrt_tab;
#else /* !CONFIG_ACPI_BGRT */
-static inline void efi_bgrt_init(void) {}
+static inline void efi_bgrt_init(struct acpi_table_header *table) {}
#endif /* !CONFIG_ACPI_BGRT */
diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
index 5b1af30ece55..94d34e0be24f 100644
--- a/include/linux/efi.h
+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
@@ -509,24 +509,6 @@ typedef struct {
u64 query_variable_info;
} efi_runtime_services_64_t;
-typedef struct {
- efi_table_hdr_t hdr;
- void *get_time;
- void *set_time;
- void *get_wakeup_time;
- void *set_wakeup_time;
- void *set_virtual_address_map;
- void *convert_pointer;
- void *get_variable;
- void *get_next_variable;
- void *set_variable;
- void *get_next_high_mono_count;
- void *reset_system;
- void *update_capsule;
- void *query_capsule_caps;
- void *query_variable_info;
-} efi_runtime_services_t;
-
typedef efi_status_t efi_get_time_t (efi_time_t *tm, efi_time_cap_t *tc);
typedef efi_status_t efi_set_time_t (efi_time_t *tm);
typedef efi_status_t efi_get_wakeup_time_t (efi_bool_t *enabled, efi_bool_t *pending,
@@ -561,6 +543,24 @@ typedef efi_status_t efi_query_variable_store_t(u32 attributes,
unsigned long size,
bool nonblocking);
+typedef struct {
+ efi_table_hdr_t hdr;
+ efi_get_time_t *get_time;
+ efi_set_time_t *set_time;
+ efi_get_wakeup_time_t *get_wakeup_time;
+ efi_set_wakeup_time_t *set_wakeup_time;
+ efi_set_virtual_address_map_t *set_virtual_address_map;
+ void *convert_pointer;
+ efi_get_variable_t *get_variable;
+ efi_get_next_variable_t *get_next_variable;
+ efi_set_variable_t *set_variable;
+ efi_get_next_high_mono_count_t *get_next_high_mono_count;
+ efi_reset_system_t *reset_system;
+ efi_update_capsule_t *update_capsule;
+ efi_query_capsule_caps_t *query_capsule_caps;
+ efi_query_variable_info_t *query_variable_info;
+} efi_runtime_services_t;
+
void efi_native_runtime_setup(void);
/*
@@ -611,6 +611,9 @@ void efi_native_runtime_setup(void);
#define EFI_CONSOLE_OUT_DEVICE_GUID EFI_GUID(0xd3b36f2c, 0xd551, 0x11d4, 0x9a, 0x46, 0x00, 0x90, 0x27, 0x3f, 0xc1, 0x4d)
#define APPLE_PROPERTIES_PROTOCOL_GUID EFI_GUID(0x91bd12fe, 0xf6c3, 0x44fb, 0xa5, 0xb7, 0x51, 0x22, 0xab, 0x30, 0x3a, 0xe0)
+#define EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID EFI_GUID(0xd719b2cb, 0x3d3a, 0x4596, 0xa3, 0xbc, 0xda, 0xd0, 0x0e, 0x67, 0x65, 0x6f)
+#define EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID EFI_GUID(0x605dab50, 0xe046, 0x4300, 0xab, 0xb6, 0x3d, 0xd8, 0x10, 0xdd, 0x8b, 0x23)
+
/*
* This GUID is used to pass to the kernel proper the struct screen_info
* structure that was populated by the stub based on the GOP protocol instance
@@ -1065,6 +1068,7 @@ extern int __init efi_setup_pcdp_console(char *);
#define EFI_ARCH_1 7 /* First arch-specific bit */
#define EFI_DBG 8 /* Print additional debug info at runtime */
#define EFI_NX_PE_DATA 9 /* Can runtime data regions be mapped non-executable? */
+#define EFI_MEM_ATTR 10 /* Did firmware publish an EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES table? */
#ifdef CONFIG_EFI
/*
@@ -1240,17 +1244,17 @@ struct efivar_entry {
bool deleting;
};
-struct efi_simple_text_output_protocol_32 {
+typedef struct {
u32 reset;
u32 output_string;
u32 test_string;
-};
+} efi_simple_text_output_protocol_32_t;
-struct efi_simple_text_output_protocol_64 {
+typedef struct {
u64 reset;
u64 output_string;
u64 test_string;
-};
+} efi_simple_text_output_protocol_64_t;
struct efi_simple_text_output_protocol {
void *reset;
@@ -1476,6 +1480,14 @@ efi_status_t efi_setup_gop(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg,
bool efi_runtime_disabled(void);
extern void efi_call_virt_check_flags(unsigned long flags, const char *call);
+enum efi_secureboot_mode {
+ efi_secureboot_mode_unset,
+ efi_secureboot_mode_unknown,
+ efi_secureboot_mode_disabled,
+ efi_secureboot_mode_enabled,
+};
+enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot(efi_system_table_t *sys_table);
+
/*
* Arch code can implement the following three template macros, avoiding
* reptition for the void/non-void return cases of {__,}efi_call_virt():
diff --git a/init/main.c b/init/main.c
index b0c9d6facef9..9648d707eea5 100644
--- a/init/main.c
+++ b/init/main.c
@@ -663,7 +663,6 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init start_kernel(void)
sfi_init_late();
if (efi_enabled(EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES)) {
- efi_late_init();
efi_free_boot_services();
}
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: [GIT PULL] EFI changes for v4.11
Date: Mon, 20 Feb 2017 10:40:17 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170220094017.GA9846@gmail.com> (raw)
Linus,
Please pull the latest efi-core-for-linus git tree from:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git efi-core-for-linus
# HEAD: b3879a4d3a31ef14265a52e8d941cf4b0f6627ae efi/libstub: Make file I/O chunking x86-specific
The main changes in this cycle were:
- Changes to the EFI init code to establish whether secure boot authentication
was performed at boot time. (Josh Boyer, David Howells)
- Wire up the UEFI memory attributes table for x86. This eliminates any
runtime memory regions that are both writable and executable, on recent
firmware versions. (Sai Praneeth)
- Move the BGRT init code to an earlier stage so that we can still use
efi_mem_reserve(). (Dave Young)
- Preserve debug symbols in the ARM/arm64 UEFI stub (Ard Biesheuvel)
- Code deduplication work and various other cleanups (Lukas Wunner)
- ... plus various other fixes and cleanups.
Thanks,
Ingo
------------------>
Ard Biesheuvel (3):
efi: Use typed function pointers for the runtime services table
efi/libstub: Preserve .debug sections after absolute relocation check
efi/libstub: Make file I/O chunking x86-specific
Colin Ian King (1):
efi/esrt: Fix typo in pr_err() message
Dave Young (2):
efi/x86: Move the EFI BGRT init code to early init code
efi/x86: Add debug code to print cooked memmap
David Howells (4):
x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services
arm/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services
efi: Get and store the secure boot status
efi: Print the secure boot status in x86 setup_arch()
Josh Boyer (2):
efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions
efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode
Lukas Wunner (2):
efi: Deduplicate efi_file_size() / _read() / _close()
x86/efi: Deduplicate efi_char16_printk()
Sai Praneeth (3):
efi: Make EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE initialization common across all architectures
efi: Introduce the EFI_MEM_ATTR bit and set it from the memory attributes table
x86/efi: Add support for EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE
Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt | 2 +
arch/arm/include/asm/efi.h | 1 +
arch/arm64/include/asm/efi.h | 1 +
arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c | 182 ++-----------------------
arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S | 6 +-
arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S | 8 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h | 5 +
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h | 3 +-
arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c | 9 ++
arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 14 ++
arch/x86/platform/efi/efi-bgrt.c | 59 ++++----
arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c | 10 +-
arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c | 64 +++++++--
drivers/acpi/bgrt.c | 28 ++--
drivers/firmware/efi/arm-init.c | 1 -
drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 2 +
drivers/firmware/efi/esrt.c | 2 +-
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile | 26 ++--
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c | 132 +-----------------
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub-helper.c | 74 +++++++++-
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h | 8 --
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c | 84 ++++++++++++
drivers/firmware/efi/memattr.c | 6 +-
include/linux/efi-bgrt.h | 11 +-
include/linux/efi.h | 56 +++++---
init/main.c | 1 -
27 files changed, 383 insertions(+), 413 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c
diff --git a/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt b/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt
index 95a4d34af3fd..b8527c6b7646 100644
--- a/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt
+++ b/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt
@@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ Offset Proto Name Meaning
1E9/001 ALL eddbuf_entries Number of entries in eddbuf (below)
1EA/001 ALL edd_mbr_sig_buf_entries Number of entries in edd_mbr_sig_buffer
(below)
+1EB/001 ALL kbd_status Numlock is enabled
+1EC/001 ALL secure_boot Secure boot is enabled in the firmware
1EF/001 ALL sentinel Used to detect broken bootloaders
290/040 ALL edd_mbr_sig_buffer EDD MBR signatures
2D0/A00 ALL e820_map E820 memory map table
diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/efi.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/efi.h
index 0b06f5341b45..e4e6a9d6a825 100644
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/efi.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/efi.h
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ void efi_virtmap_unload(void);
#define efi_call_early(f, ...) sys_table_arg->boottime->f(__VA_ARGS__)
#define __efi_call_early(f, ...) f(__VA_ARGS__)
+#define efi_call_runtime(f, ...) sys_table_arg->runtime->f(__VA_ARGS__)
#define efi_is_64bit() (false)
#define efi_call_proto(protocol, f, instance, ...) \
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/efi.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/efi.h
index 0b6b1633017f..e7445281e534 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/efi.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/efi.h
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ int efi_set_mapping_permissions(struct mm_struct *mm, efi_memory_desc_t *md);
#define efi_call_early(f, ...) sys_table_arg->boottime->f(__VA_ARGS__)
#define __efi_call_early(f, ...) f(__VA_ARGS__)
+#define efi_call_runtime(f, ...) sys_table_arg->runtime->f(__VA_ARGS__)
#define efi_is_64bit() (true)
#define efi_call_proto(protocol, f, instance, ...) \
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
index ff01c8fc76f7..801c7a158e55 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
@@ -32,160 +32,13 @@ static void setup_boot_services##bits(struct efi_config *c) \
\
table = (typeof(table))sys_table; \
\
+ c->runtime_services = table->runtime; \
c->boot_services = table->boottime; \
c->text_output = table->con_out; \
}
BOOT_SERVICES(32);
BOOT_SERVICES(64);
-void efi_char16_printk(efi_system_table_t *, efi_char16_t *);
-
-static efi_status_t
-__file_size32(void *__fh, efi_char16_t *filename_16,
- void **handle, u64 *file_sz)
-{
- efi_file_handle_32_t *h, *fh = __fh;
- efi_file_info_t *info;
- efi_status_t status;
- efi_guid_t info_guid = EFI_FILE_INFO_ID;
- u32 info_sz;
-
- status = efi_early->call((unsigned long)fh->open, fh, &h, filename_16,
- EFI_FILE_MODE_READ, (u64)0);
- if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
- efi_printk(sys_table, "Failed to open file: ");
- efi_char16_printk(sys_table, filename_16);
- efi_printk(sys_table, "\n");
- return status;
- }
-
- *handle = h;
-
- info_sz = 0;
- status = efi_early->call((unsigned long)h->get_info, h, &info_guid,
- &info_sz, NULL);
- if (status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
- efi_printk(sys_table, "Failed to get file info size\n");
- return status;
- }
-
-grow:
- status = efi_call_early(allocate_pool, EFI_LOADER_DATA,
- info_sz, (void **)&info);
- if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
- efi_printk(sys_table, "Failed to alloc mem for file info\n");
- return status;
- }
-
- status = efi_early->call((unsigned long)h->get_info, h, &info_guid,
- &info_sz, info);
- if (status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
- efi_call_early(free_pool, info);
- goto grow;
- }
-
- *file_sz = info->file_size;
- efi_call_early(free_pool, info);
-
- if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
- efi_printk(sys_table, "Failed to get initrd info\n");
-
- return status;
-}
-
-static efi_status_t
-__file_size64(void *__fh, efi_char16_t *filename_16,
- void **handle, u64 *file_sz)
-{
- efi_file_handle_64_t *h, *fh = __fh;
- efi_file_info_t *info;
- efi_status_t status;
- efi_guid_t info_guid = EFI_FILE_INFO_ID;
- u64 info_sz;
-
- status = efi_early->call((unsigned long)fh->open, fh, &h, filename_16,
- EFI_FILE_MODE_READ, (u64)0);
- if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
- efi_printk(sys_table, "Failed to open file: ");
- efi_char16_printk(sys_table, filename_16);
- efi_printk(sys_table, "\n");
- return status;
- }
-
- *handle = h;
-
- info_sz = 0;
- status = efi_early->call((unsigned long)h->get_info, h, &info_guid,
- &info_sz, NULL);
- if (status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
- efi_printk(sys_table, "Failed to get file info size\n");
- return status;
- }
-
-grow:
- status = efi_call_early(allocate_pool, EFI_LOADER_DATA,
- info_sz, (void **)&info);
- if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
- efi_printk(sys_table, "Failed to alloc mem for file info\n");
- return status;
- }
-
- status = efi_early->call((unsigned long)h->get_info, h, &info_guid,
- &info_sz, info);
- if (status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
- efi_call_early(free_pool, info);
- goto grow;
- }
-
- *file_sz = info->file_size;
- efi_call_early(free_pool, info);
-
- if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
- efi_printk(sys_table, "Failed to get initrd info\n");
-
- return status;
-}
-efi_status_t
-efi_file_size(efi_system_table_t *sys_table, void *__fh,
- efi_char16_t *filename_16, void **handle, u64 *file_sz)
-{
- if (efi_early->is64)
- return __file_size64(__fh, filename_16, handle, file_sz);
-
- return __file_size32(__fh, filename_16, handle, file_sz);
-}
-
-efi_status_t
-efi_file_read(void *handle, unsigned long *size, void *addr)
-{
- unsigned long func;
-
- if (efi_early->is64) {
- efi_file_handle_64_t *fh = handle;
-
- func = (unsigned long)fh->read;
- return efi_early->call(func, handle, size, addr);
- } else {
- efi_file_handle_32_t *fh = handle;
-
- func = (unsigned long)fh->read;
- return efi_early->call(func, handle, size, addr);
- }
-}
-
-efi_status_t efi_file_close(void *handle)
-{
- if (efi_early->is64) {
- efi_file_handle_64_t *fh = handle;
-
- return efi_early->call((unsigned long)fh->close, handle);
- } else {
- efi_file_handle_32_t *fh = handle;
-
- return efi_early->call((unsigned long)fh->close, handle);
- }
-}
-
static inline efi_status_t __open_volume32(void *__image, void **__fh)
{
efi_file_io_interface_t *io;
@@ -249,30 +102,8 @@ efi_open_volume(efi_system_table_t *sys_table, void *__image, void **__fh)
void efi_char16_printk(efi_system_table_t *table, efi_char16_t *str)
{
- unsigned long output_string;
- size_t offset;
-
- if (efi_early->is64) {
- struct efi_simple_text_output_protocol_64 *out;
- u64 *func;
-
- offset = offsetof(typeof(*out), output_string);
- output_string = efi_early->text_output + offset;
- out = (typeof(out))(unsigned long)efi_early->text_output;
- func = (u64 *)output_string;
-
- efi_early->call(*func, out, str);
- } else {
- struct efi_simple_text_output_protocol_32 *out;
- u32 *func;
-
- offset = offsetof(typeof(*out), output_string);
- output_string = efi_early->text_output + offset;
- out = (typeof(out))(unsigned long)efi_early->text_output;
- func = (u32 *)output_string;
-
- efi_early->call(*func, out, str);
- }
+ efi_call_proto(efi_simple_text_output_protocol, output_string,
+ efi_early->text_output, str);
}
static efi_status_t
@@ -1157,6 +988,13 @@ struct boot_params *efi_main(struct efi_config *c,
else
setup_boot_services32(efi_early);
+ /*
+ * If the boot loader gave us a value for secure_boot then we use that,
+ * otherwise we ask the BIOS.
+ */
+ if (boot_params->secure_boot == efi_secureboot_mode_unset)
+ boot_params->secure_boot = efi_get_secureboot(sys_table);
+
setup_graphics(boot_params);
setup_efi_pci(boot_params);
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S
index fd0b6a272dd5..d85b9625e836 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ ENTRY(efi_pe_entry)
/* Relocate efi_config->call() */
leal efi32_config(%esi), %eax
- add %esi, 32(%eax)
+ add %esi, 40(%eax)
pushl %eax
call make_boot_params
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ ENTRY(efi32_stub_entry)
/* Relocate efi_config->call() */
leal efi32_config(%esi), %eax
- add %esi, 32(%eax)
+ add %esi, 40(%eax)
pushl %eax
2:
call efi_main
@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ ENDPROC(startup_32)
#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_STUB
.data
efi32_config:
- .fill 4,8,0
+ .fill 5,8,0
.long efi_call_phys
.long 0
.byte 0
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
index 4d85e600db78..d2ae1f821e0c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ ENTRY(efi_pe_entry)
/*
* Relocate efi_config->call().
*/
- addq %rbp, efi64_config+32(%rip)
+ addq %rbp, efi64_config+40(%rip)
movq %rax, %rdi
call make_boot_params
@@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ ENTRY(efi_pe_entry)
* Relocate efi_config->call().
*/
movq efi_config(%rip), %rax
- addq %rbp, 32(%rax)
+ addq %rbp, 40(%rax)
2:
movq efi_config(%rip), %rdi
call efi_main
@@ -456,14 +456,14 @@ ENDPROC(efi64_stub_entry)
#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_MIXED
.global efi32_config
efi32_config:
- .fill 4,8,0
+ .fill 5,8,0
.quad efi64_thunk
.byte 0
#endif
.global efi64_config
efi64_config:
- .fill 4,8,0
+ .fill 5,8,0
.quad efi_call
.byte 1
#endif /* CONFIG_EFI_STUB */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h
index e99675b9c861..2f77bcefe6b4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h
@@ -191,6 +191,7 @@ static inline efi_status_t efi_thunk_set_virtual_address_map(
struct efi_config {
u64 image_handle;
u64 table;
+ u64 runtime_services;
u64 boot_services;
u64 text_output;
efi_status_t (*call)(unsigned long, ...);
@@ -226,6 +227,10 @@ static inline bool efi_is_64bit(void)
#define __efi_call_early(f, ...) \
__efi_early()->call((unsigned long)f, __VA_ARGS__);
+#define efi_call_runtime(f, ...) \
+ __efi_early()->call(efi_table_attr(efi_runtime_services, f, \
+ __efi_early()->runtime_services), __VA_ARGS__)
+
extern bool efi_reboot_required(void);
#else
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h
index b10bf319ed20..5138dacf8bb8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h
@@ -135,7 +135,8 @@ struct boot_params {
__u8 eddbuf_entries; /* 0x1e9 */
__u8 edd_mbr_sig_buf_entries; /* 0x1ea */
__u8 kbd_status; /* 0x1eb */
- __u8 _pad5[3]; /* 0x1ec */
+ __u8 secure_boot; /* 0x1ec */
+ __u8 _pad5[2]; /* 0x1ed */
/*
* The sentinel is set to a nonzero value (0xff) in header.S.
*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c
index 64422f850e95..7ff007ed899d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
#include <linux/bootmem.h>
#include <linux/ioport.h>
#include <linux/pci.h>
+#include <linux/efi-bgrt.h>
#include <asm/irqdomain.h>
#include <asm/pci_x86.h>
@@ -1557,6 +1558,12 @@ int __init early_acpi_boot_init(void)
return 0;
}
+static int __init acpi_parse_bgrt(struct acpi_table_header *table)
+{
+ efi_bgrt_init(table);
+ return 0;
+}
+
int __init acpi_boot_init(void)
{
/* those are executed after early-quirks are executed */
@@ -1581,6 +1588,8 @@ int __init acpi_boot_init(void)
acpi_process_madt();
acpi_table_parse(ACPI_SIG_HPET, acpi_parse_hpet);
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ACPI_BGRT))
+ acpi_table_parse(ACPI_SIG_BGRT, acpi_parse_bgrt);
if (!acpi_noirq)
x86_init.pci.init = pci_acpi_init;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c
index c62e015b126c..de827d6ac8c2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c
@@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ void common(void) {
BLANK();
OFFSET(BP_scratch, boot_params, scratch);
+ OFFSET(BP_secure_boot, boot_params, secure_boot);
OFFSET(BP_loadflags, boot_params, hdr.loadflags);
OFFSET(BP_hardware_subarch, boot_params, hdr.hardware_subarch);
OFFSET(BP_version, boot_params, hdr.version);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
index 4cfba947d774..69780edf0dde 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
@@ -1176,6 +1176,20 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
/* Allocate bigger log buffer */
setup_log_buf(1);
+ if (efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT)) {
+ switch (boot_params.secure_boot) {
+ case efi_secureboot_mode_disabled:
+ pr_info("Secure boot disabled\n");
+ break;
+ case efi_secureboot_mode_enabled:
+ pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n");
+ break;
+ default:
+ pr_info("Secure boot could not be determined\n");
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
reserve_initrd();
acpi_table_upgrade();
diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi-bgrt.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi-bgrt.c
index 6aad870e8962..04ca8764f0c0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi-bgrt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi-bgrt.c
@@ -19,8 +19,7 @@
#include <linux/efi.h>
#include <linux/efi-bgrt.h>
-struct acpi_table_bgrt *bgrt_tab;
-void *__initdata bgrt_image;
+struct acpi_table_bgrt bgrt_tab;
size_t __initdata bgrt_image_size;
struct bmp_header {
@@ -28,66 +27,58 @@ struct bmp_header {
u32 size;
} __packed;
-void __init efi_bgrt_init(void)
+void __init efi_bgrt_init(struct acpi_table_header *table)
{
- acpi_status status;
void *image;
struct bmp_header bmp_header;
+ struct acpi_table_bgrt *bgrt = &bgrt_tab;
if (acpi_disabled)
return;
- status = acpi_get_table("BGRT", 0,
- (struct acpi_table_header **)&bgrt_tab);
- if (ACPI_FAILURE(status))
- return;
-
- if (bgrt_tab->header.length < sizeof(*bgrt_tab)) {
+ if (table->length < sizeof(bgrt_tab)) {
pr_notice("Ignoring BGRT: invalid length %u (expected %zu)\n",
- bgrt_tab->header.length, sizeof(*bgrt_tab));
+ table->length, sizeof(bgrt_tab));
return;
}
- if (bgrt_tab->version != 1) {
+ *bgrt = *(struct acpi_table_bgrt *)table;
+ if (bgrt->version != 1) {
pr_notice("Ignoring BGRT: invalid version %u (expected 1)\n",
- bgrt_tab->version);
- return;
+ bgrt->version);
+ goto out;
}
- if (bgrt_tab->status & 0xfe) {
+ if (bgrt->status & 0xfe) {
pr_notice("Ignoring BGRT: reserved status bits are non-zero %u\n",
- bgrt_tab->status);
- return;
+ bgrt->status);
+ goto out;
}
- if (bgrt_tab->image_type != 0) {
+ if (bgrt->image_type != 0) {
pr_notice("Ignoring BGRT: invalid image type %u (expected 0)\n",
- bgrt_tab->image_type);
- return;
+ bgrt->image_type);
+ goto out;
}
- if (!bgrt_tab->image_address) {
+ if (!bgrt->image_address) {
pr_notice("Ignoring BGRT: null image address\n");
- return;
+ goto out;
}
- image = memremap(bgrt_tab->image_address, sizeof(bmp_header), MEMREMAP_WB);
+ image = early_memremap(bgrt->image_address, sizeof(bmp_header));
if (!image) {
pr_notice("Ignoring BGRT: failed to map image header memory\n");
- return;
+ goto out;
}
memcpy(&bmp_header, image, sizeof(bmp_header));
- memunmap(image);
+ early_memunmap(image, sizeof(bmp_header));
if (bmp_header.id != 0x4d42) {
pr_notice("Ignoring BGRT: Incorrect BMP magic number 0x%x (expected 0x4d42)\n",
bmp_header.id);
- return;
+ goto out;
}
bgrt_image_size = bmp_header.size;
+ efi_mem_reserve(bgrt->image_address, bgrt_image_size);
- bgrt_image = memremap(bgrt_tab->image_address, bmp_header.size, MEMREMAP_WB);
- if (!bgrt_image) {
- pr_notice("Ignoring BGRT: failed to map image memory\n");
- bgrt_image = NULL;
- return;
- }
-
- efi_mem_reserve(bgrt_tab->image_address, bgrt_image_size);
+ return;
+out:
+ memset(bgrt, 0, sizeof(bgrt_tab));
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c
index 274dfc481849..565dff3c9a12 100644
--- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c
+++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c
@@ -542,11 +542,6 @@ void __init efi_init(void)
efi_print_memmap();
}
-void __init efi_late_init(void)
-{
- efi_bgrt_init();
-}
-
void __init efi_set_executable(efi_memory_desc_t *md, bool executable)
{
u64 addr, npages;
@@ -960,6 +955,11 @@ static void __init __efi_enter_virtual_mode(void)
return;
}
+ if (efi_enabled(EFI_DBG)) {
+ pr_info("EFI runtime memory map:\n");
+ efi_print_memmap();
+ }
+
BUG_ON(!efi.systab);
if (efi_setup_page_tables(pa, 1 << pg_shift)) {
diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
index 2f25a363068c..a4695da42d77 100644
--- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
@@ -414,10 +414,44 @@ void __init parse_efi_setup(u64 phys_addr, u32 data_len)
efi_setup = phys_addr + sizeof(struct setup_data);
}
-void __init efi_runtime_update_mappings(void)
+static int __init efi_update_mappings(efi_memory_desc_t *md, unsigned long pf)
{
unsigned long pfn;
pgd_t *pgd = efi_pgd;
+ int err1, err2;
+
+ /* Update the 1:1 mapping */
+ pfn = md->phys_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+ err1 = kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd, pfn, md->phys_addr, md->num_pages, pf);
+ if (err1) {
+ pr_err("Error while updating 1:1 mapping PA 0x%llx -> VA 0x%llx!\n",
+ md->phys_addr, md->virt_addr);
+ }
+
+ err2 = kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd, pfn, md->virt_addr, md->num_pages, pf);
+ if (err2) {
+ pr_err("Error while updating VA mapping PA 0x%llx -> VA 0x%llx!\n",
+ md->phys_addr, md->virt_addr);
+ }
+
+ return err1 || err2;
+}
+
+static int __init efi_update_mem_attr(struct mm_struct *mm, efi_memory_desc_t *md)
+{
+ unsigned long pf = 0;
+
+ if (md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_XP)
+ pf |= _PAGE_NX;
+
+ if (!(md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_RO))
+ pf |= _PAGE_RW;
+
+ return efi_update_mappings(md, pf);
+}
+
+void __init efi_runtime_update_mappings(void)
+{
efi_memory_desc_t *md;
if (efi_enabled(EFI_OLD_MEMMAP)) {
@@ -426,6 +460,24 @@ void __init efi_runtime_update_mappings(void)
return;
}
+ /*
+ * Use the EFI Memory Attribute Table for mapping permissions if it
+ * exists, since it is intended to supersede EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE.
+ */
+ if (efi_enabled(EFI_MEM_ATTR)) {
+ efi_memattr_apply_permissions(NULL, efi_update_mem_attr);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE is intended to replace
+ * EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE. So, use EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE to update
+ * permissions only if EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE is not
+ * published by the firmware. Even if we find a buggy implementation of
+ * EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE, don't fall back to
+ * EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE, because of the same reason.
+ */
+
if (!efi_enabled(EFI_NX_PE_DATA))
return;
@@ -446,15 +498,7 @@ void __init efi_runtime_update_mappings(void)
(md->type != EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE))
pf |= _PAGE_RW;
- /* Update the 1:1 mapping */
- pfn = md->phys_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
- if (kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd, pfn, md->phys_addr, md->num_pages, pf))
- pr_warn("Error mapping PA 0x%llx -> VA 0x%llx!\n",
- md->phys_addr, md->virt_addr);
-
- if (kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd, pfn, md->virt_addr, md->num_pages, pf))
- pr_warn("Error mapping PA 0x%llx -> VA 0x%llx!\n",
- md->phys_addr, md->virt_addr);
+ efi_update_mappings(md, pf);
}
}
diff --git a/drivers/acpi/bgrt.c b/drivers/acpi/bgrt.c
index 75f128e766a9..ca28aa572aa9 100644
--- a/drivers/acpi/bgrt.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/bgrt.c
@@ -15,40 +15,41 @@
#include <linux/sysfs.h>
#include <linux/efi-bgrt.h>
+static void *bgrt_image;
static struct kobject *bgrt_kobj;
static ssize_t show_version(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
- return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", bgrt_tab->version);
+ return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", bgrt_tab.version);
}
static DEVICE_ATTR(version, S_IRUGO, show_version, NULL);
static ssize_t show_status(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
- return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", bgrt_tab->status);
+ return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", bgrt_tab.status);
}
static DEVICE_ATTR(status, S_IRUGO, show_status, NULL);
static ssize_t show_type(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
- return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", bgrt_tab->image_type);
+ return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", bgrt_tab.image_type);
}
static DEVICE_ATTR(type, S_IRUGO, show_type, NULL);
static ssize_t show_xoffset(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
- return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", bgrt_tab->image_offset_x);
+ return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", bgrt_tab.image_offset_x);
}
static DEVICE_ATTR(xoffset, S_IRUGO, show_xoffset, NULL);
static ssize_t show_yoffset(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
- return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", bgrt_tab->image_offset_y);
+ return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", bgrt_tab.image_offset_y);
}
static DEVICE_ATTR(yoffset, S_IRUGO, show_yoffset, NULL);
@@ -84,15 +85,24 @@ static int __init bgrt_init(void)
{
int ret;
- if (!bgrt_image)
+ if (!bgrt_tab.image_address)
return -ENODEV;
+ bgrt_image = memremap(bgrt_tab.image_address, bgrt_image_size,
+ MEMREMAP_WB);
+ if (!bgrt_image) {
+ pr_notice("Ignoring BGRT: failed to map image memory\n");
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
bin_attr_image.private = bgrt_image;
bin_attr_image.size = bgrt_image_size;
bgrt_kobj = kobject_create_and_add("bgrt", acpi_kobj);
- if (!bgrt_kobj)
- return -EINVAL;
+ if (!bgrt_kobj) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_memmap;
+ }
ret = sysfs_create_group(bgrt_kobj, &bgrt_attribute_group);
if (ret)
@@ -102,6 +112,8 @@ static int __init bgrt_init(void)
out_kobject:
kobject_put(bgrt_kobj);
+out_memmap:
+ memunmap(bgrt_image);
return ret;
}
device_initcall(bgrt_init);
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/arm-init.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/arm-init.c
index f853ad2c4ca0..1027d7b44358 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/arm-init.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/arm-init.c
@@ -250,7 +250,6 @@ void __init efi_init(void)
}
reserve_regions();
- efi_memattr_init();
efi_esrt_init();
efi_memmap_unmap();
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c
index 92914801e388..e7d404059b73 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c
@@ -529,6 +529,8 @@ int __init efi_config_parse_tables(void *config_tables, int count, int sz,
}
}
+ efi_memattr_init();
+
/* Parse the EFI Properties table if it exists */
if (efi.properties_table != EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR) {
efi_properties_table_t *tbl;
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/esrt.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/esrt.c
index 14914074f716..08b026864d4e 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/esrt.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/esrt.c
@@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ void __init efi_esrt_init(void)
max -= efi.esrt;
if (max < size) {
- pr_err("ESRT header doen't fit on single memory map entry. (size: %zu max: %zu)\n",
+ pr_err("ESRT header doesn't fit on single memory map entry. (size: %zu max: %zu)\n",
size, max);
return;
}
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
index d564d25df8ab..f7425960f6a5 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ cflags-$(CONFIG_X86) += -m$(BITS) -D__KERNEL__ -O2 \
-mno-mmx -mno-sse
cflags-$(CONFIG_ARM64) := $(subst -pg,,$(KBUILD_CFLAGS))
-cflags-$(CONFIG_ARM) := $(subst -pg,,$(KBUILD_CFLAGS)) -g0 \
+cflags-$(CONFIG_ARM) := $(subst -pg,,$(KBUILD_CFLAGS)) \
-fno-builtin -fpic -mno-single-pic-base
cflags-$(CONFIG_EFI_ARMSTUB) += -I$(srctree)/scripts/dtc/libfdt
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD := y
# Prevents link failures: __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() is not linked in.
KCOV_INSTRUMENT := n
-lib-y := efi-stub-helper.o gop.o
+lib-y := efi-stub-helper.o gop.o secureboot.o
# include the stub's generic dependencies from lib/ when building for ARM/arm64
arm-deps := fdt_rw.c fdt_ro.c fdt_wip.c fdt.c fdt_empty_tree.c fdt_sw.c sort.c
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ CFLAGS_arm64-stub.o := -DTEXT_OFFSET=$(TEXT_OFFSET)
extra-$(CONFIG_EFI_ARMSTUB) := $(lib-y)
lib-$(CONFIG_EFI_ARMSTUB) := $(patsubst %.o,%.stub.o,$(lib-y))
-STUBCOPY_FLAGS-y := -R .debug* -R *ksymtab* -R *kcrctab*
+STUBCOPY_RM-y := -R *ksymtab* -R *kcrctab*
STUBCOPY_FLAGS-$(CONFIG_ARM64) += --prefix-alloc-sections=.init \
--prefix-symbols=__efistub_
STUBCOPY_RELOC-$(CONFIG_ARM64) := R_AARCH64_ABS
@@ -68,17 +68,25 @@ STUBCOPY_RELOC-$(CONFIG_ARM64) := R_AARCH64_ABS
$(obj)/%.stub.o: $(obj)/%.o FORCE
$(call if_changed,stubcopy)
+#
+# Strip debug sections and some other sections that may legally contain
+# absolute relocations, so that we can inspect the remaining sections for
+# such relocations. If none are found, regenerate the output object, but
+# this time, use objcopy and leave all sections in place.
+#
quiet_cmd_stubcopy = STUBCPY $@
- cmd_stubcopy = if $(OBJCOPY) $(STUBCOPY_FLAGS-y) $< $@; then \
- $(OBJDUMP) -r $@ | grep $(STUBCOPY_RELOC-y) \
- && (echo >&2 "$@: absolute symbol references not allowed in the EFI stub"; \
- rm -f $@; /bin/false); else /bin/false; fi
+ cmd_stubcopy = if $(STRIP) --strip-debug $(STUBCOPY_RM-y) -o $@ $<; \
+ then if $(OBJDUMP) -r $@ | grep $(STUBCOPY_RELOC-y); \
+ then (echo >&2 "$@: absolute symbol references not allowed in the EFI stub"; \
+ rm -f $@; /bin/false); \
+ else $(OBJCOPY) $(STUBCOPY_FLAGS-y) $< $@; fi \
+ else /bin/false; fi
#
# ARM discards the .data section because it disallows r/w data in the
# decompressor. So move our .data to .data.efistub, which is preserved
# explicitly by the decompressor linker script.
#
-STUBCOPY_FLAGS-$(CONFIG_ARM) += --rename-section .data=.data.efistub \
- -R ___ksymtab+sort -R ___kcrctab+sort
+STUBCOPY_FLAGS-$(CONFIG_ARM) += --rename-section .data=.data.efistub
+STUBCOPY_RM-$(CONFIG_ARM) += -R ___ksymtab+sort -R ___kcrctab+sort
STUBCOPY_RELOC-$(CONFIG_ARM) := R_ARM_ABS
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c
index b4f7d78f9e8b..d4056c6be1ec 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c
@@ -20,52 +20,6 @@
bool __nokaslr;
-static int efi_get_secureboot(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
-{
- static efi_char16_t const sb_var_name[] = {
- 'S', 'e', 'c', 'u', 'r', 'e', 'B', 'o', 'o', 't', 0 };
- static efi_char16_t const sm_var_name[] = {
- 'S', 'e', 't', 'u', 'p', 'M', 'o', 'd', 'e', 0 };
-
- efi_guid_t var_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID;
- efi_get_variable_t *f_getvar = sys_table_arg->runtime->get_variable;
- u8 val;
- unsigned long size = sizeof(val);
- efi_status_t status;
-
- status = f_getvar((efi_char16_t *)sb_var_name, (efi_guid_t *)&var_guid,
- NULL, &size, &val);
-
- if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
- goto out_efi_err;
-
- if (val == 0)
- return 0;
-
- status = f_getvar((efi_char16_t *)sm_var_name, (efi_guid_t *)&var_guid,
- NULL, &size, &val);
-
- if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
- goto out_efi_err;
-
- if (val == 1)
- return 0;
-
- return 1;
-
-out_efi_err:
- switch (status) {
- case EFI_NOT_FOUND:
- return 0;
- case EFI_DEVICE_ERROR:
- return -EIO;
- case EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION:
- return -EACCES;
- default:
- return -EINVAL;
- }
-}
-
efi_status_t efi_open_volume(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg,
void *__image, void **__fh)
{
@@ -91,75 +45,6 @@ efi_status_t efi_open_volume(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg,
return status;
}
-efi_status_t efi_file_close(void *handle)
-{
- efi_file_handle_t *fh = handle;
-
- return fh->close(handle);
-}
-
-efi_status_t
-efi_file_read(void *handle, unsigned long *size, void *addr)
-{
- efi_file_handle_t *fh = handle;
-
- return fh->read(handle, size, addr);
-}
-
-
-efi_status_t
-efi_file_size(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg, void *__fh,
- efi_char16_t *filename_16, void **handle, u64 *file_sz)
-{
- efi_file_handle_t *h, *fh = __fh;
- efi_file_info_t *info;
- efi_status_t status;
- efi_guid_t info_guid = EFI_FILE_INFO_ID;
- unsigned long info_sz;
-
- status = fh->open(fh, &h, filename_16, EFI_FILE_MODE_READ, (u64)0);
- if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
- efi_printk(sys_table_arg, "Failed to open file: ");
- efi_char16_printk(sys_table_arg, filename_16);
- efi_printk(sys_table_arg, "\n");
- return status;
- }
-
- *handle = h;
-
- info_sz = 0;
- status = h->get_info(h, &info_guid, &info_sz, NULL);
- if (status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
- efi_printk(sys_table_arg, "Failed to get file info size\n");
- return status;
- }
-
-grow:
- status = sys_table_arg->boottime->allocate_pool(EFI_LOADER_DATA,
- info_sz, (void **)&info);
- if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
- efi_printk(sys_table_arg, "Failed to alloc mem for file info\n");
- return status;
- }
-
- status = h->get_info(h, &info_guid, &info_sz,
- info);
- if (status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
- sys_table_arg->boottime->free_pool(info);
- goto grow;
- }
-
- *file_sz = info->file_size;
- sys_table_arg->boottime->free_pool(info);
-
- if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
- efi_printk(sys_table_arg, "Failed to get initrd info\n");
-
- return status;
-}
-
-
-
void efi_char16_printk(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg,
efi_char16_t *str)
{
@@ -226,7 +111,7 @@ unsigned long efi_entry(void *handle, efi_system_table_t *sys_table,
efi_guid_t loaded_image_proto = LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL_GUID;
unsigned long reserve_addr = 0;
unsigned long reserve_size = 0;
- int secure_boot = 0;
+ enum efi_secureboot_mode secure_boot;
struct screen_info *si;
/* Check if we were booted by the EFI firmware */
@@ -296,19 +181,14 @@ unsigned long efi_entry(void *handle, efi_system_table_t *sys_table,
pr_efi_err(sys_table, "Failed to parse EFI cmdline options\n");
secure_boot = efi_get_secureboot(sys_table);
- if (secure_boot > 0)
- pr_efi(sys_table, "UEFI Secure Boot is enabled.\n");
-
- if (secure_boot < 0) {
- pr_efi_err(sys_table,
- "could not determine UEFI Secure Boot status.\n");
- }
/*
- * Unauthenticated device tree data is a security hazard, so
- * ignore 'dtb=' unless UEFI Secure Boot is disabled.
+ * Unauthenticated device tree data is a security hazard, so ignore
+ * 'dtb=' unless UEFI Secure Boot is disabled. We assume that secure
+ * boot is enabled if we can't determine its state.
*/
- if (secure_boot != 0 && strstr(cmdline_ptr, "dtb=")) {
+ if (secure_boot != efi_secureboot_mode_disabled &&
+ strstr(cmdline_ptr, "dtb=")) {
pr_efi(sys_table, "Ignoring DTB from command line.\n");
} else {
status = handle_cmdline_files(sys_table, image, cmdline_ptr,
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub-helper.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub-helper.c
index 757badc1debb..919822b7773d 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub-helper.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub-helper.c
@@ -338,6 +338,69 @@ void efi_free(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg, unsigned long size,
efi_call_early(free_pages, addr, nr_pages);
}
+static efi_status_t efi_file_size(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg, void *__fh,
+ efi_char16_t *filename_16, void **handle,
+ u64 *file_sz)
+{
+ efi_file_handle_t *h, *fh = __fh;
+ efi_file_info_t *info;
+ efi_status_t status;
+ efi_guid_t info_guid = EFI_FILE_INFO_ID;
+ unsigned long info_sz;
+
+ status = efi_call_proto(efi_file_handle, open, fh, &h, filename_16,
+ EFI_FILE_MODE_READ, (u64)0);
+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
+ efi_printk(sys_table_arg, "Failed to open file: ");
+ efi_char16_printk(sys_table_arg, filename_16);
+ efi_printk(sys_table_arg, "\n");
+ return status;
+ }
+
+ *handle = h;
+
+ info_sz = 0;
+ status = efi_call_proto(efi_file_handle, get_info, h, &info_guid,
+ &info_sz, NULL);
+ if (status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
+ efi_printk(sys_table_arg, "Failed to get file info size\n");
+ return status;
+ }
+
+grow:
+ status = efi_call_early(allocate_pool, EFI_LOADER_DATA,
+ info_sz, (void **)&info);
+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
+ efi_printk(sys_table_arg, "Failed to alloc mem for file info\n");
+ return status;
+ }
+
+ status = efi_call_proto(efi_file_handle, get_info, h, &info_guid,
+ &info_sz, info);
+ if (status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
+ efi_call_early(free_pool, info);
+ goto grow;
+ }
+
+ *file_sz = info->file_size;
+ efi_call_early(free_pool, info);
+
+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
+ efi_printk(sys_table_arg, "Failed to get initrd info\n");
+
+ return status;
+}
+
+static efi_status_t efi_file_read(void *handle, unsigned long *size, void *addr)
+{
+ return efi_call_proto(efi_file_handle, read, handle, size, addr);
+}
+
+static efi_status_t efi_file_close(void *handle)
+{
+ return efi_call_proto(efi_file_handle, close, handle);
+}
+
/*
* Parse the ASCII string 'cmdline' for EFI options, denoted by the efi=
* option, e.g. efi=nochunk.
@@ -351,6 +414,14 @@ efi_status_t efi_parse_options(char *cmdline)
char *str;
/*
+ * Currently, the only efi= option we look for is 'nochunk', which
+ * is intended to work around known issues on certain x86 UEFI
+ * versions. So ignore for now on other architectures.
+ */
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86))
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+
+ /*
* If no EFI parameters were specified on the cmdline we've got
* nothing to do.
*/
@@ -523,7 +594,8 @@ efi_status_t handle_cmdline_files(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg,
size = files[j].size;
while (size) {
unsigned long chunksize;
- if (size > __chunk_size)
+
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86) && size > __chunk_size)
chunksize = __chunk_size;
else
chunksize = size;
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h
index 0e2a96b12cb3..71c4d0e3c4ed 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h
@@ -29,14 +29,6 @@ void efi_char16_printk(efi_system_table_t *, efi_char16_t *);
efi_status_t efi_open_volume(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg, void *__image,
void **__fh);
-efi_status_t efi_file_size(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg, void *__fh,
- efi_char16_t *filename_16, void **handle,
- u64 *file_sz);
-
-efi_status_t efi_file_read(void *handle, unsigned long *size, void *addr);
-
-efi_status_t efi_file_close(void *handle);
-
unsigned long get_dram_base(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg);
efi_status_t allocate_new_fdt_and_exit_boot(efi_system_table_t *sys_table,
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..6def402bf569
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+/*
+ * Secure boot handling.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2013,2014 Linaro Limited
+ * Roy Franz <roy.franz@linaro.org
+ * Copyright (C) 2013 Red Hat, Inc.
+ * Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * This file is part of the Linux kernel, and is made available under the
+ * terms of the GNU General Public License version 2.
+ */
+#include <linux/efi.h>
+#include <asm/efi.h>
+
+/* BIOS variables */
+static const efi_guid_t efi_variable_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID;
+static const efi_char16_t const efi_SecureBoot_name[] = {
+ 'S', 'e', 'c', 'u', 'r', 'e', 'B', 'o', 'o', 't', 0
+};
+static const efi_char16_t const efi_SetupMode_name[] = {
+ 'S', 'e', 't', 'u', 'p', 'M', 'o', 'd', 'e', 0
+};
+
+/* SHIM variables */
+static const efi_guid_t shim_guid = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID;
+static efi_char16_t const shim_MokSBState_name[] = {
+ 'M', 'o', 'k', 'S', 'B', 'S', 't', 'a', 't', 'e', 0
+};
+
+#define get_efi_var(name, vendor, ...) \
+ efi_call_runtime(get_variable, \
+ (efi_char16_t *)(name), (efi_guid_t *)(vendor), \
+ __VA_ARGS__);
+
+/*
+ * Determine whether we're in secure boot mode.
+ */
+enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
+{
+ u32 attr;
+ u8 secboot, setupmode, moksbstate;
+ unsigned long size;
+ efi_status_t status;
+
+ size = sizeof(secboot);
+ status = get_efi_var(efi_SecureBoot_name, &efi_variable_guid,
+ NULL, &size, &secboot);
+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
+ goto out_efi_err;
+
+ size = sizeof(setupmode);
+ status = get_efi_var(efi_SetupMode_name, &efi_variable_guid,
+ NULL, &size, &setupmode);
+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
+ goto out_efi_err;
+
+ if (secboot == 0 || setupmode == 1)
+ return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled;
+
+ /*
+ * See if a user has put the shim into insecure mode. If so, and if the
+ * variable doesn't have the runtime attribute set, we might as well
+ * honor that.
+ */
+ size = sizeof(moksbstate);
+ status = get_efi_var(shim_MokSBState_name, &shim_guid,
+ &attr, &size, &moksbstate);
+
+ /* If it fails, we don't care why. Default to secure */
+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
+ goto secure_boot_enabled;
+ if (!(attr & EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS) && moksbstate == 1)
+ return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled;
+
+secure_boot_enabled:
+ pr_efi(sys_table_arg, "UEFI Secure Boot is enabled.\n");
+ return efi_secureboot_mode_enabled;
+
+out_efi_err:
+ pr_efi_err(sys_table_arg, "Could not determine UEFI Secure Boot status.\n");
+ if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND)
+ return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled;
+ return efi_secureboot_mode_unknown;
+}
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/memattr.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/memattr.c
index 236004b9a50d..8986757eafaf 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/memattr.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/memattr.c
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ int __init efi_memattr_init(void)
tbl_size = sizeof(*tbl) + tbl->num_entries * tbl->desc_size;
memblock_reserve(efi.mem_attr_table, tbl_size);
+ set_bit(EFI_MEM_ATTR, &efi.flags);
unmap:
early_memunmap(tbl, sizeof(*tbl));
@@ -174,8 +175,11 @@ int __init efi_memattr_apply_permissions(struct mm_struct *mm,
md.phys_addr + size - 1,
efi_md_typeattr_format(buf, sizeof(buf), &md));
- if (valid)
+ if (valid) {
ret = fn(mm, &md);
+ if (ret)
+ pr_err("Error updating mappings, skipping subsequent md's\n");
+ }
}
memunmap(tbl);
return ret;
diff --git a/include/linux/efi-bgrt.h b/include/linux/efi-bgrt.h
index 051b21fedf68..2fd3993c370b 100644
--- a/include/linux/efi-bgrt.h
+++ b/include/linux/efi-bgrt.h
@@ -1,20 +1,19 @@
#ifndef _LINUX_EFI_BGRT_H
#define _LINUX_EFI_BGRT_H
-#ifdef CONFIG_ACPI_BGRT
-
#include <linux/acpi.h>
-void efi_bgrt_init(void);
+#ifdef CONFIG_ACPI_BGRT
+
+void efi_bgrt_init(struct acpi_table_header *table);
/* The BGRT data itself; only valid if bgrt_image != NULL. */
-extern void *bgrt_image;
extern size_t bgrt_image_size;
-extern struct acpi_table_bgrt *bgrt_tab;
+extern struct acpi_table_bgrt bgrt_tab;
#else /* !CONFIG_ACPI_BGRT */
-static inline void efi_bgrt_init(void) {}
+static inline void efi_bgrt_init(struct acpi_table_header *table) {}
#endif /* !CONFIG_ACPI_BGRT */
diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
index 5b1af30ece55..94d34e0be24f 100644
--- a/include/linux/efi.h
+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
@@ -509,24 +509,6 @@ typedef struct {
u64 query_variable_info;
} efi_runtime_services_64_t;
-typedef struct {
- efi_table_hdr_t hdr;
- void *get_time;
- void *set_time;
- void *get_wakeup_time;
- void *set_wakeup_time;
- void *set_virtual_address_map;
- void *convert_pointer;
- void *get_variable;
- void *get_next_variable;
- void *set_variable;
- void *get_next_high_mono_count;
- void *reset_system;
- void *update_capsule;
- void *query_capsule_caps;
- void *query_variable_info;
-} efi_runtime_services_t;
-
typedef efi_status_t efi_get_time_t (efi_time_t *tm, efi_time_cap_t *tc);
typedef efi_status_t efi_set_time_t (efi_time_t *tm);
typedef efi_status_t efi_get_wakeup_time_t (efi_bool_t *enabled, efi_bool_t *pending,
@@ -561,6 +543,24 @@ typedef efi_status_t efi_query_variable_store_t(u32 attributes,
unsigned long size,
bool nonblocking);
+typedef struct {
+ efi_table_hdr_t hdr;
+ efi_get_time_t *get_time;
+ efi_set_time_t *set_time;
+ efi_get_wakeup_time_t *get_wakeup_time;
+ efi_set_wakeup_time_t *set_wakeup_time;
+ efi_set_virtual_address_map_t *set_virtual_address_map;
+ void *convert_pointer;
+ efi_get_variable_t *get_variable;
+ efi_get_next_variable_t *get_next_variable;
+ efi_set_variable_t *set_variable;
+ efi_get_next_high_mono_count_t *get_next_high_mono_count;
+ efi_reset_system_t *reset_system;
+ efi_update_capsule_t *update_capsule;
+ efi_query_capsule_caps_t *query_capsule_caps;
+ efi_query_variable_info_t *query_variable_info;
+} efi_runtime_services_t;
+
void efi_native_runtime_setup(void);
/*
@@ -611,6 +611,9 @@ void efi_native_runtime_setup(void);
#define EFI_CONSOLE_OUT_DEVICE_GUID EFI_GUID(0xd3b36f2c, 0xd551, 0x11d4, 0x9a, 0x46, 0x00, 0x90, 0x27, 0x3f, 0xc1, 0x4d)
#define APPLE_PROPERTIES_PROTOCOL_GUID EFI_GUID(0x91bd12fe, 0xf6c3, 0x44fb, 0xa5, 0xb7, 0x51, 0x22, 0xab, 0x30, 0x3a, 0xe0)
+#define EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID EFI_GUID(0xd719b2cb, 0x3d3a, 0x4596, 0xa3, 0xbc, 0xda, 0xd0, 0x0e, 0x67, 0x65, 0x6f)
+#define EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID EFI_GUID(0x605dab50, 0xe046, 0x4300, 0xab, 0xb6, 0x3d, 0xd8, 0x10, 0xdd, 0x8b, 0x23)
+
/*
* This GUID is used to pass to the kernel proper the struct screen_info
* structure that was populated by the stub based on the GOP protocol instance
@@ -1065,6 +1068,7 @@ extern int __init efi_setup_pcdp_console(char *);
#define EFI_ARCH_1 7 /* First arch-specific bit */
#define EFI_DBG 8 /* Print additional debug info at runtime */
#define EFI_NX_PE_DATA 9 /* Can runtime data regions be mapped non-executable? */
+#define EFI_MEM_ATTR 10 /* Did firmware publish an EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES table? */
#ifdef CONFIG_EFI
/*
@@ -1240,17 +1244,17 @@ struct efivar_entry {
bool deleting;
};
-struct efi_simple_text_output_protocol_32 {
+typedef struct {
u32 reset;
u32 output_string;
u32 test_string;
-};
+} efi_simple_text_output_protocol_32_t;
-struct efi_simple_text_output_protocol_64 {
+typedef struct {
u64 reset;
u64 output_string;
u64 test_string;
-};
+} efi_simple_text_output_protocol_64_t;
struct efi_simple_text_output_protocol {
void *reset;
@@ -1476,6 +1480,14 @@ efi_status_t efi_setup_gop(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg,
bool efi_runtime_disabled(void);
extern void efi_call_virt_check_flags(unsigned long flags, const char *call);
+enum efi_secureboot_mode {
+ efi_secureboot_mode_unset,
+ efi_secureboot_mode_unknown,
+ efi_secureboot_mode_disabled,
+ efi_secureboot_mode_enabled,
+};
+enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot(efi_system_table_t *sys_table);
+
/*
* Arch code can implement the following three template macros, avoiding
* reptition for the void/non-void return cases of {__,}efi_call_virt():
diff --git a/init/main.c b/init/main.c
index b0c9d6facef9..9648d707eea5 100644
--- a/init/main.c
+++ b/init/main.c
@@ -663,7 +663,6 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init start_kernel(void)
sfi_init_late();
if (efi_enabled(EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES)) {
- efi_late_init();
efi_free_boot_services();
}
next reply other threads:[~2017-02-20 9:40 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-02-20 9:40 Ingo Molnar [this message]
2017-02-20 9:40 ` [GIT PULL] EFI changes for v4.11 Ingo Molnar
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