From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
stable@vger.kernel.org, John Dias <joaodias@google.com>,
"Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org>,
Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>,
Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Min Chong <mchong@google.com>,
Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Subject: [PATCH 4.4 17/17] perf/core: Fix concurrent sys_perf_event_open() vs. move_group race
Date: Fri, 28 Apr 2017 10:30:30 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170428082912.947570971@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170428082910.160564394@linuxfoundation.org>
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
commit 321027c1fe77f892f4ea07846aeae08cefbbb290 upstream.
Di Shen reported a race between two concurrent sys_perf_event_open()
calls where both try and move the same pre-existing software group
into a hardware context.
The problem is exactly that described in commit:
f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
... where, while we wait for a ctx->mutex acquisition, the event->ctx
relation can have changed under us.
That very same commit failed to recognise sys_perf_event_context() as an
external access vector to the events and thereby didn't apply the
established locking rules correctly.
So while one sys_perf_event_open() call is stuck waiting on
mutex_lock_double(), the other (which owns said locks) moves the group
about. So by the time the former sys_perf_event_open() acquires the
locks, the context we've acquired is stale (and possibly dead).
Apply the established locking rules as per perf_event_ctx_lock_nested()
to the mutex_lock_double() for the 'move_group' case. This obviously means
we need to validate state after we acquire the locks.
Reported-by: Di Shen (Keen Lab)
Tested-by: John Dias <joaodias@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Min Chong <mchong@google.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Fixes: f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170106131444.GZ3174@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
[bwh: Backported to 4.4:
- Test perf_event::group_flags instead of group_caps
- Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
kernel/events/core.c | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 53 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -8250,6 +8250,37 @@ static int perf_event_set_clock(struct p
return 0;
}
+/*
+ * Variation on perf_event_ctx_lock_nested(), except we take two context
+ * mutexes.
+ */
+static struct perf_event_context *
+__perf_event_ctx_lock_double(struct perf_event *group_leader,
+ struct perf_event_context *ctx)
+{
+ struct perf_event_context *gctx;
+
+again:
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ gctx = READ_ONCE(group_leader->ctx);
+ if (!atomic_inc_not_zero(&gctx->refcount)) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ goto again;
+ }
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ mutex_lock_double(&gctx->mutex, &ctx->mutex);
+
+ if (group_leader->ctx != gctx) {
+ mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex);
+ mutex_unlock(&gctx->mutex);
+ put_ctx(gctx);
+ goto again;
+ }
+
+ return gctx;
+}
+
/**
* sys_perf_event_open - open a performance event, associate it to a task/cpu
*
@@ -8486,8 +8517,26 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
}
if (move_group) {
- gctx = group_leader->ctx;
- mutex_lock_double(&gctx->mutex, &ctx->mutex);
+ gctx = __perf_event_ctx_lock_double(group_leader, ctx);
+
+ /*
+ * Check if we raced against another sys_perf_event_open() call
+ * moving the software group underneath us.
+ */
+ if (!(group_leader->group_flags & PERF_GROUP_SOFTWARE)) {
+ /*
+ * If someone moved the group out from under us, check
+ * if this new event wound up on the same ctx, if so
+ * its the regular !move_group case, otherwise fail.
+ */
+ if (gctx != ctx) {
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto err_locked;
+ } else {
+ perf_event_ctx_unlock(group_leader, gctx);
+ move_group = 0;
+ }
+ }
} else {
mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex);
}
@@ -8582,7 +8631,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
perf_unpin_context(ctx);
if (move_group)
- mutex_unlock(&gctx->mutex);
+ perf_event_ctx_unlock(group_leader, gctx);
mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex);
if (task) {
@@ -8610,7 +8659,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
err_locked:
if (move_group)
- mutex_unlock(&gctx->mutex);
+ perf_event_ctx_unlock(group_leader, gctx);
mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex);
/* err_file: */
fput(event_file);
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-04-28 8:31 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-04-28 8:30 [PATCH 4.4 00/17] 4.4.65-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-04-28 8:30 ` [PATCH 4.4 01/17] tipc: make sure IPv6 header fits in skb headroom Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-04-28 8:30 ` [PATCH 4.4 02/17] tipc: make dist queue pernet Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-04-28 8:30 ` [PATCH 4.4 03/17] tipc: re-enable compensation for socket receive buffer double counting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-04-28 8:30 ` [PATCH 4.4 04/17] tipc: correct error in node fsm Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-04-28 8:30 ` [PATCH 4.4 05/17] tty: nozomi: avoid a harmless gcc warning Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-04-28 8:30 ` [PATCH 4.4 06/17] hostap: avoid uninitialized variable use in hfa384x_get_rid Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-04-28 8:30 ` [PATCH 4.4 07/17] gfs2: avoid uninitialized variable warning Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-04-28 8:30 ` [PATCH 4.4 08/17] tipc: fix random link resets while adding a second bearer Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-04-28 8:30 ` [PATCH 4.4 09/17] tipc: fix socket timer deadlock Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-04-28 8:30 ` [PATCH 4.4 10/17] mnt: Add a per mount namespace limit on the number of mounts Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-04-28 8:30 ` [PATCH 4.4 11/17] [media] xc2028: avoid use after free Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-04-28 8:30 ` [PATCH 4.4 12/17] netfilter: nfnetlink: correctly validate length of batch messages Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-04-28 8:30 ` [PATCH 4.4 14/17] vfio/pci: Fix integer overflows, bitmask check Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-04-28 8:30 ` [PATCH 4.4 15/17] staging/android/ion : fix a race condition in the ion driver Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-04-28 8:30 ` [PATCH 4.4 16/17] ping: implement proper locking Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-04-28 8:30 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2017-04-28 18:46 ` [PATCH 4.4 00/17] 4.4.65-stable review Guenter Roeck
2017-04-29 7:41 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-04-28 19:18 ` Shuah Khan
2017-04-29 7:41 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
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