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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org, Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>,
	Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>,
	Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Subject: [PATCH 4.11 21/28] tcp: randomize timestamps on syncookies
Date: Thu, 11 May 2017 16:12:38 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170511141222.426710975@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170511141221.109842231@linuxfoundation.org>

4.11-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>


[ Upstream commit 84b114b98452c431299d99c135f751659e517acb ]

Whole point of randomization was to hide server uptime, but an attacker
can simply start a syn flood and TCP generates 'old style' timestamps,
directly revealing server jiffies value.

Also, TSval sent by the server to a particular remote address vary
depending on syncookies being sent or not, potentially triggering PAWS
drops for innocent clients.

Lets implement proper randomization, including for SYNcookies.

Also we do not need to export sysctl_tcp_timestamps, since it is not
used from a module.

In v2, I added Florian feedback and contribution, adding tsoff to
tcp_get_cookie_sock().

v3 removed one unused variable in tcp_v4_connect() as Florian spotted.

Fixes: 95a22caee396c ("tcp: randomize tcp timestamp offsets for each connection")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Tested-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 include/net/secure_seq.h |   10 ++++++----
 include/net/tcp.h        |    5 +++--
 net/core/secure_seq.c    |   34 ++++++++++++++++++++--------------
 net/ipv4/syncookies.c    |   12 ++++++++++--
 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c     |    8 +++-----
 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c      |   32 +++++++++++++++++++-------------
 net/ipv6/syncookies.c    |   10 +++++++++-
 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c      |   32 +++++++++++++++++++-------------
 8 files changed, 89 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-)

--- a/include/net/secure_seq.h
+++ b/include/net/secure_seq.h
@@ -6,10 +6,12 @@
 u32 secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 dport);
 u32 secure_ipv6_port_ephemeral(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr,
 			       __be16 dport);
-u32 secure_tcp_sequence_number(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
-			       __be16 sport, __be16 dport, u32 *tsoff);
-u32 secure_tcpv6_sequence_number(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr,
-				 __be16 sport, __be16 dport, u32 *tsoff);
+u32 secure_tcp_seq(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
+		   __be16 sport, __be16 dport);
+u32 secure_tcp_ts_off(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr);
+u32 secure_tcpv6_seq(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr,
+		     __be16 sport, __be16 dport);
+u32 secure_tcpv6_ts_off(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr);
 u64 secure_dccp_sequence_number(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
 				__be16 sport, __be16 dport);
 u64 secure_dccpv6_sequence_number(__be32 *saddr, __be32 *daddr,
--- a/include/net/tcp.h
+++ b/include/net/tcp.h
@@ -471,7 +471,7 @@ void inet_sk_rx_dst_set(struct sock *sk,
 /* From syncookies.c */
 struct sock *tcp_get_cookie_sock(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 				 struct request_sock *req,
-				 struct dst_entry *dst);
+				 struct dst_entry *dst, u32 tsoff);
 int __cookie_v4_check(const struct iphdr *iph, const struct tcphdr *th,
 		      u32 cookie);
 struct sock *cookie_v4_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
@@ -1816,7 +1816,8 @@ struct tcp_request_sock_ops {
 	struct dst_entry *(*route_req)(const struct sock *sk, struct flowi *fl,
 				       const struct request_sock *req,
 				       bool *strict);
-	__u32 (*init_seq)(const struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *tsoff);
+	u32 (*init_seq)(const struct sk_buff *skb);
+	u32 (*init_ts_off)(const struct sk_buff *skb);
 	int (*send_synack)(const struct sock *sk, struct dst_entry *dst,
 			   struct flowi *fl, struct request_sock *req,
 			   struct tcp_fastopen_cookie *foc,
--- a/net/core/secure_seq.c
+++ b/net/core/secure_seq.c
@@ -24,9 +24,13 @@ static siphash_key_t ts_secret __read_mo
 
 static __always_inline void net_secret_init(void)
 {
-	net_get_random_once(&ts_secret, sizeof(ts_secret));
 	net_get_random_once(&net_secret, sizeof(net_secret));
 }
+
+static __always_inline void ts_secret_init(void)
+{
+	net_get_random_once(&ts_secret, sizeof(ts_secret));
+}
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_INET
@@ -47,7 +51,7 @@ static u32 seq_scale(u32 seq)
 #endif
 
 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
-static u32 secure_tcpv6_ts_off(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr)
+u32 secure_tcpv6_ts_off(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr)
 {
 	const struct {
 		struct in6_addr saddr;
@@ -60,12 +64,14 @@ static u32 secure_tcpv6_ts_off(const __b
 	if (sysctl_tcp_timestamps != 1)
 		return 0;
 
+	ts_secret_init();
 	return siphash(&combined, offsetofend(typeof(combined), daddr),
 		       &ts_secret);
 }
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_tcpv6_ts_off);
 
-u32 secure_tcpv6_sequence_number(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr,
-				 __be16 sport, __be16 dport, u32 *tsoff)
+u32 secure_tcpv6_seq(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr,
+		     __be16 sport, __be16 dport)
 {
 	const struct {
 		struct in6_addr saddr;
@@ -78,14 +84,14 @@ u32 secure_tcpv6_sequence_number(const _
 		.sport = sport,
 		.dport = dport
 	};
-	u64 hash;
+	u32 hash;
+
 	net_secret_init();
 	hash = siphash(&combined, offsetofend(typeof(combined), dport),
 		       &net_secret);
-	*tsoff = secure_tcpv6_ts_off(saddr, daddr);
 	return seq_scale(hash);
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_tcpv6_sequence_number);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_tcpv6_seq);
 
 u32 secure_ipv6_port_ephemeral(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr,
 			       __be16 dport)
@@ -107,30 +113,30 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_ipv6_port_ephemeral
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_INET
-static u32 secure_tcp_ts_off(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr)
+u32 secure_tcp_ts_off(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr)
 {
 	if (sysctl_tcp_timestamps != 1)
 		return 0;
 
+	ts_secret_init();
 	return siphash_2u32((__force u32)saddr, (__force u32)daddr,
 			    &ts_secret);
 }
 
-/* secure_tcp_sequence_number(a, b, 0, d) == secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral(a, b, d),
+/* secure_tcp_seq_and_tsoff(a, b, 0, d) == secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral(a, b, d),
  * but fortunately, `sport' cannot be 0 in any circumstances. If this changes,
  * it would be easy enough to have the former function use siphash_4u32, passing
  * the arguments as separate u32.
  */
-
-u32 secure_tcp_sequence_number(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
-			       __be16 sport, __be16 dport, u32 *tsoff)
+u32 secure_tcp_seq(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
+		   __be16 sport, __be16 dport)
 {
-	u64 hash;
+	u32 hash;
+
 	net_secret_init();
 	hash = siphash_3u32((__force u32)saddr, (__force u32)daddr,
 			    (__force u32)sport << 16 | (__force u32)dport,
 			    &net_secret);
-	*tsoff = secure_tcp_ts_off(saddr, daddr);
 	return seq_scale(hash);
 }
 
--- a/net/ipv4/syncookies.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/syncookies.c
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 #include <linux/siphash.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/export.h>
+#include <net/secure_seq.h>
 #include <net/tcp.h>
 #include <net/route.h>
 
@@ -203,7 +204,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__cookie_v4_check);
 
 struct sock *tcp_get_cookie_sock(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 				 struct request_sock *req,
-				 struct dst_entry *dst)
+				 struct dst_entry *dst, u32 tsoff)
 {
 	struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
 	struct sock *child;
@@ -213,6 +214,7 @@ struct sock *tcp_get_cookie_sock(struct
 						 NULL, &own_req);
 	if (child) {
 		atomic_set(&req->rsk_refcnt, 1);
+		tcp_sk(child)->tsoffset = tsoff;
 		sock_rps_save_rxhash(child, skb);
 		inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add(sk, req, child);
 	} else {
@@ -292,6 +294,7 @@ struct sock *cookie_v4_check(struct sock
 	struct rtable *rt;
 	__u8 rcv_wscale;
 	struct flowi4 fl4;
+	u32 tsoff = 0;
 
 	if (!sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_syncookies || !th->ack || th->rst)
 		goto out;
@@ -311,6 +314,11 @@ struct sock *cookie_v4_check(struct sock
 	memset(&tcp_opt, 0, sizeof(tcp_opt));
 	tcp_parse_options(skb, &tcp_opt, 0, NULL);
 
+	if (tcp_opt.saw_tstamp && tcp_opt.rcv_tsecr) {
+		tsoff = secure_tcp_ts_off(ip_hdr(skb)->daddr, ip_hdr(skb)->saddr);
+		tcp_opt.rcv_tsecr -= tsoff;
+	}
+
 	if (!cookie_timestamp_decode(&tcp_opt))
 		goto out;
 
@@ -381,7 +389,7 @@ struct sock *cookie_v4_check(struct sock
 	ireq->rcv_wscale  = rcv_wscale;
 	ireq->ecn_ok = cookie_ecn_ok(&tcp_opt, sock_net(sk), &rt->dst);
 
-	ret = tcp_get_cookie_sock(sk, skb, req, &rt->dst);
+	ret = tcp_get_cookie_sock(sk, skb, req, &rt->dst, tsoff);
 	/* ip_queue_xmit() depends on our flow being setup
 	 * Normal sockets get it right from inet_csk_route_child_sock()
 	 */
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
@@ -85,7 +85,6 @@ int sysctl_tcp_dsack __read_mostly = 1;
 int sysctl_tcp_app_win __read_mostly = 31;
 int sysctl_tcp_adv_win_scale __read_mostly = 1;
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(sysctl_tcp_adv_win_scale);
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(sysctl_tcp_timestamps);
 
 /* rfc5961 challenge ack rate limiting */
 int sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit = 1000;
@@ -6332,8 +6331,8 @@ int tcp_conn_request(struct request_sock
 	if (security_inet_conn_request(sk, skb, req))
 		goto drop_and_free;
 
-	if (isn && tmp_opt.tstamp_ok)
-		af_ops->init_seq(skb, &tcp_rsk(req)->ts_off);
+	if (tmp_opt.tstamp_ok)
+		tcp_rsk(req)->ts_off = af_ops->init_ts_off(skb);
 
 	if (!want_cookie && !isn) {
 		/* VJ's idea. We save last timestamp seen
@@ -6375,7 +6374,7 @@ int tcp_conn_request(struct request_sock
 			goto drop_and_release;
 		}
 
-		isn = af_ops->init_seq(skb, &tcp_rsk(req)->ts_off);
+		isn = af_ops->init_seq(skb);
 	}
 	if (!dst) {
 		dst = af_ops->route_req(sk, &fl, req, NULL);
@@ -6387,7 +6386,6 @@ int tcp_conn_request(struct request_sock
 
 	if (want_cookie) {
 		isn = cookie_init_sequence(af_ops, sk, skb, &req->mss);
-		tcp_rsk(req)->ts_off = 0;
 		req->cookie_ts = tmp_opt.tstamp_ok;
 		if (!tmp_opt.tstamp_ok)
 			inet_rsk(req)->ecn_ok = 0;
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
@@ -94,12 +94,18 @@ static int tcp_v4_md5_hash_hdr(char *md5
 struct inet_hashinfo tcp_hashinfo;
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_hashinfo);
 
-static u32 tcp_v4_init_sequence(const struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *tsoff)
+static u32 tcp_v4_init_seq(const struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
-	return secure_tcp_sequence_number(ip_hdr(skb)->daddr,
-					  ip_hdr(skb)->saddr,
-					  tcp_hdr(skb)->dest,
-					  tcp_hdr(skb)->source, tsoff);
+	return secure_tcp_seq(ip_hdr(skb)->daddr,
+			      ip_hdr(skb)->saddr,
+			      tcp_hdr(skb)->dest,
+			      tcp_hdr(skb)->source);
+}
+
+static u32 tcp_v4_init_ts_off(const struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	return secure_tcp_ts_off(ip_hdr(skb)->daddr,
+				 ip_hdr(skb)->saddr);
 }
 
 int tcp_twsk_unique(struct sock *sk, struct sock *sktw, void *twp)
@@ -145,7 +151,6 @@ int tcp_v4_connect(struct sock *sk, stru
 	struct flowi4 *fl4;
 	struct rtable *rt;
 	int err;
-	u32 seq;
 	struct ip_options_rcu *inet_opt;
 	struct inet_timewait_death_row *tcp_death_row = &sock_net(sk)->ipv4.tcp_death_row;
 
@@ -236,13 +241,13 @@ int tcp_v4_connect(struct sock *sk, stru
 	rt = NULL;
 
 	if (likely(!tp->repair)) {
-		seq = secure_tcp_sequence_number(inet->inet_saddr,
-						 inet->inet_daddr,
-						 inet->inet_sport,
-						 usin->sin_port,
-						 &tp->tsoffset);
 		if (!tp->write_seq)
-			tp->write_seq = seq;
+			tp->write_seq = secure_tcp_seq(inet->inet_saddr,
+						       inet->inet_daddr,
+						       inet->inet_sport,
+						       usin->sin_port);
+		tp->tsoffset = secure_tcp_ts_off(inet->inet_saddr,
+						 inet->inet_daddr);
 	}
 
 	inet->inet_id = tp->write_seq ^ jiffies;
@@ -1253,7 +1258,8 @@ static const struct tcp_request_sock_ops
 	.cookie_init_seq =	cookie_v4_init_sequence,
 #endif
 	.route_req	=	tcp_v4_route_req,
-	.init_seq	=	tcp_v4_init_sequence,
+	.init_seq	=	tcp_v4_init_seq,
+	.init_ts_off	=	tcp_v4_init_ts_off,
 	.send_synack	=	tcp_v4_send_synack,
 };
 
--- a/net/ipv6/syncookies.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/syncookies.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 #include <linux/random.h>
 #include <linux/siphash.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <net/secure_seq.h>
 #include <net/ipv6.h>
 #include <net/tcp.h>
 
@@ -143,6 +144,7 @@ struct sock *cookie_v6_check(struct sock
 	int mss;
 	struct dst_entry *dst;
 	__u8 rcv_wscale;
+	u32 tsoff = 0;
 
 	if (!sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_syncookies || !th->ack || th->rst)
 		goto out;
@@ -162,6 +164,12 @@ struct sock *cookie_v6_check(struct sock
 	memset(&tcp_opt, 0, sizeof(tcp_opt));
 	tcp_parse_options(skb, &tcp_opt, 0, NULL);
 
+	if (tcp_opt.saw_tstamp && tcp_opt.rcv_tsecr) {
+		tsoff = secure_tcpv6_ts_off(ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr.s6_addr32,
+					    ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr.s6_addr32);
+		tcp_opt.rcv_tsecr -= tsoff;
+	}
+
 	if (!cookie_timestamp_decode(&tcp_opt))
 		goto out;
 
@@ -242,7 +250,7 @@ struct sock *cookie_v6_check(struct sock
 	ireq->rcv_wscale = rcv_wscale;
 	ireq->ecn_ok = cookie_ecn_ok(&tcp_opt, sock_net(sk), dst);
 
-	ret = tcp_get_cookie_sock(sk, skb, req, dst);
+	ret = tcp_get_cookie_sock(sk, skb, req, dst, tsoff);
 out:
 	return ret;
 out_free:
--- a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
@@ -101,12 +101,18 @@ static void inet6_sk_rx_dst_set(struct s
 	}
 }
 
-static u32 tcp_v6_init_sequence(const struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *tsoff)
+static u32 tcp_v6_init_seq(const struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
-	return secure_tcpv6_sequence_number(ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr.s6_addr32,
-					    ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr.s6_addr32,
-					    tcp_hdr(skb)->dest,
-					    tcp_hdr(skb)->source, tsoff);
+	return secure_tcpv6_seq(ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr.s6_addr32,
+				ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr.s6_addr32,
+				tcp_hdr(skb)->dest,
+				tcp_hdr(skb)->source);
+}
+
+static u32 tcp_v6_init_ts_off(const struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	return secure_tcpv6_ts_off(ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr.s6_addr32,
+				   ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr.s6_addr32);
 }
 
 static int tcp_v6_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
@@ -122,7 +128,6 @@ static int tcp_v6_connect(struct sock *s
 	struct flowi6 fl6;
 	struct dst_entry *dst;
 	int addr_type;
-	u32 seq;
 	int err;
 	struct inet_timewait_death_row *tcp_death_row = &sock_net(sk)->ipv4.tcp_death_row;
 
@@ -287,13 +292,13 @@ static int tcp_v6_connect(struct sock *s
 	sk_set_txhash(sk);
 
 	if (likely(!tp->repair)) {
-		seq = secure_tcpv6_sequence_number(np->saddr.s6_addr32,
-						   sk->sk_v6_daddr.s6_addr32,
-						   inet->inet_sport,
-						   inet->inet_dport,
-						   &tp->tsoffset);
 		if (!tp->write_seq)
-			tp->write_seq = seq;
+			tp->write_seq = secure_tcpv6_seq(np->saddr.s6_addr32,
+							 sk->sk_v6_daddr.s6_addr32,
+							 inet->inet_sport,
+							 inet->inet_dport);
+		tp->tsoffset = secure_tcpv6_ts_off(np->saddr.s6_addr32,
+						   sk->sk_v6_daddr.s6_addr32);
 	}
 
 	if (tcp_fastopen_defer_connect(sk, &err))
@@ -757,7 +762,8 @@ static const struct tcp_request_sock_ops
 	.cookie_init_seq =	cookie_v6_init_sequence,
 #endif
 	.route_req	=	tcp_v6_route_req,
-	.init_seq	=	tcp_v6_init_sequence,
+	.init_seq	=	tcp_v6_init_seq,
+	.init_ts_off	=	tcp_v6_init_ts_off,
 	.send_synack	=	tcp_v6_send_synack,
 };
 

  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-05-11 14:14 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 37+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-05-11 14:12 [PATCH 4.11 00/28] 4.11.1-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-05-11 14:12 ` [PATCH 4.11 01/28] dm ioctl: prevent stack leak in dm ioctl call Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-05-11 14:12 ` [PATCH 4.11 02/28] drm/sti: fix GDP size to support up to UHD resolution Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-05-11 14:12 ` [PATCH 4.11 04/28] brcmfmac: Ensure pointer correctly set if skb data location changes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-05-11 14:12 ` [PATCH 4.11 05/28] brcmfmac: Make skb header writable before use Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-05-11 14:12 ` [PATCH 4.11 06/28] sparc64: fix fault handling in NGbzero.S and GENbzero.S Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-05-11 14:12 ` [PATCH 4.11 08/28] net: macb: fix phy interrupt parsing Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-05-11 14:12 ` [PATCH 4.11 09/28] tcp: fix access to sk->sk_state in tcp_poll() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-05-11 14:12 ` [PATCH 4.11 10/28] geneve: fix incorrect setting of UDP checksum flag Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-05-11 14:12 ` [PATCH 4.11 11/28] bpf: enhance verifier to understand stack pointer arithmetic Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-05-11 14:12 ` [PATCH 4.11 12/28] bpf, arm64: fix jit branch offset related to ldimm64 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-05-11 14:12 ` [PATCH 4.11 13/28] tcp: fix wraparound issue in tcp_lp Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-05-11 14:12 ` [PATCH 4.11 14/28] net: ipv6: Do not duplicate DAD on link up Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-05-11 14:12 ` [PATCH 4.11 16/28] tcp: do not inherit fastopen_req from parent Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-05-11 14:12 ` [PATCH 4.11 17/28] ipv4, ipv6: ensure raw socket message is big enough to hold an IP header Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-05-11 14:12 ` [PATCH 4.11 18/28] rtnetlink: NUL-terminate IFLA_PHYS_PORT_NAME string Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-05-11 14:12 ` [PATCH 4.11 19/28] ipv6: initialize route null entry in addrconf_init() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-05-11 14:12 ` [PATCH 4.11 20/28] ipv6: reorder ip6_route_dev_notifier after ipv6_dev_notf Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-05-11 14:12 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2017-05-11 14:12 ` [PATCH 4.11 22/28] bnxt_en: allocate enough space for ->ntp_fltr_bmap Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-05-11 14:12 ` [PATCH 4.11 23/28] bpf: dont let ldimm64 leak map addresses on unprivileged Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-05-11 14:12 ` [PATCH 4.11 24/28] net: mdio-mux: bcm-iproc: call mdiobus_free() in error path Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-05-11 14:12 ` [PATCH 4.11 25/28] f2fs: sanity check segment count Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-05-11 14:12 ` [PATCH 4.11 26/28] xen/arm,arm64: fix xen_dma_ops after 815dd18 "Consolidate get_dma_ops..." Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-05-11 14:12 ` [PATCH 4.11 27/28] xen: Revert commits da72ff5bfcb0 and 72a9b186292d Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-05-11 14:12   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-05-11 14:12 ` [PATCH 4.11 28/28] block: get rid of blk_integrity_revalidate() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-05-12 15:25 ` [PATCH 4.11 00/28] 4.11.1-stable review Shuah Khan
2017-05-12 15:47   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-05-12 16:01   ` Shuah Khan
2017-05-15 14:36     ` Matt Fleming
2017-05-15 17:28       ` Shuah Khan
2017-05-25 11:39         ` Matt Fleming
     [not found]           ` <20170525113908.GC3546-mF/unelCI9GS6iBeEJttW/XRex20P6io@public.gmane.org>
2017-05-25 20:06             ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-05-25 20:06               ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-05-12 19:50 ` Guenter Roeck
2017-05-14 10:59   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman

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