From: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
To: Russell King - ARM Linux <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: "Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
"Linus Torvalds" <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
"Mark Rutland" <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
"Kernel Hardening" <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
"Greg KH" <greg@kroah.com>,
"Heiko Carstens" <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
"Dave Hansen" <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@kernel.org>,
"Pavel Tikhomirov" <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com>,
linux-s390 <linux-s390@vger.kernel.org>,
"the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@kernel.org>,
"Will Deacon" <will.deacon@arm.com>,
"Christian Borntraeger" <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>,
"René Nyffenegger" <mail@renenyffenegger.ch>,
"Catalin Marinas" <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
"Paul E . McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
"Rik van Riel" <riel@redhat.com>,
"Peter Zijlstra" <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>,
"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
"Brian Gerst" <brgerst@gmail.com>,
"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
"Josh Poimboeuf" <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org"
<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
"Linux API" <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
"Oleg Nesterov" <oleg@redhat.com>,
"Daniel Micay" <danielmicay@gmail.com>,
"James Morse" <james.morse@arm.com>,
"Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
"Martin Schwidefsky" <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>,
"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
"Thomas Garnier" <thgarnie@google.com>,
"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode
Date: Fri, 12 May 2017 22:06:46 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170512210645.GS390@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170512202106.GO22219@n2100.armlinux.org.uk>
On Fri, May 12, 2017 at 09:21:06PM +0100, Russell King - ARM Linux wrote:
> On Fri, May 12, 2017 at 12:30:02PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> > I'm clearly not explaining things well enough. I shouldn't say
> > "corruption", I should say "malicious manipulation". The methodology
> > of attacks against the stack are quite different from the other kinds
> > of attacks like use-after-free, heap overflow, etc. Being able to
> > exhaust the kernel stack (either due to deep recursion or unbounded
> > alloca())
>
> I really hope we don't have alloca() use in the kernel. Do you have
> evidence to support that assertion?
>
> IMHO alloca() (or similar) should not be present in any kernel code
> because we have a limited stack - we have kmalloc() etc for that kind
> of thing.
No alloca(), but there are VLAs. Said that, the whole "what if they
can bugger thread_info and/or task_struct and go after set_fs() state"
is idiocy, of course - in that case the box is fucked, no matter what.
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
To: Russell King - ARM Linux <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: "Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
"Linus Torvalds" <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
"Mark Rutland" <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
"Kernel Hardening" <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
"Greg KH" <greg@kroah.com>,
"Heiko Carstens" <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
"Dave Hansen" <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@kernel.org>,
"Pavel Tikhomirov" <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com>,
linux-s390 <linux-s390@vger.kernel.org>,
"the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@kernel.org>,
"Will Deacon" <will.deacon@arm.com>,
"Christian Borntraeger" <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>,
"René Nyffenegger" <mail@renenyffenegger.ch>,
"Catalin Marinas" <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
"Paul E . McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
"Rik van Riel" <riel@redhat.com>,
"Peter Zijlstra" <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Subject: Re: Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode
Date: Fri, 12 May 2017 22:06:46 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170512210645.GS390@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170512202106.GO22219@n2100.armlinux.org.uk>
On Fri, May 12, 2017 at 09:21:06PM +0100, Russell King - ARM Linux wrote:
> On Fri, May 12, 2017 at 12:30:02PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> > I'm clearly not explaining things well enough. I shouldn't say
> > "corruption", I should say "malicious manipulation". The methodology
> > of attacks against the stack are quite different from the other kinds
> > of attacks like use-after-free, heap overflow, etc. Being able to
> > exhaust the kernel stack (either due to deep recursion or unbounded
> > alloca())
>
> I really hope we don't have alloca() use in the kernel. Do you have
> evidence to support that assertion?
>
> IMHO alloca() (or similar) should not be present in any kernel code
> because we have a limited stack - we have kmalloc() etc for that kind
> of thing.
No alloca(), but there are VLAs. Said that, the whole "what if they
can bugger thread_info and/or task_struct and go after set_fs() state"
is idiocy, of course - in that case the box is fucked, no matter what.
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk (Al Viro)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode
Date: Fri, 12 May 2017 22:06:46 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170512210645.GS390@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170512202106.GO22219@n2100.armlinux.org.uk>
On Fri, May 12, 2017 at 09:21:06PM +0100, Russell King - ARM Linux wrote:
> On Fri, May 12, 2017 at 12:30:02PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> > I'm clearly not explaining things well enough. I shouldn't say
> > "corruption", I should say "malicious manipulation". The methodology
> > of attacks against the stack are quite different from the other kinds
> > of attacks like use-after-free, heap overflow, etc. Being able to
> > exhaust the kernel stack (either due to deep recursion or unbounded
> > alloca())
>
> I really hope we don't have alloca() use in the kernel. Do you have
> evidence to support that assertion?
>
> IMHO alloca() (or similar) should not be present in any kernel code
> because we have a limited stack - we have kmalloc() etc for that kind
> of thing.
No alloca(), but there are VLAs. Said that, the whole "what if they
can bugger thread_info and/or task_struct and go after set_fs() state"
is idiocy, of course - in that case the box is fucked, no matter what.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-05-12 21:06 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 282+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-04-28 15:32 [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Thomas Garnier
2017-04-28 15:32 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-04-28 15:32 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-04-28 15:32 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-04-28 15:32 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v9 2/4] x86/syscalls: Optimize address limit check Thomas Garnier
2017-04-28 15:32 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-04-28 15:32 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-04-28 15:32 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-04-28 15:32 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v9 3/4] arm/syscalls: " Thomas Garnier
2017-04-28 15:32 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-04-28 15:32 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-04-28 15:32 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-04-28 15:32 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v9 4/4] arm64/syscalls: " Thomas Garnier
2017-04-28 15:32 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-04-28 15:32 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-04-28 15:32 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-05-05 22:18 ` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Thomas Garnier
2017-05-05 22:18 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-05-05 22:18 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-05-05 22:18 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-05-08 7:33 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2017-05-08 7:33 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-05-08 7:33 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-05-08 7:33 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-05-08 7:52 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2017-05-08 7:52 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-05-08 7:52 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-05-08 7:52 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2017-05-08 7:52 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-05-08 15:22 ` [kernel-hardening] " Daniel Micay
2017-05-08 15:22 ` Daniel Micay
2017-05-08 15:22 ` Daniel Micay
2017-05-08 15:26 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-08 15:26 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-08 15:26 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-08 19:51 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-05-08 19:51 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-05-08 19:51 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-05-09 6:56 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-05-09 6:56 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-05-09 6:56 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-05-09 11:10 ` Greg KH
2017-05-09 11:10 ` Greg KH
2017-05-09 11:10 ` Greg KH
2017-05-09 14:29 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-05-09 14:29 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-05-09 14:29 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-05-11 23:17 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-05-11 23:17 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-05-11 23:17 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-05-11 23:44 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-05-11 23:44 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-05-11 23:44 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-05-12 5:28 ` Martin Schwidefsky
2017-05-12 5:28 ` Martin Schwidefsky
2017-05-12 5:28 ` Martin Schwidefsky
2017-05-12 5:34 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-12 5:34 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-12 5:34 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-12 5:54 ` Martin Schwidefsky
2017-05-12 5:54 ` Martin Schwidefsky
2017-05-12 5:54 ` Martin Schwidefsky
2017-05-12 19:01 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-12 19:01 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-12 19:01 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-12 19:08 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2017-05-12 19:08 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2017-05-12 19:08 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2017-05-12 19:08 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-05-12 19:08 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-05-12 19:08 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-05-12 19:30 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-12 19:30 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-12 19:30 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-12 20:21 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2017-05-12 20:21 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2017-05-12 20:21 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2017-05-12 20:30 ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-05-12 20:30 ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-05-12 20:30 ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-05-12 20:45 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2017-05-12 20:45 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2017-05-12 20:45 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2017-05-12 21:00 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-12 21:00 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-12 21:00 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-12 21:04 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-12 21:04 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-12 21:04 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-13 7:21 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-13 7:21 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-13 7:21 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-12 21:06 ` Al Viro [this message]
2017-05-12 21:06 ` Al Viro
2017-05-12 21:06 ` Al Viro
2017-05-12 21:16 ` [kernel-hardening] " Daniel Micay
2017-05-12 21:16 ` Daniel Micay
2017-05-12 21:16 ` Daniel Micay
2017-05-12 21:17 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-12 21:17 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-12 21:17 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-12 21:23 ` Daniel Micay
2017-05-12 21:23 ` Daniel Micay
2017-05-12 21:23 ` Daniel Micay
2017-05-12 21:41 ` Al Viro
2017-05-12 21:41 ` Al Viro
2017-05-12 21:41 ` Al Viro
2017-05-12 21:47 ` Rik van Riel
2017-05-12 21:47 ` Rik van Riel
2017-05-12 21:47 ` Rik van Riel
2017-05-12 22:57 ` Al Viro
2017-05-12 22:57 ` Al Viro
2017-05-12 22:57 ` Al Viro
2017-05-12 21:50 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-12 21:50 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-12 21:50 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-12 6:57 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-05-12 6:57 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-05-12 6:57 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-05-12 6:13 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-05-12 6:13 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-05-12 6:13 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-05-12 6:58 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-05-12 6:58 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-05-12 6:58 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-05-12 17:05 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-05-12 17:05 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-05-12 17:05 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-05-09 16:30 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-05-09 16:30 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-09 16:30 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-08 12:46 ` Greg KH
2017-05-08 12:46 ` Greg KH
2017-05-08 12:46 ` Greg KH
2017-05-09 6:45 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-05-09 6:45 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-05-09 6:45 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-05-09 8:56 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-09 8:56 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-09 8:56 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-09 13:00 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-05-09 13:00 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-05-09 13:00 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-05-09 13:02 ` [kernel-hardening] " Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-09 13:02 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-09 13:02 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-09 16:03 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-09 16:03 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-09 16:03 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-09 16:50 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-09 16:50 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-09 16:50 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-09 22:52 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-05-09 22:52 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-05-09 22:52 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-05-09 23:31 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-09 23:31 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-09 23:31 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-10 1:59 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-05-10 1:59 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-05-10 1:59 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-05-10 7:15 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-10 7:15 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-10 7:15 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-11 11:22 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-11 11:22 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-11 11:22 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-10 6:46 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-10 6:46 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-10 6:46 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-10 2:11 ` Al Viro
2017-05-10 2:11 ` Al Viro
2017-05-10 2:11 ` Al Viro
2017-05-10 2:45 ` Al Viro
2017-05-10 2:45 ` Al Viro
2017-05-10 2:45 ` Al Viro
2017-05-10 3:12 ` Al Viro
2017-05-10 3:12 ` Al Viro
2017-05-10 3:12 ` Al Viro
2017-05-10 3:21 ` Al Viro
2017-05-10 3:21 ` Al Viro
2017-05-10 3:21 ` Al Viro
2017-05-10 3:39 ` Al Viro
2017-05-10 3:39 ` Al Viro
2017-05-10 3:39 ` Al Viro
2017-05-10 6:54 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-10 6:54 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-10 6:54 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-10 6:53 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-10 6:53 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-10 6:53 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-10 7:27 ` Al Viro
2017-05-10 7:27 ` Al Viro
2017-05-10 7:27 ` Al Viro
2017-05-10 7:35 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-10 7:35 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-10 7:35 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-10 6:49 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-10 6:49 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-10 6:49 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-10 7:28 ` Arnd Bergmann
2017-05-10 7:28 ` Arnd Bergmann
2017-05-10 7:28 ` Arnd Bergmann
2017-05-10 7:35 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-10 7:35 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-10 7:35 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-09 16:05 ` Brian Gerst
2017-05-09 16:05 ` Brian Gerst
2017-05-09 16:05 ` Brian Gerst
2017-05-10 7:37 ` [kernel-hardening] " Arnd Bergmann
2017-05-10 7:37 ` Arnd Bergmann
2017-05-10 7:37 ` Arnd Bergmann
2017-05-10 8:08 ` Al Viro
2017-05-10 8:08 ` Al Viro
2017-05-10 8:08 ` Al Viro
2017-05-10 8:14 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-10 8:14 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-10 8:14 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-11 0:18 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-05-11 0:18 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-05-11 0:18 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-05-12 7:00 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-05-12 7:00 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-05-12 7:00 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-05-12 7:15 ` Al Viro
2017-05-12 7:15 ` Al Viro
2017-05-12 7:15 ` Al Viro
2017-05-12 7:35 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-12 7:35 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-12 7:35 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-12 8:07 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-12 8:07 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-12 8:07 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-12 8:23 ` Greg KH
2017-05-12 8:23 ` Greg KH
2017-05-12 8:23 ` Greg KH
2017-05-12 7:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " Arnd Bergmann
2017-05-12 7:43 ` Arnd Bergmann
2017-05-12 7:43 ` Arnd Bergmann
2017-05-12 8:11 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-12 8:11 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-12 8:11 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-12 8:16 ` Al Viro
2017-05-12 8:16 ` Al Viro
2017-05-12 8:16 ` Al Viro
2017-05-12 8:11 ` Al Viro
2017-05-12 8:11 ` Al Viro
2017-05-12 8:11 ` Al Viro
2017-05-12 8:20 ` Arnd Bergmann
2017-05-12 8:20 ` Arnd Bergmann
2017-05-12 8:20 ` Arnd Bergmann
2017-05-12 23:20 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-05-12 23:20 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-05-12 23:20 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-05-08 13:09 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-08 13:09 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-08 13:09 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-08 13:09 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-08 14:02 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2017-05-08 14:02 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-05-08 14:02 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-05-08 14:02 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-05-08 14:06 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jann Horn
2017-05-08 14:06 ` Jann Horn
2017-05-08 14:06 ` Jann Horn
2017-05-08 14:06 ` Jann Horn
2017-05-08 20:48 ` [kernel-hardening] " Al Viro
2017-05-08 20:48 ` Al Viro
2017-05-08 20:48 ` Al Viro
2017-05-08 20:48 ` Al Viro
2017-05-12 23:15 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2017-05-12 23:15 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-05-12 23:15 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-05-12 23:15 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-05-08 15:24 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-05-08 15:24 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-08 15:24 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-08 15:24 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-09 6:34 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2017-05-09 6:34 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-05-09 6:34 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-05-09 6:34 ` Ingo Molnar
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