From: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "Russell King - ARM Linux" <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
"Linus Torvalds" <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
"Mark Rutland" <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
"Kernel Hardening" <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
"Greg KH" <greg@kroah.com>,
"Heiko Carstens" <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
"Dave Hansen" <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@kernel.org>,
"Pavel Tikhomirov" <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com>,
linux-s390 <linux-s390@vger.kernel.org>,
"the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@kernel.org>,
"Will Deacon" <will.deacon@arm.com>,
"Christian Borntraeger" <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>,
"René Nyffenegger" <mail@renenyffenegger.ch>,
"Catalin Marinas" <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
"Paul E . McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
"Rik van Riel" <riel@redhat.com>,
"Peter Zijlstra" <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>,
"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
"Brian Gerst" <brgerst@gmail.com>,
"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
"Josh Poimboeuf" <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org"
<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
"Linux API" <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
"Oleg Nesterov" <oleg@redhat.com>,
"Daniel Micay" <danielmicay@gmail.com>,
"James Morse" <james.morse@arm.com>,
"Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
"Martin Schwidefsky" <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>,
"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
"Thomas Garnier" <thgarnie@google.com>,
"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode
Date: Fri, 12 May 2017 22:41:44 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170512214144.GT390@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5jJu=VTqp2tzkPB4RAVxdGC+_SSQwrUwdzWpu24AA-zEcg@mail.gmail.com>
On Fri, May 12, 2017 at 02:17:19PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> Two things are at risk from stack exhaustion: thread_info (mainly
> addr_limit) when on the stack (fixed by THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK), and
Really? Let's take a look at arm, for example:
struct thread_info {
unsigned long flags; /* low level flags */
int preempt_count; /* 0 => preemptable, <0 => bug */
mm_segment_t addr_limit; /* address limit */
struct task_struct *task; /* main task structure */
and current() is defined as current_thread_info()->task.
Seriously, look at these beasts. Overwriting ->addr_limit is nowhere near
the top threat. If attacker can overwrite thread_info, you have lost.
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Al Viro <viro-3bDd1+5oDREiFSDQTTA3OLVCufUGDwFn@public.gmane.org>
To: Kees Cook <keescook-F7+t8E8rja9g9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org>
Cc: "Russell King - ARM Linux"
<linux-I+IVW8TIWO2tmTQ+vhA3Yw@public.gmane.org>,
"Linus Torvalds"
<torvalds-de/tnXTf+JLsfHDXvbKv3WD2FQJk+8+b@public.gmane.org>,
"Mark Rutland" <mark.rutland-5wv7dgnIgG8@public.gmane.org>,
"Kernel Hardening"
<kernel-hardening-ZwoEplunGu1jrUoiu81ncdBPR1lH4CV8@public.gmane.org>,
"Greg KH" <greg-U8xfFu+wG4EAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>,
"Heiko Carstens"
<heiko.carstens-tA70FqPdS9bQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org>,
"David Howells"
<dhowells-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
"Dave Hansen"
<dave.hansen-ral2JQCrhuEAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa-YMNOUZJC4hwAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>,
"Pavel Tikhomirov"
<ptikhomirov-5HdwGun5lf+gSpxsJD1C4w@public.gmane.org>,
linux-s390 <linux-s390-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org>,
"the arch/x86 maintainers"
<x86-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>,
"Will Deacon" <will.deacon-5wv7dgnIgG8@public.gmane.org>,
"Christian Borntraeger"
<borntraeger-tA70FqPdS9bQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
"René Nyffenegger"
<mail-gLCNRsNSrVdVZEhyV+6z5nIPMjoJpjVV@public.gmane.org>,
"Catalin Marinas" <catalin.marinas-5wv7dgnIgG8@public.gmane.org>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode
Date: Fri, 12 May 2017 22:41:44 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170512214144.GT390@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5jJu=VTqp2tzkPB4RAVxdGC+_SSQwrUwdzWpu24AA-zEcg-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
On Fri, May 12, 2017 at 02:17:19PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> Two things are at risk from stack exhaustion: thread_info (mainly
> addr_limit) when on the stack (fixed by THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK), and
Really? Let's take a look at arm, for example:
struct thread_info {
unsigned long flags; /* low level flags */
int preempt_count; /* 0 => preemptable, <0 => bug */
mm_segment_t addr_limit; /* address limit */
struct task_struct *task; /* main task structure */
and current() is defined as current_thread_info()->task.
Seriously, look at these beasts. Overwriting ->addr_limit is nowhere near
the top threat. If attacker can overwrite thread_info, you have lost.
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk (Al Viro)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode
Date: Fri, 12 May 2017 22:41:44 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170512214144.GT390@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5jJu=VTqp2tzkPB4RAVxdGC+_SSQwrUwdzWpu24AA-zEcg@mail.gmail.com>
On Fri, May 12, 2017 at 02:17:19PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> Two things are at risk from stack exhaustion: thread_info (mainly
> addr_limit) when on the stack (fixed by THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK), and
Really? Let's take a look at arm, for example:
struct thread_info {
unsigned long flags; /* low level flags */
int preempt_count; /* 0 => preemptable, <0 => bug */
mm_segment_t addr_limit; /* address limit */
struct task_struct *task; /* main task structure */
and current() is defined as current_thread_info()->task.
Seriously, look at these beasts. Overwriting ->addr_limit is nowhere near
the top threat. If attacker can overwrite thread_info, you have lost.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-05-12 21:41 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 282+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-04-28 15:32 [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Thomas Garnier
2017-04-28 15:32 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-04-28 15:32 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-04-28 15:32 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-04-28 15:32 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v9 2/4] x86/syscalls: Optimize address limit check Thomas Garnier
2017-04-28 15:32 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-04-28 15:32 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-04-28 15:32 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-04-28 15:32 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v9 3/4] arm/syscalls: " Thomas Garnier
2017-04-28 15:32 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-04-28 15:32 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-04-28 15:32 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-04-28 15:32 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v9 4/4] arm64/syscalls: " Thomas Garnier
2017-04-28 15:32 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-04-28 15:32 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-04-28 15:32 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-05-05 22:18 ` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Thomas Garnier
2017-05-05 22:18 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-05-05 22:18 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-05-05 22:18 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-05-08 7:33 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2017-05-08 7:33 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-05-08 7:33 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-05-08 7:33 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-05-08 7:52 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2017-05-08 7:52 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-05-08 7:52 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-05-08 7:52 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2017-05-08 7:52 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-05-08 15:22 ` [kernel-hardening] " Daniel Micay
2017-05-08 15:22 ` Daniel Micay
2017-05-08 15:22 ` Daniel Micay
2017-05-08 15:26 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-08 15:26 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-08 15:26 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-08 19:51 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-05-08 19:51 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-05-08 19:51 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-05-09 6:56 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-05-09 6:56 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-05-09 6:56 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-05-09 11:10 ` Greg KH
2017-05-09 11:10 ` Greg KH
2017-05-09 11:10 ` Greg KH
2017-05-09 14:29 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-05-09 14:29 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-05-09 14:29 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-05-11 23:17 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-05-11 23:17 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-05-11 23:17 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-05-11 23:44 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-05-11 23:44 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-05-11 23:44 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-05-12 5:28 ` Martin Schwidefsky
2017-05-12 5:28 ` Martin Schwidefsky
2017-05-12 5:28 ` Martin Schwidefsky
2017-05-12 5:34 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-12 5:34 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-12 5:34 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-12 5:54 ` Martin Schwidefsky
2017-05-12 5:54 ` Martin Schwidefsky
2017-05-12 5:54 ` Martin Schwidefsky
2017-05-12 19:01 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-12 19:01 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-12 19:01 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-12 19:08 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2017-05-12 19:08 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2017-05-12 19:08 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2017-05-12 19:08 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-05-12 19:08 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-05-12 19:08 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-05-12 19:30 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-12 19:30 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-12 19:30 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-12 20:21 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2017-05-12 20:21 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2017-05-12 20:21 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2017-05-12 20:30 ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-05-12 20:30 ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-05-12 20:30 ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-05-12 20:45 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2017-05-12 20:45 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2017-05-12 20:45 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2017-05-12 21:00 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-12 21:00 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-12 21:00 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-12 21:04 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-12 21:04 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-12 21:04 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-13 7:21 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-13 7:21 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-13 7:21 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-12 21:06 ` Al Viro
2017-05-12 21:06 ` Al Viro
2017-05-12 21:06 ` Al Viro
2017-05-12 21:16 ` [kernel-hardening] " Daniel Micay
2017-05-12 21:16 ` Daniel Micay
2017-05-12 21:16 ` Daniel Micay
2017-05-12 21:17 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-12 21:17 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-12 21:17 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-12 21:23 ` Daniel Micay
2017-05-12 21:23 ` Daniel Micay
2017-05-12 21:23 ` Daniel Micay
2017-05-12 21:41 ` Al Viro [this message]
2017-05-12 21:41 ` Al Viro
2017-05-12 21:41 ` Al Viro
2017-05-12 21:47 ` Rik van Riel
2017-05-12 21:47 ` Rik van Riel
2017-05-12 21:47 ` Rik van Riel
2017-05-12 22:57 ` Al Viro
2017-05-12 22:57 ` Al Viro
2017-05-12 22:57 ` Al Viro
2017-05-12 21:50 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-12 21:50 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-12 21:50 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-12 6:57 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-05-12 6:57 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-05-12 6:57 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-05-12 6:13 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-05-12 6:13 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-05-12 6:13 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-05-12 6:58 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-05-12 6:58 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-05-12 6:58 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-05-12 17:05 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-05-12 17:05 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-05-12 17:05 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-05-09 16:30 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-05-09 16:30 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-09 16:30 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-08 12:46 ` Greg KH
2017-05-08 12:46 ` Greg KH
2017-05-08 12:46 ` Greg KH
2017-05-09 6:45 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-05-09 6:45 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-05-09 6:45 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-05-09 8:56 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-09 8:56 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-09 8:56 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-09 13:00 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-05-09 13:00 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-05-09 13:00 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-05-09 13:02 ` [kernel-hardening] " Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-09 13:02 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-09 13:02 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-09 16:03 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-09 16:03 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-09 16:03 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-09 16:50 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-09 16:50 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-09 16:50 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-09 22:52 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-05-09 22:52 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-05-09 22:52 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-05-09 23:31 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-09 23:31 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-09 23:31 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-10 1:59 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-05-10 1:59 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-05-10 1:59 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-05-10 7:15 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-10 7:15 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-10 7:15 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-11 11:22 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-11 11:22 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-11 11:22 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-10 6:46 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-10 6:46 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-10 6:46 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-10 2:11 ` Al Viro
2017-05-10 2:11 ` Al Viro
2017-05-10 2:11 ` Al Viro
2017-05-10 2:45 ` Al Viro
2017-05-10 2:45 ` Al Viro
2017-05-10 2:45 ` Al Viro
2017-05-10 3:12 ` Al Viro
2017-05-10 3:12 ` Al Viro
2017-05-10 3:12 ` Al Viro
2017-05-10 3:21 ` Al Viro
2017-05-10 3:21 ` Al Viro
2017-05-10 3:21 ` Al Viro
2017-05-10 3:39 ` Al Viro
2017-05-10 3:39 ` Al Viro
2017-05-10 3:39 ` Al Viro
2017-05-10 6:54 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-10 6:54 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-10 6:54 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-10 6:53 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-10 6:53 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-10 6:53 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-10 7:27 ` Al Viro
2017-05-10 7:27 ` Al Viro
2017-05-10 7:27 ` Al Viro
2017-05-10 7:35 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-10 7:35 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-10 7:35 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-10 6:49 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-10 6:49 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-10 6:49 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-10 7:28 ` Arnd Bergmann
2017-05-10 7:28 ` Arnd Bergmann
2017-05-10 7:28 ` Arnd Bergmann
2017-05-10 7:35 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-10 7:35 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-10 7:35 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-09 16:05 ` Brian Gerst
2017-05-09 16:05 ` Brian Gerst
2017-05-09 16:05 ` Brian Gerst
2017-05-10 7:37 ` [kernel-hardening] " Arnd Bergmann
2017-05-10 7:37 ` Arnd Bergmann
2017-05-10 7:37 ` Arnd Bergmann
2017-05-10 8:08 ` Al Viro
2017-05-10 8:08 ` Al Viro
2017-05-10 8:08 ` Al Viro
2017-05-10 8:14 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-10 8:14 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-10 8:14 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-11 0:18 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-05-11 0:18 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-05-11 0:18 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-05-12 7:00 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-05-12 7:00 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-05-12 7:00 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-05-12 7:15 ` Al Viro
2017-05-12 7:15 ` Al Viro
2017-05-12 7:15 ` Al Viro
2017-05-12 7:35 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-12 7:35 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-12 7:35 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-12 8:07 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-12 8:07 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-12 8:07 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-12 8:23 ` Greg KH
2017-05-12 8:23 ` Greg KH
2017-05-12 8:23 ` Greg KH
2017-05-12 7:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " Arnd Bergmann
2017-05-12 7:43 ` Arnd Bergmann
2017-05-12 7:43 ` Arnd Bergmann
2017-05-12 8:11 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-12 8:11 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-12 8:11 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-12 8:16 ` Al Viro
2017-05-12 8:16 ` Al Viro
2017-05-12 8:16 ` Al Viro
2017-05-12 8:11 ` Al Viro
2017-05-12 8:11 ` Al Viro
2017-05-12 8:11 ` Al Viro
2017-05-12 8:20 ` Arnd Bergmann
2017-05-12 8:20 ` Arnd Bergmann
2017-05-12 8:20 ` Arnd Bergmann
2017-05-12 23:20 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-05-12 23:20 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-05-12 23:20 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-05-08 13:09 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-08 13:09 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-08 13:09 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-08 13:09 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-08 14:02 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2017-05-08 14:02 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-05-08 14:02 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-05-08 14:02 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-05-08 14:06 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jann Horn
2017-05-08 14:06 ` Jann Horn
2017-05-08 14:06 ` Jann Horn
2017-05-08 14:06 ` Jann Horn
2017-05-08 20:48 ` [kernel-hardening] " Al Viro
2017-05-08 20:48 ` Al Viro
2017-05-08 20:48 ` Al Viro
2017-05-08 20:48 ` Al Viro
2017-05-12 23:15 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2017-05-12 23:15 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-05-12 23:15 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-05-12 23:15 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-05-08 15:24 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-05-08 15:24 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-08 15:24 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-08 15:24 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-09 6:34 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2017-05-09 6:34 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-05-09 6:34 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-05-09 6:34 ` Ingo Molnar
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