From: "Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason" <avarab@gmail.com>
To: git@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "Junio C Hamano" <gitster@pobox.com>,
"Marc Stevens" <marc@marc-stevens.nl>,
"Michael Kebe" <michael.kebe@gmail.com>,
"Jeff King" <peff@peff.net>, "Stefan Beller" <sbeller@google.com>,
"Brandon Williams" <bmwill@google.com>,
"Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason" <avarab@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 1/2] sha1dc: update from upstream
Date: Sat, 20 May 2017 11:54:28 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170520115429.12289-2-avarab@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170520115429.12289-1-avarab@gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <xmqqpof3srw4.fsf@gitster.mtv.corp.google.com>
Update sha1dc from the latest version by the upstream
maintainer[1].
This version includes a commit of mine which allows for replacing the
local modifications done to the upstream files in git.git with macro
definitions to monkeypatch it in place.
It also brings in a change[2] upstream made for the breakage 2.13.0
introduced on SPARC and other platforms that forbid unaligned
access[3].
This means that the code customizations done since the initial import
in commit 28dc98e343 ("sha1dc: add collision-detecting sha1
implementation", 2017-03-16) can be done purely via Makefile
definitions and by including the content of our own sha1dc_git.[ch] in
sha1dc/sha1.c via a macro.
1. https://github.com/cr-marcstevens/sha1collisiondetection/commit/cc465543b310e5f59a1d534381690052e8509b22
2. https://github.com/cr-marcstevens/sha1collisiondetection/commit/33a694a9ee1b79c24be45f9eab5ac0e1aeeaf271
3. "Git 2.13.0 segfaults on Solaris SPARC due to DC_SHA1=YesPlease
being on by default"
(https://public-inbox.org/git/CACBZZX6nmKK8af0-UpjCKWV4R+hV-uk2xWXVA5U+_UQ3VXU03g@mail.gmail.com/)
Signed-off-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com>
---
Makefile | 9 +++++-
sha1dc/sha1.c | 91 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
sha1dc/sha1.h | 90 +++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------------
sha1dc/ubc_check.c | 13 ++++++--
sha1dc/ubc_check.h | 14 +++++++--
sha1dc_git.c | 24 ++++++++++++++
sha1dc_git.h | 19 ++++++++++++
7 files changed, 172 insertions(+), 88 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 sha1dc_git.c
create mode 100644 sha1dc_git.h
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index e35542e631..ffa6da71b7 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -1414,7 +1414,14 @@ else
DC_SHA1 := YesPlease
LIB_OBJS += sha1dc/sha1.o
LIB_OBJS += sha1dc/ubc_check.o
- BASIC_CFLAGS += -DSHA1_DC
+ BASIC_CFLAGS += \
+ -DSHA1_DC \
+ -DSHA1DC_NO_STANDARD_INCLUDES \
+ -DSHA1DC_INIT_SAFE_HASH_DEFAULT=0 \
+ -DSHA1DC_CUSTOM_INCLUDE_SHA1_C="\"cache.h\"" \
+ -DSHA1DC_CUSTOM_TRAILING_INCLUDE_SHA1_C="\"sha1dc_git.c\"" \
+ -DSHA1DC_CUSTOM_TRAILING_INCLUDE_SHA1_H="\"sha1dc_git.h\"" \
+ -DSHA1DC_CUSTOM_INCLUDE_UBC_CHECK_C="\"git-compat-util.h\""
endif
endif
endif
diff --git a/sha1dc/sha1.c b/sha1dc/sha1.c
index 35e9dd5bf4..3dff80ac72 100644
--- a/sha1dc/sha1.c
+++ b/sha1dc/sha1.c
@@ -5,9 +5,23 @@
* https://opensource.org/licenses/MIT
***/
-#include "cache.h"
-#include "sha1dc/sha1.h"
-#include "sha1dc/ubc_check.h"
+#ifndef SHA1DC_NO_STANDARD_INCLUDES
+#include <string.h>
+#include <memory.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SHA1DC_CUSTOM_INCLUDE_SHA1_C
+#include SHA1DC_CUSTOM_INCLUDE_SHA1_C
+#endif
+
+#ifndef SHA1DC_INIT_SAFE_HASH_DEFAULT
+#define SHA1DC_INIT_SAFE_HASH_DEFAULT 1
+#endif
+
+#include "sha1.h"
+#include "ubc_check.h"
/*
@@ -18,16 +32,31 @@
If you are compiling on a big endian platform and your compiler does not define one of these,
you will have to add whatever macros your tool chain defines to indicate Big-Endianness.
*/
-#if (defined(__BYTE_ORDER) && (__BYTE_ORDER == __BIG_ENDIAN)) || \
+#ifdef SHA1DC_BIGENDIAN
+#undef SHA1DC_BIGENDIAN
+#endif
+#if (!defined SHA1DC_FORCE_LITTLEENDIAN) && \
+ ((defined(__BYTE_ORDER) && (__BYTE_ORDER == __BIG_ENDIAN)) || \
(defined(__BYTE_ORDER__) && (__BYTE_ORDER__ == __BIG_ENDIAN__)) || \
- defined(__BIG_ENDIAN__) || defined(__ARMEB__) || defined(__THUMBEB__) || defined(__AARCH64EB__) || \
- defined(_MIPSEB) || defined(__MIPSEB) || defined(__MIPSEB__)
+ defined(_BIG_ENDIAN) || defined(__BIG_ENDIAN__) || defined(__ARMEB__) || defined(__THUMBEB__) || defined(__AARCH64EB__) || \
+ defined(_MIPSEB) || defined(__MIPSEB) || defined(__MIPSEB__) || defined(SHA1DC_FORCE_BIGENDIAN))
+
+#define SHA1DC_BIGENDIAN
-#define SHA1DC_BIGENDIAN 1
-#else
-#undef SHA1DC_BIGENDIAN
#endif /*ENDIANNESS SELECTION*/
+#if (defined SHA1DC_FORCE_UNALIGNED_ACCESS || \
+ defined(__amd64__) || defined(__amd64) || defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__x86_64) || \
+ defined(i386) || defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__) || defined(__i486__) || \
+ defined(__i586__) || defined(__i686__) || defined(_M_IX86) || defined(__X86__) || \
+ defined(_X86_) || defined(__THW_INTEL__) || defined(__I86__) || defined(__INTEL__) || \
+ defined(__386) || defined(_M_X64) || defined(_M_AMD64))
+
+#define SHA1DC_ALLOW_UNALIGNED_ACCESS
+
+#endif /*UNALIGNMENT DETECTION*/
+
+
#define rotate_right(x,n) (((x)>>(n))|((x)<<(32-(n))))
#define rotate_left(x,n) (((x)<<(n))|((x)>>(32-(n))))
@@ -36,11 +65,11 @@
#define sha1_mix(W, t) (rotate_left(W[t - 3] ^ W[t - 8] ^ W[t - 14] ^ W[t - 16], 1))
-#if defined(SHA1DC_BIGENDIAN)
+#ifdef SHA1DC_BIGENDIAN
#define sha1_load(m, t, temp) { temp = m[t]; }
#else
#define sha1_load(m, t, temp) { temp = m[t]; sha1_bswap32(temp); }
-#endif /* !defined(SHA1DC_BIGENDIAN) */
+#endif
#define sha1_store(W, t, x) *(volatile uint32_t *)&W[t] = x
@@ -869,6 +898,11 @@ static void sha1recompress_fast_ ## t (uint32_t ihvin[5], uint32_t ihvout[5], co
ihvout[0] = ihvin[0] + a; ihvout[1] = ihvin[1] + b; ihvout[2] = ihvin[2] + c; ihvout[3] = ihvin[3] + d; ihvout[4] = ihvin[4] + e; \
}
+#ifdef _MSC_VER
+#pragma warning(push)
+#pragma warning(disable: 4127) /* Complier complains about the checks in the above macro being constant. */
+#endif
+
#ifdef DOSTORESTATE0
SHA1_RECOMPRESS(0)
#endif
@@ -1189,6 +1223,10 @@ SHA1_RECOMPRESS(78)
SHA1_RECOMPRESS(79)
#endif
+#ifdef _MSC_VER
+#pragma warning(pop)
+#endif
+
static void sha1_recompression_step(uint32_t step, uint32_t ihvin[5], uint32_t ihvout[5], const uint32_t me2[80], const uint32_t state[5])
{
switch (step)
@@ -1662,7 +1700,7 @@ void SHA1DCInit(SHA1_CTX* ctx)
ctx->ihv[3] = 0x10325476;
ctx->ihv[4] = 0xC3D2E1F0;
ctx->found_collision = 0;
- ctx->safe_hash = 0;
+ ctx->safe_hash = SHA1DC_INIT_SAFE_HASH_DEFAULT;
ctx->ubc_check = 1;
ctx->detect_coll = 1;
ctx->reduced_round_coll = 0;
@@ -1710,6 +1748,7 @@ void SHA1DCSetCallback(SHA1_CTX* ctx, collision_block_callback callback)
void SHA1DCUpdate(SHA1_CTX* ctx, const char* buf, size_t len)
{
unsigned left, fill;
+
if (len == 0)
return;
@@ -1728,7 +1767,13 @@ void SHA1DCUpdate(SHA1_CTX* ctx, const char* buf, size_t len)
while (len >= 64)
{
ctx->total += 64;
+
+#if defined(SHA1DC_ALLOW_UNALIGNED_ACCESS)
sha1_process(ctx, (uint32_t*)(buf));
+#else
+ memcpy(ctx->buffer, buf, 64);
+ sha1_process(ctx, (uint32_t*)(ctx->buffer));
+#endif /* defined(SHA1DC_ALLOW_UNALIGNED_ACCESS) */
buf += 64;
len -= 64;
}
@@ -1788,22 +1833,6 @@ int SHA1DCFinal(unsigned char output[20], SHA1_CTX *ctx)
return ctx->found_collision;
}
-void git_SHA1DCFinal(unsigned char hash[20], SHA1_CTX *ctx)
-{
- if (!SHA1DCFinal(hash, ctx))
- return;
- die("SHA-1 appears to be part of a collision attack: %s",
- sha1_to_hex(hash));
-}
-
-void git_SHA1DCUpdate(SHA1_CTX *ctx, const void *vdata, unsigned long len)
-{
- const char *data = vdata;
- /* We expect an unsigned long, but sha1dc only takes an int */
- while (len > INT_MAX) {
- SHA1DCUpdate(ctx, data, INT_MAX);
- data += INT_MAX;
- len -= INT_MAX;
- }
- SHA1DCUpdate(ctx, data, len);
-}
+#ifdef SHA1DC_CUSTOM_TRAILING_INCLUDE_SHA1_C
+#include SHA1DC_CUSTOM_TRAILING_INCLUDE_SHA1_C
+#endif
diff --git a/sha1dc/sha1.h b/sha1dc/sha1.h
index bd8bd928fb..1e4e94be54 100644
--- a/sha1dc/sha1.h
+++ b/sha1dc/sha1.h
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
* See accompanying file LICENSE.txt or copy at
* https://opensource.org/licenses/MIT
***/
+
#ifndef SHA1DC_SHA1_H
#define SHA1DC_SHA1_H
@@ -11,36 +12,30 @@
extern "C" {
#endif
-/* uses SHA-1 message expansion to expand the first 16 words of W[] to 80 words */
-/* void sha1_message_expansion(uint32_t W[80]); */
-
-/* sha-1 compression function; first version takes a message block pre-parsed as 16 32-bit integers, second version takes an already expanded message) */
-/* void sha1_compression(uint32_t ihv[5], const uint32_t m[16]);
-void sha1_compression_W(uint32_t ihv[5], const uint32_t W[80]); */
+#ifndef SHA1DC_NO_STANDARD_INCLUDES
+#include <stdint.h>
+#endif
-/* same as sha1_compression_W, but additionally store intermediate states */
+/* sha-1 compression function that takes an already expanded message, and additionally store intermediate states */
/* only stores states ii (the state between step ii-1 and step ii) when DOSTORESTATEii is defined in ubc_check.h */
void sha1_compression_states(uint32_t[5], const uint32_t[16], uint32_t[80], uint32_t[80][5]);
/*
-// function type for sha1_recompression_step_T (uint32_t ihvin[5], uint32_t ihvout[5], const uint32_t me2[80], const uint32_t state[5])
-// where 0 <= T < 80
-// me2 is an expanded message (the expansion of an original message block XOR'ed with a disturbance vector's message block difference)
-// state is the internal state (a,b,c,d,e) before step T of the SHA-1 compression function while processing the original message block
-// the function will return:
-// ihvin: the reconstructed input chaining value
-// ihvout: the reconstructed output chaining value
+// Function type for sha1_recompression_step_T (uint32_t ihvin[5], uint32_t ihvout[5], const uint32_t me2[80], const uint32_t state[5]).
+// Where 0 <= T < 80
+// me2 is an expanded message (the expansion of an original message block XOR'ed with a disturbance vector's message block difference.)
+// state is the internal state (a,b,c,d,e) before step T of the SHA-1 compression function while processing the original message block.
+// The function will return:
+// ihvin: The reconstructed input chaining value.
+// ihvout: The reconstructed output chaining value.
*/
typedef void(*sha1_recompression_type)(uint32_t*, uint32_t*, const uint32_t*, const uint32_t*);
-/* table of sha1_recompression_step_0, ... , sha1_recompression_step_79 */
-/* extern sha1_recompression_type sha1_recompression_step[80];*/
-
-/* a callback function type that can be set to be called when a collision block has been found: */
+/* A callback function type that can be set to be called when a collision block has been found: */
/* void collision_block_callback(uint64_t byteoffset, const uint32_t ihvin1[5], const uint32_t ihvin2[5], const uint32_t m1[80], const uint32_t m2[80]) */
typedef void(*collision_block_callback)(uint64_t, const uint32_t*, const uint32_t*, const uint32_t*, const uint32_t*);
-/* the SHA-1 context */
+/* The SHA-1 context. */
typedef struct {
uint64_t total;
uint32_t ihv[5];
@@ -59,30 +54,34 @@ typedef struct {
uint32_t states[80][5];
} SHA1_CTX;
-/* initialize SHA-1 context */
+/* Initialize SHA-1 context. */
void SHA1DCInit(SHA1_CTX*);
/*
-// function to enable safe SHA-1 hashing:
-// collision attacks are thwarted by hashing a detected near-collision block 3 times
-// think of it as extending SHA-1 from 80-steps to 240-steps for such blocks:
-// the best collision attacks against SHA-1 have complexity about 2^60,
-// thus for 240-steps an immediate lower-bound for the best cryptanalytic attacks would 2^180
-// an attacker would be better off using a generic birthday search of complexity 2^80
-//
-// enabling safe SHA-1 hashing will result in the correct SHA-1 hash for messages where no collision attack was detected
-// but it will result in a different SHA-1 hash for messages where a collision attack was detected
-// this will automatically invalidate SHA-1 based digital signature forgeries
-// enabled by default
+ Function to enable safe SHA-1 hashing:
+ Collision attacks are thwarted by hashing a detected near-collision block 3 times.
+ Think of it as extending SHA-1 from 80-steps to 240-steps for such blocks:
+ The best collision attacks against SHA-1 have complexity about 2^60,
+ thus for 240-steps an immediate lower-bound for the best cryptanalytic attacks would be 2^180.
+ An attacker would be better off using a generic birthday search of complexity 2^80.
+
+ Enabling safe SHA-1 hashing will result in the correct SHA-1 hash for messages where no collision attack was detected,
+ but it will result in a different SHA-1 hash for messages where a collision attack was detected.
+ This will automatically invalidate SHA-1 based digital signature forgeries.
+ Enabled by default.
*/
void SHA1DCSetSafeHash(SHA1_CTX*, int);
-/* function to disable or enable the use of Unavoidable Bitconditions (provides a significant speed up) */
-/* enabled by default */
+/*
+ Function to disable or enable the use of Unavoidable Bitconditions (provides a significant speed up).
+ Enabled by default
+ */
void SHA1DCSetUseUBC(SHA1_CTX*, int);
-/* function to disable or enable the use of Collision Detection */
-/* enabled by default */
+/*
+ Function to disable or enable the use of Collision Detection.
+ Enabled by default.
+ */
void SHA1DCSetUseDetectColl(SHA1_CTX*, int);
/* function to disable or enable the detection of reduced-round SHA-1 collisions */
@@ -100,23 +99,12 @@ void SHA1DCUpdate(SHA1_CTX*, const char*, size_t);
/* returns: 0 = no collision detected, otherwise = collision found => warn user for active attack */
int SHA1DCFinal(unsigned char[20], SHA1_CTX*);
-/*
- * Same as SHA1DCFinal, but convert collision attack case into a verbose die().
- */
-void git_SHA1DCFinal(unsigned char [20], SHA1_CTX *);
-
-/*
- * Same as SHA1DCUpdate, but adjust types to match git's usual interface.
- */
-void git_SHA1DCUpdate(SHA1_CTX *ctx, const void *data, unsigned long len);
-
-#define platform_SHA_CTX SHA1_CTX
-#define platform_SHA1_Init SHA1DCInit
-#define platform_SHA1_Update git_SHA1DCUpdate
-#define platform_SHA1_Final git_SHA1DCFinal
-
#if defined(__cplusplus)
}
#endif
-#endif /* SHA1DC_SHA1_H */
+#ifdef SHA1DC_CUSTOM_TRAILING_INCLUDE_SHA1_H
+#include SHA1DC_CUSTOM_TRAILING_INCLUDE_SHA1_H
+#endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/sha1dc/ubc_check.c b/sha1dc/ubc_check.c
index 089dd4743d..b3beff2afb 100644
--- a/sha1dc/ubc_check.c
+++ b/sha1dc/ubc_check.c
@@ -24,8 +24,13 @@
// ubc_check has been verified against ubc_check_verify using the 'ubc_check_test' program in the tools section
*/
-#include "git-compat-util.h"
-#include "sha1dc/ubc_check.h"
+#ifndef SHA1DC_NO_STANDARD_INCLUDES
+#include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef SHA1DC_CUSTOM_INCLUDE_UBC_CHECK_C
+#include SHA1DC_CUSTOM_INCLUDE_UBC_CHECK_C
+#endif
+#include "ubc_check.h"
static const uint32_t DV_I_43_0_bit = (uint32_t)(1) << 0;
static const uint32_t DV_I_44_0_bit = (uint32_t)(1) << 1;
@@ -361,3 +366,7 @@ if (mask) {
dvmask[0]=mask;
}
+
+#ifdef SHA1DC_CUSTOM_TRAILING_INCLUDE_UBC_CHECK_C
+#include SHA1DC_CUSTOM_TRAILING_INCLUDE_UBC_CHECK_C
+#endif
diff --git a/sha1dc/ubc_check.h b/sha1dc/ubc_check.h
index b64c306d77..d7e17dc734 100644
--- a/sha1dc/ubc_check.h
+++ b/sha1dc/ubc_check.h
@@ -20,13 +20,17 @@
// thus one needs to do the recompression check for each DV that has its bit set
*/
-#ifndef UBC_CHECK_H
-#define UBC_CHECK_H
+#ifndef SHA1DC_UBC_CHECK_H
+#define SHA1DC_UBC_CHECK_H
#if defined(__cplusplus)
extern "C" {
#endif
+#ifndef SHA1DC_NO_STANDARD_INCLUDES
+#include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+
#define DVMASKSIZE 1
typedef struct { int dvType; int dvK; int dvB; int testt; int maski; int maskb; uint32_t dm[80]; } dv_info_t;
extern dv_info_t sha1_dvs[];
@@ -41,4 +45,8 @@ void ubc_check(const uint32_t W[80], uint32_t dvmask[DVMASKSIZE]);
}
#endif
-#endif /* UBC_CHECK_H */
+#ifdef SHA1DC_CUSTOM_TRAILING_INCLUDE_UBC_CHECK_H
+#include SHA1DC_CUSTOM_TRAILING_INCLUDE_UBC_CHECK_H
+#endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/sha1dc_git.c b/sha1dc_git.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4d32b4f77e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sha1dc_git.c
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+/*
+ * This code is included at the end of sha1dc/sha1.c with the
+ * SHA1DC_CUSTOM_TRAILING_INCLUDE_SHA1_C macro.
+ */
+
+void git_SHA1DCFinal(unsigned char hash[20], SHA1_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ if (!SHA1DCFinal(hash, ctx))
+ return;
+ die("SHA-1 appears to be part of a collision attack: %s",
+ sha1_to_hex(hash));
+}
+
+void git_SHA1DCUpdate(SHA1_CTX *ctx, const void *vdata, unsigned long len)
+{
+ const char *data = vdata;
+ /* We expect an unsigned long, but sha1dc only takes an int */
+ while (len > INT_MAX) {
+ SHA1DCUpdate(ctx, data, INT_MAX);
+ data += INT_MAX;
+ len -= INT_MAX;
+ }
+ SHA1DCUpdate(ctx, data, len);
+}
diff --git a/sha1dc_git.h b/sha1dc_git.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a8a5c1da16
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sha1dc_git.h
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+/*
+ * This code is included at the end of sha1dc/sha1.h with the
+ * SHA1DC_CUSTOM_TRAILING_INCLUDE_SHA1_H macro.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Same as SHA1DCFinal, but convert collision attack case into a verbose die().
+ */
+void git_SHA1DCFinal(unsigned char [20], SHA1_CTX *);
+
+/*
+ * Same as SHA1DCUpdate, but adjust types to match git's usual interface.
+ */
+void git_SHA1DCUpdate(SHA1_CTX *ctx, const void *data, unsigned long len);
+
+#define platform_SHA_CTX SHA1_CTX
+#define platform_SHA1_Init SHA1DCInit
+#define platform_SHA1_Update git_SHA1DCUpdate
+#define platform_SHA1_Final git_SHA1DCFinal
--
2.13.0.303.g4ebf302169
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-05-20 11:54 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-05-18 21:28 [PATCH 0/3] Update sha1dc from upstream & optionally make it a submodule Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason
2017-05-18 21:28 ` [PATCH 1/3] sha1dc: update from upstream Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason
2017-05-18 21:28 ` [PATCH 2/3] sha1dc: use sha1collisiondetection as a submodule Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason
2017-05-20 11:13 ` Junio C Hamano
2017-05-20 11:54 ` [PATCH v2 0/2] Update sha1dc from upstream & optionally make it " Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason
2017-05-22 22:27 ` Junio C Hamano
2017-05-22 22:48 ` Stefan Beller
2017-05-23 3:22 ` Junio C Hamano
2017-05-23 10:55 ` Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason
2017-05-23 13:06 ` Junio C Hamano
2017-05-25 10:44 ` Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason
2017-05-25 23:31 ` Junio C Hamano
2017-05-20 11:54 ` Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason [this message]
2017-05-20 11:54 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] sha1dc: optionally use sha1collisiondetection as " Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason
2017-05-22 1:33 ` Junio C Hamano
2017-05-22 2:48 ` Junio C Hamano
2017-05-22 8:27 ` Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason
2017-05-22 8:48 ` Junio C Hamano
2017-05-25 10:47 ` [PATCH 2/3] sha1dc: " Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason
2017-05-18 21:28 ` [PATCH 3/3] sha1dc: remove the unused sha1dc/ directory Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20170520115429.12289-2-avarab@gmail.com \
--to=avarab@gmail.com \
--cc=bmwill@google.com \
--cc=git@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=gitster@pobox.com \
--cc=marc@marc-stevens.nl \
--cc=michael.kebe@gmail.com \
--cc=peff@peff.net \
--cc=sbeller@google.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.