From: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
To: Matt Brown <matt@nmatt.com>
Cc: james.l.morris@oracle.com, serge@hallyn.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v1 1/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM
Date: Sat, 3 Jun 2017 07:33:55 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170603063354.GJ6365@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170603055351.16080-1-matt@nmatt.com>
On Sat, Jun 03, 2017 at 01:53:51AM -0400, Matt Brown wrote:
> +static int tpe_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> +{
> + struct file *file = bprm->file;
> + struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(file->f_path.dentry->d_parent);
> + struct inode *file_inode = d_backing_inode(file->f_path.dentry);
Bloody wonderful. Do tell, what *does* prevent a race with rename(2) here,
somehow making sure that your 'inode' won't get freed right under you?
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk (Al Viro)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v1 1/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM
Date: Sat, 3 Jun 2017 07:33:55 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170603063354.GJ6365@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170603055351.16080-1-matt@nmatt.com>
On Sat, Jun 03, 2017 at 01:53:51AM -0400, Matt Brown wrote:
> +static int tpe_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> +{
> + struct file *file = bprm->file;
> + struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(file->f_path.dentry->d_parent);
> + struct inode *file_inode = d_backing_inode(file->f_path.dentry);
Bloody wonderful. Do tell, what *does* prevent a race with rename(2) here,
somehow making sure that your 'inode' won't get freed right under you?
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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
To: Matt Brown <matt@nmatt.com>
Cc: james.l.morris@oracle.com, serge@hallyn.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 1/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM
Date: Sat, 3 Jun 2017 07:33:55 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170603063354.GJ6365@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170603055351.16080-1-matt@nmatt.com>
On Sat, Jun 03, 2017 at 01:53:51AM -0400, Matt Brown wrote:
> +static int tpe_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> +{
> + struct file *file = bprm->file;
> + struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(file->f_path.dentry->d_parent);
> + struct inode *file_inode = d_backing_inode(file->f_path.dentry);
Bloody wonderful. Do tell, what *does* prevent a race with rename(2) here,
somehow making sure that your 'inode' won't get freed right under you?
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-06-03 6:33 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-06-03 5:53 [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v1 1/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM Matt Brown
2017-06-03 5:53 ` Matt Brown
2017-06-03 5:53 ` Matt Brown
2017-06-03 6:33 ` Al Viro [this message]
2017-06-03 6:33 ` Al Viro
2017-06-03 6:33 ` Al Viro
2017-06-04 5:24 ` [kernel-hardening] " Matt Brown
2017-06-04 5:24 ` Matt Brown
2017-06-04 5:24 ` Matt Brown
2017-06-04 5:47 ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric Biggers
2017-06-04 5:47 ` Eric Biggers
2017-06-04 12:43 ` Matt Brown
2017-06-04 12:43 ` Matt Brown
2017-06-04 6:51 ` Al Viro
2017-06-04 6:51 ` Al Viro
2017-06-04 6:51 ` Al Viro
2017-06-03 10:39 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jann Horn
2017-06-03 10:39 ` Jann Horn
2017-06-03 22:30 ` Matt Brown
2017-06-03 22:30 ` Matt Brown
2017-06-03 15:47 ` Solar Designer
2017-06-03 15:59 ` Greg KH
2017-06-03 16:22 ` Solar Designer
2017-06-03 17:16 ` Daniel Micay
2017-06-03 22:02 ` Nicolas Belouin
2017-06-03 21:55 ` Corey Henderson
2017-06-03 16:13 ` Solar Designer
2017-06-05 14:41 ` Matt Brown
2017-06-05 15:23 ` Solar Designer
2017-06-04 16:43 ` Mickaël Salaün
2017-06-04 22:07 ` Mickaël Salaün
2017-06-05 15:30 ` [kernel-hardening] " Alan Cox
2017-06-05 15:30 ` Alan Cox
2017-06-05 15:30 ` Alan Cox
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