From: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org,
"Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>,
Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
Hillf Danton <hillf.zj@alibaba-inc.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] userfaultfd: shmem: handle coredumping in handle_userfault()
Date: Fri, 16 Jun 2017 00:52:31 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170615225231.GB11676@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170615145428.55264cd6c7e058b6e7a58f58@linux-foundation.org>
On Thu, Jun 15, 2017 at 02:54:28PM -0700, Andrew Morton wrote:
> So what are the user-visible effects of the bug? Incomplete core files,
> I assume?
The side effect is a BUG_ON with no lock held triggered by the
coredumping process which exits. This is why I converted it to
WARN_ON_ONCE for good.
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at fs/userfaultfd.c:343!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
Modules linked in:
CPU: 5 PID: 2054 Comm: userfaultfd-seg Tainted: G W 4.11.0+ #15
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.10.2-0-g5f4c7b1-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
task: ffff88006b991900 task.stack: ffff880067f38000
RIP: 0010:handle_userfault+0xaf8/0x1930
RSP: 0000:ffff880067f3ee98 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: ffff880065a7dec0 RBX: 1ffff1000cfe7de0 RCX: 1ffff1000cb4fbee
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000200 RDI: ffff8800684a6028
RBP: ffff880067f3f088 R08: ffff880065a7df70 R09: 0000000000000003
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8800684a5fe8
R13: ffff880067f3f380 R14: ffff880067f3f060 R15: ffff880067f3f2c0
FS: 00007f05d58d8700(0000) GS:ffff88006cf40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000000696c2000 CR4: 00000000000406e0
Call Trace:
? ext4_reserve_inode_write+0x200/0x200
? userfaultfd_ioctl+0x2d80/0x2d80
? find_get_entry+0x231/0x4b0
? lock_downgrade+0x820/0x820
? radix_tree_lookup_slot+0x58/0x90
? __radix_tree_lookup+0x330/0x330
? find_get_entry+0x250/0x4b0
? find_lock_entry+0x2d/0x330
shmem_getpage_gfp+0x1381/0x1c20
? generic_file_readonly_mmap+0x1a0/0x1b0
? shmem_should_replace_page.isra.3+0x40/0x40
? lock_downgrade+0x820/0x820
shmem_fault+0x1de/0x750
? shmem_getpage_gfp+0x1c20/0x1c20
? ext4_file_write_iter+0x477/0xf20
? read_cache_page_gfp+0xa0/0xa0
? ext4_file_open+0x890/0x890
? follow_page_pte+0x80b/0xa97
__do_fault+0x80/0x340
__handle_mm_fault+0x1b28/0x3d50
? vm_insert_page+0x6b0/0x6b0
handle_mm_fault+0x1ae/0x440
__get_user_pages+0x286/0x1020
? generic_file_llseek_size+0x20e/0x2c0
? follow_page_mask+0x11b0/0x11b0
? __kernel_write+0x268/0x350
? ext4_find_unwritten_pgoff.isra.1+0x790/0x790
get_dump_page+0xc2/0x120
? __mm_populate+0x320/0x320
? cn_esc_printf+0x5d0/0x5d0
? __might_sleep+0x9a/0x190
? dump_skip+0xd5/0x190
elf_core_dump+0x335f/0x40a0
? writenote+0x240/0x240
? rcu_sync_lockdep_assert+0x75/0xb0
? __sb_start_write+0xfc/0x270
do_coredump+0x154f/0x2a10
? __dequeue_signal+0x3c2/0x580
? __dequeue_signal+0x527/0x580
? dump_align+0x70/0x70
? lock_downgrade+0x820/0x820
? try_to_wake_up+0x91/0x1250
? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x3c0/0x3c0
? __sigqueue_free.part.3+0x51/0x60
? get_signal+0x568/0x12a0
? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x2c/0x80
? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x48a/0x5a0
get_signal+0x5b6/0x12a0
do_signal+0x92/0x1840
? force_sig_info_fault+0x199/0x290
? pgtable_bad+0x110/0x110
? setup_sigcontext+0x7d0/0x7d0
? printk+0x94/0xb0
? load_image_and_restore+0xd1/0xd1
? up_read+0x35/0x40
? printk+0x94/0xb0
? bad_area+0x69/0x80
? exit_to_usermode_loop+0x46/0x1a0
exit_to_usermode_loop+0x132/0x1a0
prepare_exit_to_usermode+0xf4/0x120
retint_user+0x8/0x20
RIP: 0033:0x401c9d
RSP: 002b:00007f05d58d7ee0 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f05e447b3f4
RDX: 00007f05ddcdb000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f05d58d7f20 R08: 00007f05d58d8700 R09: 00007f05d58d8700
R10: 00007f05d58d89d0 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007ffd232d7eef R14: 0000000000000008 R15: 00007f05d58d8700
Code: de 49 89 46 c0 e8 a9 78 2c 01 8b 95 50 fe ff ff 4c 89 e7 89 95 50 fe ff ff e8 15 a5 ff ff 8b 95 50 fe ff ff e9 16 f7 ff ff 0f 0b <0f> 0b 0f 0b 0f 0b a8 08 0f 85 59 04 00 00 48 c7 c7 60 88 cf 82
RIP: handle_userfault+0xaf8/0x1930 RSP: ffff880067f3ee98
---[ end trace b85d6355d483e79f ]---
This doesn't affect the rest of the system at all and it's definitely
not exploitable, but there's a nuisance of a process left in D state.
> Can we please get that description into the changelog so that others
> can decide which kernel(s) need the fix?
Only 4.11 is affected, pre-4.11 anon memory holes are skipped in
__get_user_pages by checking FOLL_DUMP explicitly against empty
pagetables (mm/gup.c:no_page_table()).
Should I re-submit with this detail?
I checked ages ago that if get_dump_page() would ever later reach
handle_userfault somehow, VM_FAULT_RETRY couldn't get set. In turn
handle_userfault() would immediately return a SIGBUS without blocking
(so then the coredump would correctly skip the missing page).
What I missed is that the caller of get_dump_page doesn't hold the
mmap_sem and it ends up invoking handle_mm_fault without bothering to
take any mmap_sem because it assumes it's single threaded (same
assumption as in exit_mmap.. with the slight difference exit_mmap
would never dream to invoke handle_mm_fault without mmap_sem and it's
only a teardown op, not a bring-up pagein-and-fill-page-tables op).
To verify my earlier evaluation was correct (modulo the mmap_sem
part..) I added "if (!down_write_trylock(¤t->mm->mmap_sem))
WARN_ON_ONCE()" around get_dump_page, and then it works as I
originally expected (handle_userfault complains because VM_FAULT_RETRY
is missing but it doesn't block and the coredump completes fine for
shmem).
We surely want local fix to handle_userfault() anyway so whatever else
happens in the coredump logic later (mmap_sem or not) cannot affect
handle_userfault() anymore.
I did such down_write_trylock test around get_dump_page also to verify
it was all working fine at the coredump level with the mmap_sem.
Adding a selftest is possible too, but it'll leave garbage in the abrt
spoool or on the local dir, depending on the system
config. Potentially leaving garbage in /var is not the norm for
selftests as far as I can tell, advice is welcome about that.
Thanks,
Andrea
--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in
the body to majordomo@kvack.org. For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"dont@kvack.org"> email@kvack.org </a>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-06-15 22:52 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-06-15 21:48 [PATCH 1/1] userfaultfd: shmem: handle coredumping in handle_userfault() Andrea Arcangeli
2017-06-15 21:54 ` Andrew Morton
2017-06-15 22:52 ` Andrea Arcangeli [this message]
2017-06-15 22:58 ` Andrew Morton
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20170615225231.GB11676@redhat.com \
--to=aarcange@redhat.com \
--cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=dgilbert@redhat.com \
--cc=hillf.zj@alibaba-inc.com \
--cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
--cc=mike.kravetz@oracle.com \
--cc=rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.