Re: [PATCH v4 4/4] x86/boot/KASLR: Restrict kernel to be randomized in mirror regions

[Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>]

On 07/09/17 at 07:11am, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Sun, Jul 9, 2017 at 5:37 AM, Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> wrote:
> > Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
> > +/* Marks if efi mirror regions have been found and handled. */
> > +static bool efi_mirror_found;
> 
> I think this is only ever checked once? How about having
> process_efi_entries return bool to indicate if mirror was found? Also,
> that function should be behind #ifdef. Let's do something like this:
> 
> 
> > +
> > +static void process_efi_entries(unsigned long minimum,
> > +                               unsigned long image_size)
> 
> #ifdef CONFIG_EFI
> /* Returns true if mirror region found (and further scanning should stop) */

Well, here it might be not like that. The mirror regions could be multiple,
we need find and process each of them to add slots. 

> static bool process_efi_entries(...)
> {
> ...
> }
> #else
> static inline bool process_efi_entries(...)
> {
>     return false;
> }
> #endif
> 
> Then:
> 
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_EFI
> > +       process_efi_entries(minimum, image_size);
> > +       if (efi_mirror_found)
> > +               return slots_fetch_random();
> > +#endif
> 
> Can become:
> 
> if (process_efi_entries(minimum, image_size))
>     return slots_fetch_random()
> 
> and no #ifndef needed here.
> 
> > +
> >         process_e820_entries(minimum, image_size);
> >         return slots_fetch_random();
> >  }
> > @@ -652,7 +708,7 @@ void choose_random_location(unsigned long input,
> >          */
> >         min_addr = min(*output, 512UL << 20);
> >
> > -       /* Walk e820 and find a random address. */
> > +       /* Walk available memory entries to find a random address. */
> >         random_addr = find_random_phys_addr(min_addr, output_size);
> >         if (!random_addr) {
> >                 warn("Physical KASLR disabled: no suitable memory region!");
> > --
> > 2.5.5
> >
> 
> Otherwise, if the EFI logic is good, this looks sensible.
> 
> Thanks for splitting up the patches!
> 
> -Kees
> 
> -- 
> Kees Cook
> Pixel Security