From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>,
Chen Feng <puck.chen@hisilicon.com>,
zhaoyukun@huawei.com, arnd@arndb.de,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, suzhuangluan@hisilicon.com,
dan.zhao@hisilicon.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC] random: fix syzkaller fuzzer test int overflow
Date: Mon, 30 Oct 2017 08:39:56 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20171030073956.GA17153@kroah.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20171029182529.rxmbawagx63e2dw4@thunk.org>
On Sun, Oct 29, 2017 at 02:25:29PM -0400, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
> On Sat, Oct 28, 2017 at 11:22:00AM +0800, Chen Feng wrote:
> >
> > I checked the ioctl. What's the purpose of RNDADDTOENTCNT ioctl to
> > userspace?
>
> It's a legacy ioctl which is probably not used anywhere; it's been
> replaced by RNDADDENTROPY. It previously allows root to bump the
> entropy estimate, but the right way to do this by rngd is to
> atomically add entropy to the pool land and bump the entropy estimate
> at the same time.
>
> The UBSAN is harmless. The ioctl requires root, and the entropy_total
> field, which is involved in the UBSAN, is only used in the first few
> seconds of boot, to determine when the entropy pool has been
> initialized. In general on desktop and servers this happens before
> userspace has a chance to run.
>
> In any case, here's a fix for this.
>
> - Ted
>
> commit 6f7034d0c52e21f30002b95126b6b98e4618dc57
> Author: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
> Date: Sun Oct 29 14:17:26 2017 -0400
>
> random: use a tighter cap in credit_entropy_bits_safe()
>
> This fixes a harmless UBSAN where root could potentially end up
> causing an overflow while bumping the entropy_total field (which is
> ignored once the entropy pool has been initialized, and this generally
> is completed during the boot sequence).
>
> This is marginal for the stable kernel series, but it's a really
> trivial patch, and it UBSAN warning that might cause security folks to
> get overly excited for no reason.
>
> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
No "Reported-by:"?
thanks,
greg k-h
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-10-30 7:39 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-10-24 7:44 [PATCH RFC] random: fix syzkaller fuzzer test int overflow Chen Feng
2017-10-24 9:09 ` Greg KH
2017-10-24 9:24 ` Chen Feng
2017-10-24 9:57 ` Greg KH
2017-10-24 10:25 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-10-25 6:30 ` Chen Feng
2017-10-25 6:56 ` Greg KH
2017-10-25 7:08 ` Chen Feng
2017-10-25 8:49 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-10-26 8:25 ` Chen Feng
2017-10-26 15:04 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-10-28 3:22 ` Chen Feng
2017-10-29 18:25 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-10-30 7:39 ` Greg KH [this message]
2017-10-30 9:11 ` Theodore Ts'o
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