[PATCH] arm64: ensure __dump_instr() checks addr_limit

[will.deacon@arm.com (Will Deacon)]

On Thu, Nov 02, 2017 at 04:12:03PM +0000, Mark Rutland wrote:
> It's possible for a user to deliberately trigger __dump_instr with a
> chosen kernel address.
> 
> Let's avoid problems resulting from this by using get_user() rather than
> __get_user(), ensuring that we don't erroneously access kernel memory.
> 
> Where we use __dump_instr() on kernel text, we already switch to
> KERNEL_DS, so this shouldn't adversely affect those cases.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
> Fixes: 60ffc30d5652810d ("arm64: Exception handling")
> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
> Cc: stable at vger.kernel.org
> ---
>  arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c | 2 +-
>  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>

Catalin, can you take this as a fix please?

Will

> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c
> index 5ea4b85aee0e..8383af15a759 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c
> @@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ static void __dump_instr(const char *lvl, struct pt_regs *regs)
>  	for (i = -4; i < 1; i++) {
>  		unsigned int val, bad;
>  
> -		bad = __get_user(val, &((u32 *)addr)[i]);
> +		bad = get_user(val, &((u32 *)addr)[i]);
>  
>  		if (!bad)
>  			p += sprintf(p, i == 0 ? "(%08x) " : "%08x ", val);
> -- 
> 2.11.0
>