From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Date: Thu, 9 Nov 2017 22:46:46 -0600 From: "Serge E. Hallyn" Message-ID: <20171110044645.GA3694@mail.hallyn.com> References: <20171106233913.GA1518@mail.hallyn.com> <20171107032802.GA6669@mail.hallyn.com> <20171108190223.vdkyepcaegmub6le@gmail.com> <20171109032134.GA15666@mail.hallyn.com> <871sl7dsh8.fsf@xmission.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <871sl7dsh8.fsf@xmission.com> Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH resend 2/2] userns: control capabilities of some user namespaces To: "Eric W. Biederman" Cc: Mahesh Bandewar =?utf-8?B?KOCkruCkueClh+CktiDgpKzgpILgpKHgpYfgpLXgpL4=?= =?utf-8?B?4KSwKQ==?= , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Christian Brauner , Boris Lukashev , Daniel Micay , Mahesh Bandewar , LKML , Netdev , Kernel-hardening , Linux API , Kees Cook , Eric Dumazet , David Miller List-ID: Quoting Eric W. Biederman (ebiederm@xmission.com): > single sandbox. I am not at all certain that the capabilities is the > proper place to limit code reachability. Right, I keep having this gut feeling that there is another way we should be doing that. Maybe based on ksplice or perf, or maybe more based on subsystems. And I hope someone pursues that. But I can't put my finger on it, and meanwhile the capability checks obviously *are* in fact gates... -serge From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: "Serge E. Hallyn" Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH resend 2/2] userns: control capabilities of some user namespaces Date: Thu, 9 Nov 2017 22:46:46 -0600 Message-ID: <20171110044645.GA3694@mail.hallyn.com> References: <20171106233913.GA1518@mail.hallyn.com> <20171107032802.GA6669@mail.hallyn.com> <20171108190223.vdkyepcaegmub6le@gmail.com> <20171109032134.GA15666@mail.hallyn.com> <871sl7dsh8.fsf@xmission.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Return-path: Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <871sl7dsh8.fsf-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org> Sender: linux-api-owner-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org To: "Eric W. Biederman" Cc: Mahesh Bandewar =?utf-8?B?KOCkruCkueClh+CktiDgpKzgpILgpKHgpYfgpLXgpL4=?= =?utf-8?B?4KSwKQ==?= , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Christian Brauner , Boris Lukashev , Daniel Micay , Mahesh Bandewar , LKML , Netdev , Kernel-hardening , Linux API , Kees Cook , Eric Dumazet , David Miller List-Id: linux-api@vger.kernel.org Quoting Eric W. Biederman (ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org): > single sandbox. I am not at all certain that the capabilities is the > proper place to limit code reachability. Right, I keep having this gut feeling that there is another way we should be doing that. Maybe based on ksplice or perf, or maybe more based on subsystems. And I hope someone pursues that. But I can't put my finger on it, and meanwhile the capability checks obviously *are* in fact gates... -serge