From: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
To: Ilya Lesokhin <ilyal@mellanox.com>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org, davem@davemloft.net, davejwatson@fb.com,
tom@herbertland.com, hannes@stressinduktion.org,
borisp@mellanox.com, aviadye@mellanox.com, liranl@mellanox.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 net-next 6/6] tls: Add generic NIC offload infrastructure.
Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2017 17:53:35 -0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20171218195335.GB6122@localhost.localdomain> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20171218111033.13256-7-ilyal@mellanox.com>
On Mon, Dec 18, 2017 at 01:10:33PM +0200, Ilya Lesokhin wrote:
> This patch adds a generic infrastructure to offload TLS crypto to a
> network devices. It enables the kernel TLS socket to skip encryption
> and authentication operations on the transmit side of the data path.
> Leaving those computationally expensive operations to the NIC.
I have a hard time understanding why this was named 'tls_device' if no
net_device's are registered.
>
> The NIC offload infrastructure builds TLS records and pushes them to
> the TCP layer just like the SW KTLS implementation and using the same API.
> TCP segmentation is mostly unaffected. Currently the only exception is
> that we prevent mixed SKBs where only part of the payload requires
> offload. In the future we are likely to add a similar restriction
> following a change cipher spec record.
>
> The notable differences between SW KTLS and NIC offloaded TLS
> implementations are as follows:
> 1. The offloaded implementation builds "plaintext TLS record", those
> records contain plaintext instead of ciphertext and place holder bytes
> instead of authentication tags.
> 2. The offloaded implementation maintains a mapping from TCP sequence
> number to TLS records. Thus given a TCP SKB sent from a NIC offloaded
> TLS socket, we can use the tls NIC offload infrastructure to obtain
> enough context to encrypt the payload of the SKB.
> A TLS record is released when the last byte of the record is ack'ed,
> this is done through the new icsk_clean_acked callback.
>
> The infrastructure should be extendable to support various NIC offload
> implementations. However it is currently written with the
> implementation below in mind:
> The NIC assumes that packets from each offloaded stream are sent as
> plaintext and in-order. It keeps track of the TLS records in the TCP
> stream. When a packet marked for offload is transmitted, the NIC
> encrypts the payload in-place and puts authentication tags in the
> relevant place holders.
>
> The responsibility for handling out-of-order packets (i.e. TCP
> retransmission, qdisc drops) falls on the netdev driver.
>
> The netdev driver keeps track of the expected TCP SN from the NIC's
> perspective. If the next packet to transmit matches the expected TCP
> SN, the driver advances the expected TCP SN, and transmits the packet
> with TLS offload indication.
>
> If the next packet to transmit does not match the expected TCP SN. The
> driver calls the TLS layer to obtain the TLS record that includes the
> TCP of the packet for transmission. Using this TLS record, the driver
> posts a work entry on the transmit queue to reconstruct the NIC TLS
> state required for the offload of the out-of-order packet. It updates
> the expected TCP SN accordingly and transmit the now in-order packet.
> The same queue is used for packet transmission and TLS context
> reconstruction to avoid the need for flushing the transmit queue before
> issuing the context reconstruction request.
>
> Signed-off-by: Boris Pismenny <borisp@mellanox.com>
> Signed-off-by: Ilya Lesokhin <ilyal@mellanox.com>
> Signed-off-by: Aviad Yehezkel <aviadye@mellanox.com>
> ---
> include/net/tls.h | 62 +++-
> net/tls/Kconfig | 9 +
> net/tls/Makefile | 3 +
> net/tls/tls_device.c | 800 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> net/tls/tls_device_fallback.c | 405 +++++++++++++++++++++
> net/tls/tls_main.c | 33 +-
> 6 files changed, 1305 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 net/tls/tls_device.c
> create mode 100644 net/tls/tls_device_fallback.c
>
> diff --git a/include/net/tls.h b/include/net/tls.h
> index 936cfc5cab7d..9c1b5d13d9a7 100644
> --- a/include/net/tls.h
> +++ b/include/net/tls.h
> @@ -75,6 +75,29 @@ struct tls_sw_context {
> struct scatterlist sg_aead_out[2];
> };
>
> +struct tls_record_info {
> + struct list_head list;
> + u32 end_seq;
> + int len;
> + int num_frags;
> + skb_frag_t frags[MAX_SKB_FRAGS];
> +};
> +
> +struct tls_offload_context {
> + struct crypto_aead *aead_send;
> +
> + struct list_head records_list;
> + struct scatterlist sg_tx_data[MAX_SKB_FRAGS];
> + void (*sk_destruct)(struct sock *sk);
> + struct tls_record_info *open_record;
> + struct tls_record_info *retransmit_hint;
> + u64 hint_record_sn;
> + u64 unacked_record_sn;
> +
> + u32 expected_seq;
> + spinlock_t lock; /* protects records list */
> +};
> +
> enum {
> TLS_PENDING_CLOSED_RECORD
> };
> @@ -85,6 +108,10 @@ struct tls_context {
> struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_128 crypto_send_aes_gcm_128;
> };
>
> + struct list_head list;
> + struct net_device *netdev;
> + refcount_t refcount;
> +
> void *priv_ctx;
>
> u8 tx_conf:2;
> @@ -129,9 +156,29 @@ int tls_sw_sendpage(struct sock *sk, struct page *page,
> void tls_sw_close(struct sock *sk, long timeout);
> void tls_sw_free_tx_resources(struct sock *sk);
>
> -void tls_sk_destruct(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *ctx);
> -void tls_icsk_clean_acked(struct sock *sk);
> +void tls_clear_device_offload(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *ctx);
> +int tls_set_device_offload(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *ctx);
> +int tls_device_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size);
> +int tls_device_sendpage(struct sock *sk, struct page *page,
> + int offset, size_t size, int flags);
> +void tls_device_sk_destruct(struct sock *sk);
> +void tls_device_init(void);
> +void tls_device_cleanup(void);
>
> +struct tls_record_info *tls_get_record(struct tls_offload_context *context,
> + u32 seq, u64 *p_record_sn);
> +
> +static inline bool tls_record_is_start_marker(struct tls_record_info *rec)
> +{
> + return rec->len == 0;
> +}
> +
> +static inline u32 tls_record_start_seq(struct tls_record_info *rec)
> +{
> + return rec->end_seq - rec->len;
> +}
> +
> +void tls_sk_destruct(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *ctx);
> int tls_push_sg(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *ctx,
> struct scatterlist *sg, u16 first_offset,
> int flags);
> @@ -168,6 +215,13 @@ static inline bool tls_is_pending_open_record(struct tls_context *tls_ctx)
> return tls_ctx->pending_open_record_frags;
> }
>
> +static inline bool tls_is_sk_tx_device_offloaded(struct sock *sk)
> +{
> + return sk_fullsock(sk) &&
> + /* matches smp_store_release in tls_set_device_offload */
> + smp_load_acquire(&sk->sk_destruct) == &tls_device_sk_destruct;
> +}
> +
> static inline void tls_err_abort(struct sock *sk)
> {
> sk->sk_err = -EBADMSG;
> @@ -255,4 +309,8 @@ static inline struct tls_offload_context *tls_offload_ctx(
> int tls_proccess_cmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
> unsigned char *record_type);
>
> +int tls_sw_fallback_init(struct sock *sk,
> + struct tls_offload_context *offload_ctx,
> + struct tls_crypto_info *crypto_info);
> +
> #endif /* _TLS_OFFLOAD_H */
> diff --git a/net/tls/Kconfig b/net/tls/Kconfig
> index eb583038c67e..1a4ea55c2f09 100644
> --- a/net/tls/Kconfig
> +++ b/net/tls/Kconfig
> @@ -13,3 +13,12 @@ config TLS
> encryption handling of the TLS protocol to be done in-kernel.
>
> If unsure, say N.
> +
> +config TLS_DEVICE
> + bool "Transport Layer Security HW offload"
> + depends on TLS
> + default n
> + ---help---
> + Enable kernel support for HW offload of the TLS protocol.
> +
> + If unsure, say N.
> diff --git a/net/tls/Makefile b/net/tls/Makefile
> index a930fd1c4f7b..44483cd47b3a 100644
> --- a/net/tls/Makefile
> +++ b/net/tls/Makefile
> @@ -5,3 +5,6 @@
> obj-$(CONFIG_TLS) += tls.o
>
> tls-y := tls_main.o tls_sw.o
> +
> +tls-$(CONFIG_TLS_DEVICE) += tls_device.o tls_device_fallback.o
> +
> diff --git a/net/tls/tls_device.c b/net/tls/tls_device.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..5082d693a503
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/net/tls/tls_device.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,800 @@
> +/* Copyright (c) 2016-2017, Mellanox Technologies All rights reserved.
> + *
> + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
> + * without modification, are permitted provided that the following
> + * conditions are met:
> + *
> + * - Redistributions of source code must retain the above
> + * copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following
> + * disclaimer.
> + *
> + * - Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above
> + * copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following
> + * disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials
> + * provided with the distribution.
> + *
> + * - Neither the name of the Mellanox Technologies nor the
> + * names of its contributors may be used to endorse or promote
> + * products derived from this software without specific prior written
> + * permission.
> + *
> + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS"
> + * AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
> + * THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR
> + * A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
> + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR
> + * ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
> + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
> + * SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
> + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
> + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING
> + * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
> + * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE
> + */
> +
> +#include <linux/module.h>
> +#include <net/tcp.h>
> +#include <net/inet_common.h>
> +#include <linux/highmem.h>
> +#include <linux/netdevice.h>
> +
> +#include <net/tls.h>
> +#include <crypto/aead.h>
> +
> +/* device_offload_lock is used to synchronize tls_dev_add
> + * against NETDEV_DOWN notifications.
> + */
> +DEFINE_STATIC_PERCPU_RWSEM(device_offload_lock);
> +
> +static void tls_device_gc_task(struct work_struct *work);
> +
> +static DECLARE_WORK(tls_device_gc_work, tls_device_gc_task);
> +static LIST_HEAD(tls_device_gc_list);
> +static LIST_HEAD(tls_device_list);
> +static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(tls_device_lock);
> +
> +static void tls_device_free_ctx(struct tls_context *ctx)
> +{
> + struct tls_offload_context *offlad_ctx = tls_offload_ctx(ctx);
> +
> + kfree(offlad_ctx);
> + kfree(ctx);
> +}
> +
> +static void tls_device_gc_task(struct work_struct *work)
> +{
> + struct tls_context *ctx, *tmp;
> + struct list_head gc_list;
> + unsigned long flags;
> +
> + spin_lock_irqsave(&tls_device_lock, flags);
> + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&gc_list);
> + list_splice_init(&tls_device_gc_list, &gc_list);
> + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tls_device_lock, flags);
> +
> + list_for_each_entry_safe(ctx, tmp, &gc_list, list) {
> + struct net_device *netdev = ctx->netdev;
> +
> + if (netdev) {
> + netdev->tlsdev_ops->tls_dev_del(netdev, ctx,
> + TLS_OFFLOAD_CTX_DIR_TX);
> + dev_put(netdev);
> + }
> +
> + list_del(&ctx->list);
> + tls_device_free_ctx(ctx);
> + }
> +}
> +
> +static void tls_device_queue_ctx_destruction(struct tls_context *ctx)
> +{
> + unsigned long flags;
> +
> + spin_lock_irqsave(&tls_device_lock, flags);
> + list_move_tail(&ctx->list, &tls_device_gc_list);
> +
> + /* schedule_work inside the spinlock
> + * to make sure tls_device_down waits for that work.
> + */
> + schedule_work(&tls_device_gc_work);
> +
> + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tls_device_lock, flags);
> +}
> +
> +/* We assume that the socket is already connected */
> +static struct net_device *get_netdev_for_sock(struct sock *sk)
> +{
> + struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
> + struct net_device *netdev = NULL;
> +
> + netdev = dev_get_by_index(sock_net(sk), inet->cork.fl.flowi_oif);
> +
> + return netdev;
> +}
> +
> +static int attach_sock_to_netdev(struct sock *sk, struct net_device *netdev,
> + struct tls_context *ctx)
> +{
> + int rc;
> +
> + rc = netdev->tlsdev_ops->tls_dev_add(netdev, sk, TLS_OFFLOAD_CTX_DIR_TX,
> + &ctx->crypto_send);
> + if (rc) {
> + pr_err("The netdev has refused to offload this socket\n");
_ratelimit here is probably welcomed, as this could be triggered by
users at will.
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + rc = 0;
> +out:
> + return rc;
> +}
> +
> +static void destroy_record(struct tls_record_info *record)
> +{
> + skb_frag_t *frag;
> + int nr_frags = record->num_frags;
> +
> + while (nr_frags > 0) {
> + frag = &record->frags[nr_frags - 1];
> + __skb_frag_unref(frag);
> + --nr_frags;
> + }
> + kfree(record);
> +}
> +
> +static void delete_all_records(struct tls_offload_context *offload_ctx)
> +{
> + struct tls_record_info *info, *temp;
> +
> + list_for_each_entry_safe(info, temp, &offload_ctx->records_list, list) {
> + list_del(&info->list);
> + destroy_record(info);
> + }
> +
> + offload_ctx->retransmit_hint = NULL;
> +}
> +
> +static void tls_icsk_clean_acked(struct sock *sk)
> +{
> + struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
> + struct tls_offload_context *ctx;
> + struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
> + struct tls_record_info *info, *temp;
> + unsigned long flags;
> + u64 deleted_records = 0;
> +
> + if (!tls_ctx)
> + return;
> +
> + ctx = tls_offload_ctx(tls_ctx);
> +
> + spin_lock_irqsave(&ctx->lock, flags);
Would be nice if this spinlock could be avoided somehow, as it's being
called right from tcp_ack().
> + info = ctx->retransmit_hint;
> + if (info && !before(tp->snd_una, info->end_seq)) {
> + ctx->retransmit_hint = NULL;
> + list_del(&info->list);
> + destroy_record(info);
> + deleted_records++;
> + }
> +
> + list_for_each_entry_safe(info, temp, &ctx->records_list, list) {
> + if (before(tp->snd_una, info->end_seq))
> + break;
> + list_del(&info->list);
> +
> + destroy_record(info);
> + deleted_records++;
> + }
> +
> + ctx->unacked_record_sn += deleted_records;
> + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ctx->lock, flags);
> +}
> +
> +/* At this point, there should be no references on this
> + * socket and no in-flight SKBs associated with this
> + * socket, so it is safe to free all the resources.
> + */
> +void tls_device_sk_destruct(struct sock *sk)
> +{
> + struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
> + struct tls_offload_context *ctx = tls_offload_ctx(tls_ctx);
> +
> + if (ctx->open_record)
> + destroy_record(ctx->open_record);
> +
> + delete_all_records(ctx);
> + crypto_free_aead(ctx->aead_send);
> + ctx->sk_destruct(sk);
> +
> + if (refcount_dec_and_test(&tls_ctx->refcount))
> + tls_device_queue_ctx_destruction(tls_ctx);
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(tls_device_sk_destruct);
> +
> +static inline void tls_append_frag(struct tls_record_info *record,
> + struct page_frag *pfrag,
> + int size)
> +{
> + skb_frag_t *frag;
> +
> + frag = &record->frags[record->num_frags - 1];
> + if (frag->page.p == pfrag->page &&
> + frag->page_offset + frag->size == pfrag->offset) {
> + frag->size += size;
> + } else {
> + ++frag;
> + frag->page.p = pfrag->page;
> + frag->page_offset = pfrag->offset;
> + frag->size = size;
> + ++record->num_frags;
> + get_page(pfrag->page);
> + }
> +
> + pfrag->offset += size;
> + record->len += size;
> +}
> +
> +static inline int tls_push_record(struct sock *sk,
> + struct tls_context *ctx,
> + struct tls_offload_context *offload_ctx,
> + struct tls_record_info *record,
> + struct page_frag *pfrag,
> + int flags,
> + unsigned char record_type)
> +{
> + skb_frag_t *frag;
> + struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
> + struct page_frag fallback_frag;
> + struct page_frag *tag_pfrag = pfrag;
> + int i;
> +
> + /* fill prepand */
> + frag = &record->frags[0];
> + tls_fill_prepend(ctx,
> + skb_frag_address(frag),
> + record->len - ctx->prepend_size,
> + record_type);
> +
> + if (unlikely(!skb_page_frag_refill(ctx->tag_size, pfrag, GFP_KERNEL))) {
> + /* HW doesn't care about the data in the tag
> + * so in case pfrag has no room
> + * for a tag and we can't allocate a new pfrag
> + * just use the page in the first frag
> + * rather then write a complicated fall back code.
> + */
> + tag_pfrag = &fallback_frag;
> + tag_pfrag->page = skb_frag_page(frag);
> + tag_pfrag->offset = 0;
> + }
> +
> + tls_append_frag(record, tag_pfrag, ctx->tag_size);
> + record->end_seq = tp->write_seq + record->len;
> + spin_lock_irq(&offload_ctx->lock);
> + list_add_tail(&record->list, &offload_ctx->records_list);
> + spin_unlock_irq(&offload_ctx->lock);
> + offload_ctx->open_record = NULL;
> + set_bit(TLS_PENDING_CLOSED_RECORD, &ctx->flags);
> + tls_advance_record_sn(sk, ctx);
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < record->num_frags; i++) {
> + frag = &record->frags[i];
> + sg_unmark_end(&offload_ctx->sg_tx_data[i]);
> + sg_set_page(&offload_ctx->sg_tx_data[i], skb_frag_page(frag),
> + frag->size, frag->page_offset);
> + sk_mem_charge(sk, frag->size);
> + get_page(skb_frag_page(frag));
> + }
> + sg_mark_end(&offload_ctx->sg_tx_data[record->num_frags - 1]);
> +
> + /* all ready, send */
> + return tls_push_sg(sk, ctx, offload_ctx->sg_tx_data, 0, flags);
> +}
> +
> +static inline int tls_create_new_record(struct tls_offload_context *offload_ctx,
> + struct page_frag *pfrag,
> + size_t prepend_size)
> +{
> + skb_frag_t *frag;
> + struct tls_record_info *record;
> +
> + record = kmalloc(sizeof(*record), GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!record)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +
> + frag = &record->frags[0];
> + __skb_frag_set_page(frag, pfrag->page);
> + frag->page_offset = pfrag->offset;
> + skb_frag_size_set(frag, prepend_size);
> +
> + get_page(pfrag->page);
> + pfrag->offset += prepend_size;
> +
> + record->num_frags = 1;
> + record->len = prepend_size;
> + offload_ctx->open_record = record;
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static inline int tls_do_allocation(struct sock *sk,
> + struct tls_offload_context *offload_ctx,
> + struct page_frag *pfrag,
> + size_t prepend_size)
> +{
> + int ret;
> +
> + if (!offload_ctx->open_record) {
> + if (unlikely(!skb_page_frag_refill(prepend_size, pfrag,
> + sk->sk_allocation))) {
> + sk->sk_prot->enter_memory_pressure(sk);
> + sk_stream_moderate_sndbuf(sk);
> + return -ENOMEM;
> + }
> +
> + ret = tls_create_new_record(offload_ctx, pfrag, prepend_size);
> + if (ret)
> + return ret;
> +
> + if (pfrag->size > pfrag->offset)
> + return 0;
> + }
> +
> + if (!sk_page_frag_refill(sk, pfrag))
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static int tls_push_data(struct sock *sk,
> + struct iov_iter *msg_iter,
> + size_t size, int flags,
> + unsigned char record_type)
> +{
> + struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
> + struct tls_offload_context *ctx = tls_offload_ctx(tls_ctx);
> + struct tls_record_info *record = ctx->open_record;
> + struct page_frag *pfrag;
> + int copy, rc = 0;
> + size_t orig_size = size;
> + u32 max_open_record_len;
> + long timeo;
> + int more = flags & (MSG_SENDPAGE_NOTLAST | MSG_MORE);
> + int tls_push_record_flags = flags | MSG_SENDPAGE_NOTLAST;
> + bool done = false;
> +
> + if (flags &
> + ~(MSG_MORE | MSG_DONTWAIT | MSG_NOSIGNAL | MSG_SENDPAGE_NOTLAST))
> + return -ENOTSUPP;
> +
> + if (sk->sk_err)
> + return -sk->sk_err;
> +
> + timeo = sock_sndtimeo(sk, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
> + rc = tls_complete_pending_work(sk, tls_ctx, flags, &timeo);
> + if (rc < 0)
> + return rc;
> +
> + pfrag = sk_page_frag(sk);
> +
> + /* KTLS_TLS_HEADER_SIZE is not counted as part of the TLS record, and
> + * we need to leave room for an authentication tag.
> + */
> + max_open_record_len = TLS_MAX_PAYLOAD_SIZE +
> + tls_ctx->prepend_size;
> + do {
> + if (tls_do_allocation(sk, ctx, pfrag,
> + tls_ctx->prepend_size)) {
> + rc = sk_stream_wait_memory(sk, &timeo);
> + if (!rc)
> + continue;
> +
> + record = ctx->open_record;
> + if (!record)
> + break;
> +handle_error:
> + if (record_type != TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA) {
> + /* avoid sending partial
> + * record with type !=
> + * application_data
> + */
> + size = orig_size;
> + destroy_record(record);
> + ctx->open_record = NULL;
> + } else if (record->len > tls_ctx->prepend_size) {
> + goto last_record;
> + }
> +
> + break;
> + }
> +
> + record = ctx->open_record;
> + copy = min_t(size_t, size, (pfrag->size - pfrag->offset));
> + copy = min_t(size_t, copy, (max_open_record_len - record->len));
> +
> + if (copy_from_iter_nocache(page_address(pfrag->page) +
> + pfrag->offset,
> + copy, msg_iter) != copy) {
> + rc = -EFAULT;
> + goto handle_error;
> + }
> + tls_append_frag(record, pfrag, copy);
> +
> + size -= copy;
> + if (!size) {
> +last_record:
> + tls_push_record_flags = flags;
> + if (more) {
> + tls_ctx->pending_open_record_frags =
> + record->num_frags;
> + break;
> + }
> +
> + done = true;
> + }
> +
> + if ((done) || record->len >= max_open_record_len ||
> + (record->num_frags >= MAX_SKB_FRAGS - 1)) {
> + rc = tls_push_record(sk,
> + tls_ctx,
> + ctx,
> + record,
> + pfrag,
> + tls_push_record_flags,
> + record_type);
> + if (rc < 0)
> + break;
> + }
> + } while (!done);
> +
> + if (orig_size - size > 0)
> + rc = orig_size - size;
> +
> + return rc;
> +}
> +
> +int tls_device_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size)
> +{
> + unsigned char record_type = TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA;
> + int rc = 0;
> +
> + lock_sock(sk);
> +
> + if (unlikely(msg->msg_controllen)) {
> + rc = tls_proccess_cmsg(sk, msg, &record_type);
> + if (rc)
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + rc = tls_push_data(sk, &msg->msg_iter, size,
> + msg->msg_flags, record_type);
> +
> +out:
> + release_sock(sk);
> + return rc;
> +}
> +
> +int tls_device_sendpage(struct sock *sk, struct page *page,
> + int offset, size_t size, int flags)
> +{
> + struct iov_iter msg_iter;
> + struct kvec iov;
> + char *kaddr = kmap(page);
> + int rc = 0;
> +
> + if (flags & MSG_SENDPAGE_NOTLAST)
> + flags |= MSG_MORE;
> +
> + lock_sock(sk);
> +
> + if (flags & MSG_OOB) {
> + rc = -ENOTSUPP;
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + iov.iov_base = kaddr + offset;
> + iov.iov_len = size;
> + iov_iter_kvec(&msg_iter, WRITE | ITER_KVEC, &iov, 1, size);
> + rc = tls_push_data(sk, &msg_iter, size,
> + flags, TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA);
> + kunmap(page);
> +
> +out:
> + release_sock(sk);
> + return rc;
> +}
> +
> +struct tls_record_info *tls_get_record(struct tls_offload_context *context,
> + u32 seq, u64 *p_record_sn)
> +{
> + struct tls_record_info *info;
> + u64 record_sn = context->hint_record_sn;
> +
> + info = context->retransmit_hint;
> + if (!info ||
> + before(seq, info->end_seq - info->len)) {
> + /* if retransmit_hint is irrelevant start
> + * from the begging of the list
> + */
> + info = list_first_entry(&context->records_list,
> + struct tls_record_info, list);
> + record_sn = context->unacked_record_sn;
> + }
> +
> + list_for_each_entry_from(info, &context->records_list, list) {
> + if (before(seq, info->end_seq)) {
> + if (!context->retransmit_hint ||
> + after(info->end_seq,
> + context->retransmit_hint->end_seq)) {
> + context->hint_record_sn = record_sn;
> + context->retransmit_hint = info;
> + }
> + *p_record_sn = record_sn;
> + return info;
> + }
> + record_sn++;
> + }
> +
> + return NULL;
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(tls_get_record);
> +
> +static int tls_device_push_pending_record(struct sock *sk, int flags)
> +{
> + struct iov_iter msg_iter;
> +
> + iov_iter_kvec(&msg_iter, WRITE | ITER_KVEC, NULL, 0, 0);
> + return tls_push_data(sk, &msg_iter, 0, flags, TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA);
> +}
> +
> +int tls_set_device_offload(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *ctx)
> +{
> + struct tls_crypto_info *crypto_info;
> + struct tls_offload_context *offload_ctx;
> + struct tls_record_info *start_marker_record;
> + u16 nonece_size, tag_size, iv_size, rec_seq_size;
> + char *iv, *rec_seq;
> + int rc;
> + struct net_device *netdev;
> + struct sk_buff *skb;
> +
> + if (!ctx) {
> + rc = -EINVAL;
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + if (ctx->priv_ctx) {
> + rc = -EEXIST;
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + /* We support starting offload on multiple sockets
> + * concurrently, So we only need a read lock here.
> + */
> + percpu_down_read(&device_offload_lock);
> + netdev = get_netdev_for_sock(sk);
> + if (!netdev) {
> + pr_err("%s: netdev not found\n", __func__);
_ratelimit?
> + rc = -EINVAL;
> + goto release_lock;
> + }
> +
Marcelo
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-12-18 19:53 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-12-18 11:10 [PATCH v3 net-next 0/6] tls: Add generic NIC offload infrastructure Ilya Lesokhin
2017-12-18 11:10 ` [PATCH v3 net-next 1/6] tcp: Add clean acked data hook Ilya Lesokhin
2017-12-19 19:13 ` Eric Dumazet
2017-12-19 19:21 ` Ilya Lesokhin
2017-12-19 19:28 ` Eric Dumazet
2017-12-19 19:43 ` Ilya Lesokhin
2017-12-18 11:10 ` [PATCH v3 net-next 2/6] net: Rename and export copy_skb_header Ilya Lesokhin
2017-12-18 11:10 ` [PATCH v3 net-next 3/6] net: Add SW fallback infrastructure for offloaded sockets Ilya Lesokhin
2017-12-18 19:18 ` Marcelo Ricardo Leitner
2017-12-19 7:51 ` Ilya Lesokhin
2017-12-19 15:05 ` Marcelo Ricardo Leitner
2017-12-19 19:12 ` Eric Dumazet
2017-12-19 19:15 ` Ilya Lesokhin
2017-12-18 11:10 ` [PATCH v3 net-next 4/6] net: Add TLS offload netdev ops Ilya Lesokhin
2017-12-18 11:10 ` [PATCH v3 net-next 5/6] net: Add TLS TX offload features Ilya Lesokhin
2017-12-18 11:10 ` [PATCH v3 net-next 6/6] tls: Add generic NIC offload infrastructure Ilya Lesokhin
2017-12-18 19:53 ` Marcelo Ricardo Leitner [this message]
2017-12-19 7:31 ` Ilya Lesokhin
2017-12-19 15:11 ` Marcelo Ricardo Leitner
2017-12-19 15:38 ` Ilya Lesokhin
2017-12-19 16:18 ` Marcelo Ricardo Leitner
2017-12-19 7:00 ` kbuild test robot
2017-12-19 7:01 ` kbuild test robot
2017-12-19 8:17 ` [RFC PATCH] tls: tls_sw_fallback() can be static kbuild test robot
2017-12-19 8:17 ` [PATCH v3 net-next 6/6] tls: Add generic NIC offload infrastructure kbuild test robot
2017-12-18 17:10 ` [PATCH v3 net-next 0/6] " Jiri Pirko
2017-12-19 10:30 ` Jiri Pirko
2017-12-20 8:28 ` Boris Pismenny
2017-12-20 10:08 ` Jiri Pirko
2017-12-20 10:15 ` Or Gerlitz
2017-12-20 10:31 ` Or Gerlitz
2017-12-20 16:12 ` David Miller
2017-12-20 16:23 ` Ilya Lesokhin
2017-12-20 16:36 ` David Miller
2017-12-20 19:12 ` Jiri Pirko
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