From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Tom Horsley <horsley1953@gmail.com>,
Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] exec: Weaken dumpability for secureexec
Date: Tue, 2 Jan 2018 15:21:33 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180102232133.GA39880@beast> (raw)
This is a logical revert of:
commit e37fdb785a5f ("exec: Use secureexec for setting dumpability")
This weakens dumpability back to checking only for uid/gid changes in
current (which is useless), but userspace depends on dumpability not
being tied to secureexec.
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1528633
Reported-by: Tom Horsley <horsley1953@gmail.com>
Fixes: e37fdb785a5f ("exec: Use secureexec for setting dumpability")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
fs/exec.c | 9 +++++++--
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index 5688b5e1b937..7eb8d21bcab9 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -1349,9 +1349,14 @@ void setup_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
current->sas_ss_sp = current->sas_ss_size = 0;
- /* Figure out dumpability. */
+ /*
+ * Figure out dumpability. Note that this checking only of current
+ * is wrong, but userspace depends on it. This should be testing
+ * bprm->secureexec instead.
+ */
if (bprm->interp_flags & BINPRM_FLAGS_ENFORCE_NONDUMP ||
- bprm->secureexec)
+ !(uid_eq(current_euid(), current_uid()) &&
+ gid_eq(current_egid(), current_gid())))
set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable);
else
set_dumpable(current->mm, SUID_DUMP_USER);
--
2.7.4
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
next reply other threads:[~2018-01-02 23:21 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-01-02 23:21 Kees Cook [this message]
2018-01-03 7:04 ` [PATCH] exec: Weaken dumpability for secureexec Serge E. Hallyn
2018-01-03 12:11 ` Tom Horsley
2018-01-03 17:21 ` Kees Cook
2018-01-03 17:34 ` Laura Abbott
2018-01-03 7:06 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-01-03 17:21 ` Kees Cook
2018-01-03 17:41 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-01-03 19:08 ` Tom Horsley
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