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From: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
To: tglx@linuxtronix.de
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org, gregkh@linux-foundation.org,
	dwmw@amazon.co.uk, tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dave.hansen@intel.com,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH 01/11] x86/retpoline: Define retpoline indirect thunk and macros
Date: Wed,  3 Jan 2018 15:09:24 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180103230934.15788-2-andi@firstfloor.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180103230934.15788-1-andi@firstfloor.org>

From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>

From: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>

retpoline is a special sequence on Intel CPUs to stop speculation for
indirect branches.

Provide assembler infrastructure to use retpoline by the compiler
and for assembler. We add the out of line trampoline used by the
compiler, and NOSPEC_JUMP / NOSPEC_CALL macros for assembler

[Originally from David and Tim, heavily hacked by AK]

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/jump-asm.h | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S   |  1 +
 arch/x86/lib/Makefile           |  1 +
 arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S        | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 84 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/jump-asm.h
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/jump-asm.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/jump-asm.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..953c391991b9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/jump-asm.h
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef JUMP_ASM_H
+#define JUMP_ASM_H 1
+
+#ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
+
+/*
+ * Jump to an indirect pointer without speculation.
+ *
+ * The out of line __x86.indirect_thunk has special code sequences
+ * to stop speculation.
+ */
+
+.macro NOSPEC_JMP target
+	push	\target
+	jmp	__x86.indirect_thunk
+.endm
+
+
+/*
+ * Call an indirect pointer without speculation.
+ */
+
+.macro NOSPEC_CALL target
+	jmp     1221f
+1222:
+	push	\target
+	jmp	__x86.indirect_thunk
+1221:
+	call	1222b
+.endm
+
+#else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
+
+#define NOSPEC_JUMP(t) \
+	"push " t "; "				\
+	"jmp __x86.indirect_thunk; "
+
+#define NOSPEC_CALL(t) \
+	"	jmp 1221f; "			\
+	"1222:	push " t ";"			\
+	"	jmp __x86.indirect_thunk;"	\
+	"1221:	call 1222b;"
+
+#endif /* !__ASSEMBLY */
+
+#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
index 1e413a9326aa..2e64241a6664 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
@@ -103,6 +103,7 @@ SECTIONS
 		/* bootstrapping code */
 		HEAD_TEXT
 		. = ALIGN(8);
+		*(.text.__x86.indirect_thunk)
 		TEXT_TEXT
 		SCHED_TEXT
 		CPUIDLE_TEXT
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/Makefile b/arch/x86/lib/Makefile
index 7b181b61170e..ec7a329b9b3c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/Makefile
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ lib-y += memcpy_$(BITS).o
 lib-$(CONFIG_RWSEM_XCHGADD_ALGORITHM) += rwsem.o
 lib-$(CONFIG_INSTRUCTION_DECODER) += insn.o inat.o insn-eval.o
 lib-$(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE) += kaslr.o
+lib-y += retpoline.o
 
 obj-y += msr.o msr-reg.o msr-reg-export.o hweight.o
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..cb40781adbfe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+
+/*
+ * Out of line jump trampoline for calls that disable speculation.
+ *
+ * This is a special sequence that prevents the CPU speculating
+ * for indirect calls.
+ *
+ * This can be called by gcc generated code, or with the asm macros
+ * in asm/jump-asm.h
+ */
+
+#include <linux/linkage.h>
+#include <asm/dwarf2.h>
+#include <asm/export.h>
+
+	.section	.text.__x86.indirect_thunk,"ax"
+
+ENTRY(__x86.indirect_thunk)
+	CFI_STARTPROC
+	call	retpoline_call_target
+2:
+	lfence		/* stop speculation */
+	jmp	2b
+retpoline_call_target:
+#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
+	lea	8(%rsp), %rsp
+#else
+	lea	4(%esp), %esp
+#endif
+	ret
+	CFI_ENDPROC
+ENDPROC(__x86.indirect_thunk)
+
+	EXPORT_SYMBOL(__x86.indirect_thunk)
-- 
2.14.3

  reply	other threads:[~2018-01-03 23:09 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 101+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-01-03 23:09 Avoid speculative indirect calls in kernel Andi Kleen
2018-01-03 23:09 ` Andi Kleen [this message]
2018-01-03 23:09 ` [PATCH 02/11] x86/retpoline/crypto: Convert crypto assembler indirect jumps Andi Kleen
2018-01-03 23:09 ` [PATCH 03/11] x86/retpoline/entry: Convert entry " Andi Kleen
2018-01-03 23:09 ` [PATCH 04/11] x86/retpoline/ftrace: Convert ftrace " Andi Kleen
2018-01-03 23:09 ` [PATCH 05/11] x86/retpoline/hyperv: Convert " Andi Kleen
2018-01-03 23:09 ` [PATCH 06/11] x86/retpoline/crypto: Convert xen " Andi Kleen
2018-01-03 23:09 ` [PATCH 07/11] x86/retpoline/checksum32: Convert " Andi Kleen
2018-01-03 23:09 ` [PATCH 08/11] x86/retpoline/irq32: " Andi Kleen
2018-01-03 23:09 ` [PATCH 09/11] x86/retpoline: Finally enable retpoline for C code Andi Kleen
2018-01-04  8:28   ` Greg KH
2018-01-04  8:30     ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-03 23:09 ` [PATCH 10/11] retpoline/taint: Taint kernel for missing retpoline in compiler Andi Kleen
2018-01-04  0:29   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-04  0:35     ` Randy Dunlap
2018-01-03 23:09 ` [PATCH 11/11] retpoline/objtool: Disable some objtool warnings Andi Kleen
2018-01-03 23:51 ` Avoid speculative indirect calls in kernel Linus Torvalds
2018-01-04  0:00   ` Alan Cox
2018-01-04  0:09   ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-04  0:12     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-04  0:15       ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-04  0:19         ` Jiri Kosina
2018-01-05  2:01           ` james harvey
2018-01-05 10:40             ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-05 12:29               ` james harvey
2018-01-05 12:06             ` Alan Cox
2018-01-04  0:29         ` Alan Cox
2018-01-04  0:31           ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-04  0:38             ` Alan Cox
2018-01-04  0:40             ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-04  8:15               ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-04 15:53                 ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-04 15:55                   ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-04  0:20       ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-04  0:26         ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-04  0:18     ` David Lang
2018-01-04  1:00   ` Paul Turner
2018-01-04  1:41   ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-04  1:59     ` Alan Cox
2018-01-04  2:11       ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-04  8:20         ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-04 11:42           ` Pavel Machek
2018-01-04 11:47             ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-04 14:20               ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-04 14:51                 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 15:29                   ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-04 15:32                     ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-04 15:37                       ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 16:15                     ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-04 20:00                       ` Tom Lendacky
2018-01-04 20:05                         ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-04 23:47                           ` Tom Lendacky
2018-01-05  0:06                             ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-05  0:26                             ` Tom Lendacky
2018-01-04 16:52                     ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-04 15:32                   ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-04 16:25                     ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-04 17:04                       ` Alan Cox
2018-01-04 17:40                         ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-04 17:13                       ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-04 17:15                         ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-04 18:05                           ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-04 14:55                 ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-04 18:24                 ` Pavel Machek
2018-01-04 19:57           ` Jon Masters
2018-01-05  0:41             ` Jon Masters
2018-01-05  0:54               ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-05  4:11                 ` Jon Masters
2018-01-05  9:59                   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-08 10:28                     ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-08 20:42                       ` [tip:x86/pti] x86/tboot: Unbreak tboot with PTI enabled tip-bot for Dave Hansen
2018-01-08 20:53                       ` Avoid speculative indirect calls in kernel Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-08 21:32                         ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-10  0:45                           ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-10  1:11                             ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-10 16:02                               ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-05  6:49                 ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-05  6:57                   ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-05  7:13                     ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-07 14:14                       ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-07 17:21                         ` David Lang
2018-01-07 18:49                           ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-07 17:44                         ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-07 18:55                           ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-07 22:10                             ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-08  9:18                               ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-08  9:29                                 ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-08 16:22                               ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-08 16:53                                 ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-05 12:12                 ` Alan Cox
2018-01-09  1:44                   ` Samir Bellabes
     [not found]                 ` <CAL9bgJ8XNJgCtxR6+M+Vm9eDBVZ4Dyi_-Lt-Q1ei9N=TE2c6cg@mail.gmail.com>
2018-01-07  5:04                   ` Fwd: " Kiernan Hager
2018-01-07  6:39                     ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-07 14:01                     ` Alan Cox
2018-01-07 17:47                       ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-07 18:01                         ` Ivan Ivanov
2018-01-07 18:16                           ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-04 11:26   ` Pavel Machek
2018-01-04 11:54     ` Alan Cox
2018-01-04 18:33     ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-04 20:08       ` Jon Masters

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