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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org,
	Benjamin Gilbert <benjamin.gilbert@coreos.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>,
	Alexander Kuleshov <kuleshovmail@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.14 03/38] x86/kaslr: Fix the vaddr_end mess
Date: Mon,  8 Jan 2018 13:58:56 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180108125916.138122452@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180108125915.951963528@linuxfoundation.org>

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

commit 1dddd25125112ba49706518ac9077a1026a18f37 upstream.

vaddr_end for KASLR is only documented in the KASLR code itself and is
adjusted depending on config options. So it's not surprising that a change
of the memory layout causes KASLR to have the wrong vaddr_end. This can map
arbitrary stuff into other areas causing hard to understand problems.

Remove the whole ifdef magic and define the start of the cpu_entry_area to
be the end of the KASLR vaddr range.

Add documentation to that effect.

Fixes: 92a0f81d8957 ("x86/cpu_entry_area: Move it out of the fixmap")
Reported-by: Benjamin Gilbert <benjamin.gilbert@coreos.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Benjamin Gilbert <benjamin.gilbert@coreos.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Kuleshov <kuleshovmail@gmail.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1801041320360.1771@nanos
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt         |    6 ++++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h |    8 +++++++-
 arch/x86/mm/kaslr.c                     |   32 +++++++++-----------------------
 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)

--- a/Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt
+++ b/Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ ffffea0000000000 - ffffeaffffffffff (=40
 ... unused hole ...
 ffffec0000000000 - fffffbffffffffff (=44 bits) kasan shadow memory (16TB)
 ... unused hole ...
+				    vaddr_end for KASLR
 fffffe0000000000 - fffffe7fffffffff (=39 bits) cpu_entry_area mapping
 fffffe8000000000 - fffffeffffffffff (=39 bits) LDT remap for PTI
 ffffff0000000000 - ffffff7fffffffff (=39 bits) %esp fixup stacks
@@ -37,6 +38,7 @@ ffd4000000000000 - ffd5ffffffffffff (=49
 ... unused hole ...
 ffdf000000000000 - fffffc0000000000 (=53 bits) kasan shadow memory (8PB)
 ... unused hole ...
+				    vaddr_end for KASLR
 fffffe0000000000 - fffffe7fffffffff (=39 bits) cpu_entry_area mapping
 ... unused hole ...
 ffffff0000000000 - ffffff7fffffffff (=39 bits) %esp fixup stacks
@@ -71,3 +73,7 @@ during EFI runtime calls.
 Note that if CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY is enabled, the direct mapping of all
 physical memory, vmalloc/ioremap space and virtual memory map are randomized.
 Their order is preserved but their base will be offset early at boot time.
+
+Be very careful vs. KASLR when changing anything here. The KASLR address
+range must not overlap with anything except the KASAN shadow area, which is
+correct as KASAN disables KASLR.
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h
@@ -75,7 +75,13 @@ typedef struct { pteval_t pte; } pte_t;
 #define PGDIR_SIZE	(_AC(1, UL) << PGDIR_SHIFT)
 #define PGDIR_MASK	(~(PGDIR_SIZE - 1))
 
-/* See Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt for a description of the memory map. */
+/*
+ * See Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt for a description of the memory map.
+ *
+ * Be very careful vs. KASLR when changing anything here. The KASLR address
+ * range must not overlap with anything except the KASAN shadow area, which
+ * is correct as KASAN disables KASLR.
+ */
 #define MAXMEM			_AC(__AC(1, UL) << MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS, UL)
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL
--- a/arch/x86/mm/kaslr.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/kaslr.c
@@ -34,25 +34,14 @@
 #define TB_SHIFT 40
 
 /*
- * Virtual address start and end range for randomization. The end changes base
- * on configuration to have the highest amount of space for randomization.
- * It increases the possible random position for each randomized region.
+ * Virtual address start and end range for randomization.
  *
- * You need to add an if/def entry if you introduce a new memory region
- * compatible with KASLR. Your entry must be in logical order with memory
- * layout. For example, ESPFIX is before EFI because its virtual address is
- * before. You also need to add a BUILD_BUG_ON() in kernel_randomize_memory() to
- * ensure that this order is correct and won't be changed.
+ * The end address could depend on more configuration options to make the
+ * highest amount of space for randomization available, but that's too hard
+ * to keep straight and caused issues already.
  */
 static const unsigned long vaddr_start = __PAGE_OFFSET_BASE;
-
-#if defined(CONFIG_X86_ESPFIX64)
-static const unsigned long vaddr_end = ESPFIX_BASE_ADDR;
-#elif defined(CONFIG_EFI)
-static const unsigned long vaddr_end = EFI_VA_END;
-#else
-static const unsigned long vaddr_end = __START_KERNEL_map;
-#endif
+static const unsigned long vaddr_end = CPU_ENTRY_AREA_BASE;
 
 /* Default values */
 unsigned long page_offset_base = __PAGE_OFFSET_BASE;
@@ -101,15 +90,12 @@ void __init kernel_randomize_memory(void
 	unsigned long remain_entropy;
 
 	/*
-	 * All these BUILD_BUG_ON checks ensures the memory layout is
-	 * consistent with the vaddr_start/vaddr_end variables.
+	 * These BUILD_BUG_ON checks ensure the memory layout is consistent
+	 * with the vaddr_start/vaddr_end variables. These checks are very
+	 * limited....
 	 */
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(vaddr_start >= vaddr_end);
-	BUILD_BUG_ON(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_ESPFIX64) &&
-		     vaddr_end >= EFI_VA_END);
-	BUILD_BUG_ON((IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_ESPFIX64) ||
-		      IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI)) &&
-		     vaddr_end >= __START_KERNEL_map);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(vaddr_end != CPU_ENTRY_AREA_BASE);
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(vaddr_end > __START_KERNEL_map);
 
 	if (!kaslr_memory_enabled())

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-01-08 12:59 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 46+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-01-08 12:58 [PATCH 4.14 00/38] 4.14.13-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:58 ` [PATCH 4.14 01/38] x86/mm: Set MODULES_END to 0xffffffffff000000 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:58 ` [PATCH 4.14 02/38] x86/mm: Map cpu_entry_area at the same place on 4/5 level Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:58 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2018-01-08 12:58 ` [PATCH 4.14 04/38] x86/events/intel/ds: Use the proper cache flush method for mapping ds buffers Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:58 ` [PATCH 4.14 05/38] x86/tlb: Drop the _GPL from the cpu_tlbstate export Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:58 ` [PATCH 4.14 06/38] x86/alternatives: Add missing \n at end of ALTERNATIVE inline asm Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.14 07/38] x86/pti: Rename BUG_CPU_INSECURE to BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.14 08/38] kernel/acct.c: fix the acct->needcheck check in check_free_space() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.14 09/38] mm/mprotect: add a cond_resched() inside change_pmd_range() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.14 10/38] mm/sparse.c: wrong allocation for mem_section Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.14 11/38] userfaultfd: clear the vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx if UFFD_EVENT_FORK fails Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.14 12/38] btrfs: fix refcount_t usage when deleting btrfs_delayed_nodes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.14 13/38] efi/capsule-loader: Reinstate virtual capsule mapping Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.14 14/38] crypto: n2 - cure use after free Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.14 15/38] crypto: chacha20poly1305 - validate the digest size Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.14 16/38] crypto: pcrypt - fix freeing pcrypt instances Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.14 17/38] crypto: chelsio - select CRYPTO_GF128MUL Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.14 18/38] drm/i915: Disable DC states around GMBUS on GLK Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.14 19/38] drm/i915: Apply Display WA #1183 on skl, kbl, and cfl Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.14 20/38] sunxi-rsb: Include OF based modalias in device uevent Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.14 21/38] fscache: Fix the default for fscache_maybe_release_page() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.14 22/38] x86 / CPU: Avoid unnecessary IPIs in arch_freq_get_on_cpu() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.14 23/38] x86 / CPU: Always show current CPU frequency in /proc/cpuinfo Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.14 24/38] kernel/signal.c: protect the traced SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE tasks from SIGKILL Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.14 25/38] kernel/signal.c: protect the SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE tasks from !sig_kernel_only() signals Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.14 26/38] kernel/signal.c: remove the no longer needed SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE check in complete_signal() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.14 27/38] iommu/arm-smmu-v3: Dont free page table ops twice Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.14 28/38] iommu/arm-smmu-v3: Cope with duplicated Stream IDs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.14 29/38] ARC: uaccess: dont use "l" gcc inline asm constraint modifier Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.14 30/38] powerpc/mm: Fix SEGV on mapped region to return SEGV_ACCERR Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.14 31/38] Input: elantech - add new icbody type 15 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.14 32/38] x86/microcode/AMD: Add support for fam17h microcode loading Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.14 33/38] apparmor: fix regression in mount mediation when feature set is pinned Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.14 34/38] parisc: Fix alignment of pa_tlb_lock in assembly on 32-bit SMP kernel Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.14 35/38] parisc: qemu idle sleep support Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.14 36/38] mtd: nand: pxa3xx: Fix READOOB implementation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.14 37/38] KVM: s390: fix cmma migration for multiple memory slots Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.14 38/38] KVM: s390: prevent buffer overrun on memory hotplug during migration Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 16:47 ` [PATCH 4.14 00/38] 4.14.13-stable review kernelci.org bot
2018-01-08 20:59 ` Shuah Khan
2018-01-09  9:11   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-09  8:45 ` Naresh Kamboju
2018-01-09  9:27   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-09 13:45 ` Guenter Roeck
2018-01-09 19:07   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman

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