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From: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, r.marek@assembler.cz,
	ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com, rkrcmar@redhat.com,
	Janakarajan.Natarajan@amd.com, bp@suse.de, x86@kernel.org,
	hpa@zytor.com, mingo@redhat.com,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] clarify how insecure CPU is
Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2018 00:03:55 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180108230355.GA25349@amd> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <alpine.DEB.2.20.1801082125530.2253@nanos>

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On Mon 2018-01-08 21:27:25, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> On Mon, 8 Jan 2018, Pavel Machek wrote:
> 
> > 
> > First, what is going on with X86_BUG_AMD_E400 and X86_BUG_AMD_APIC_C1E
> > ? They seem to refer to the same bug, perhaps comment should mention
> > that? (Do we need two flags for one bug?)
> > 
> > Next, maybe X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE is a bit too generic? This seems to
> > address "Meltdown" problem, but not "Spectre". Should it be limited to
> > PPro and newer Intel CPUs?
> > 
> > Should another erratum be added for "Spectre"? This is present even on
> > AMD CPUs, but should not be present in 486, maybe Pentium, and some
> > Atom chips?
> > 
> > Plus... is this reasonable interface?
> > 
> > bugs		: cpu_insecure
> 
> We've renamed it to meltdown already and added spectre_v1/v2 bits for the
> rest of the mess.

Could you explain (best with code comment) what is going on with
X86_BUG_AMD_E400 and X86_BUG_AMD_APIC_C1E ? They seem to refer to the
same bug.

Plus, as I explained: "bugs: meltdown, spectre" seems to be bad idea,
as userland application can not easily tell between "no bug" and "bug
not known to kernel".

Best regards,
									Pavel
-- 
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html

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  reply	other threads:[~2018-01-08 23:03 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-01-08 20:10 [PATCH] clarify how insecure CPU is Pavel Machek
2018-01-08 20:27 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-08 23:03   ` Pavel Machek [this message]
2018-01-08 23:44     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-03-03 21:06       ` Pavel Machek
2018-03-04  7:34         ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-03-04  8:51           ` Pavel Machek
2018-03-04  9:29             ` Borislav Petkov
2018-03-04 14:01               ` Pavel Machek
2018-03-04 14:27                 ` Borislav Petkov

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