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From: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: "Woodhouse, David" <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com" <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>,
	"peterz@infradead.org" <peterz@infradead.org>,
	"tglx@linutronix.de" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"riel@redhat.com" <riel@redhat.com>,
	"keescook@google.com" <keescook@google.com>,
	"gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk" <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
	"pjt@google.com" <pjt@google.com>,
	"dave.hansen@intel.com" <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	"luto@amacapital.net" <luto@amacapital.net>,
	"jikos@kernel.org" <jikos@kernel.org>,
	"gregkh@linux-foundation.org" <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 11/10] x86/retpoline: Avoid return buffer underflows on context switch
Date: Mon, 8 Jan 2018 17:16:02 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180109011602.GH6718@tassilo.jf.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CA+55aFy3sCY5xUwZtOYL1MLhRwYe1sU=5d8sWPZqAnEZ71u8-w@mail.gmail.com>

> If we clear the registers, what the hell are you going to put in the
> RSB that helps you?

RSB allows you to control chains of gadgets.

You can likely find some chain of gadgets that set up constants in registers in a
lot of useful ways. Perhaps not any way (so may be hard to scan through all of
memory), but it's likely you could find gadgets that result in a lot of useful
direct mapped addresses, which the next gadget can then reference.

Especially RAX is quite vulnerable to this because there will be a lot 
of code that does "modify RAX in interesting ways ; RET"

> So instead of saying "we have to flush the return stack", I'm saying
> that we should look at things that make flushing the return stack
> _unnecessary_, simply because even if the attacker were to control it
> entirely, they'd still be up shit creek without a paddle.

I agree that clearing registers is useful (was just hacking on that patch).

-Andi

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-01-09  1:16 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 66+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-01-07 22:11 [PATCH v6 00/10] Retpoline: Avoid speculative indirect calls in kernel David Woodhouse
2018-01-07 22:11 ` [PATCH v6 01/10] x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support David Woodhouse
2018-01-08 10:45   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-08 10:53     ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-08 11:03       ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-08 12:45         ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-08 13:42   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-08 13:46     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-08 13:53       ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-08 14:26         ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-08 21:20           ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-09 12:36       ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-09 13:35         ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-09 13:40         ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-07 22:11 ` [PATCH v6 02/10] x86/retpoline/crypto: Convert crypto assembler indirect jumps David Woodhouse
2018-01-08 13:49   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-07 22:11 ` [PATCH v6 03/10] x86/retpoline/entry: Convert entry " David Woodhouse
2018-01-07 22:11 ` [PATCH v6 04/10] x86/retpoline/ftrace: Convert ftrace " David Woodhouse
2018-01-07 22:11 ` [PATCH v6 05/10] x86/retpoline/hyperv: Convert " David Woodhouse
2018-01-07 22:11 ` [PATCH v6 06/10] x86/retpoline/xen: Convert Xen hypercall " David Woodhouse
2018-01-07 22:11 ` [PATCH v6 07/10] x86/retpoline/checksum32: Convert assembler " David Woodhouse
2018-01-07 22:11 ` [PATCH v6 08/10] x86/retpoline/irq32: " David Woodhouse
2018-01-07 22:11 ` [PATCH v6 09/10] x86/retpoline: Add boot time option to disable retpoline David Woodhouse
2018-01-07 22:11 ` [PATCH v6 10/10] x86/retpoline: Exclude objtool with retpoline David Woodhouse
2018-01-08 10:25   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-08 10:34     ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-08 13:20       ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-07 22:22 ` [PATCH v6 00/10] Retpoline: Avoid speculative indirect calls in kernel Linus Torvalds
2018-01-08 10:01   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-08 17:54   ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-08 21:10     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-08 10:34 ` Paul Turner
2018-01-08 10:38   ` Jiri Kosina
2018-01-08 10:45     ` Paul Turner
2018-01-08 10:42   ` Paul Turner
2018-01-08 11:16     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-08 11:25       ` Paul Turner
2018-01-08 16:13     ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-10 15:20     ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-10 15:31       ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2018-01-08 10:45   ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-08 10:53     ` Paul Turner
2018-01-08 12:49       ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-08 23:44 ` [PATCH v6 11/10] x86/retpoline: Avoid return buffer underflows on context switch David Woodhouse
2018-01-08 23:56   ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-08 23:58     ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-09  0:35       ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-09  0:42         ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-09  0:48           ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-09  0:55             ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-09  0:44         ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-09  0:58           ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-09  1:15             ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-09  3:27               ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-01-09 13:04                 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-09 13:10                   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-09 17:53                   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-09 18:09                   ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-16  8:58                   ` Pavel Machek
2018-01-09  1:16             ` Andi Kleen [this message]
2018-01-09  1:21               ` [PATCH v6 11/10] x86/retpoline: Avoid return buffer underflows on context switch II Andi Kleen
2018-01-09  1:23                 ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-09  1:49                   ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-09  1:53                 ` Paul Turner
2018-01-09  1:18             ` [PATCH v6 11/10] x86/retpoline: Avoid return buffer underflows on context switch Woodhouse, David
2018-01-09  0:06     ` Andi Kleen

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