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Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2018 11:04:57 +0100
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
To: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
        Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
        Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
        Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
        Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com>,
        David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
        Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
        Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 3/5] x86/enter: Use IBRS on syscall and interrupts
Message-ID: <20180110100457.GA29822@worktop.programming.kicks-ass.net>
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On Tue, Jan 09, 2018 at 06:26:47PM -0800, Tim Chen wrote:
> Set IBRS upon kernel entrance via syscall and interrupts. Clear it
> upon exit.  IBRS protects against unsafe indirect branching predictions
> in the kernel.
> 
> The NMI interrupt save/restore of IBRS state was based on Andrea
> Arcangeli's implementation.
> Here's an explanation by Dave Hansen on why we save IBRS state for NMI.
> 
> The normal interrupt code uses the 'error_entry' path which uses the
> Code Segment (CS) of the instruction that was interrupted to tell
> whether it interrupted the kernel or userspace and thus has to switch
> IBRS, or leave it alone.
> 
> The NMI code is different.  It uses 'paranoid_entry' because it can
> interrupt the kernel while it is running with a userspace IBRS (and %GS
> and CR3) value, but has a kernel CS.  If we used the same approach as
> the normal interrupt code, we might do the following;
> 
> 	SYSENTER_entry
> <-------------- NMI HERE
> 	IBRS=1
> 		do_something()
> 	IBRS=0
> 	SYSRET
> 
> The NMI code might notice that we are running in the kernel and decide
> that it is OK to skip the IBRS=1.  This would leave it running
> unprotected with IBRS=0, which is bad.
> 
> However, if we unconditionally set IBRS=1, in the NMI, we might get the
> following case:
> 
> 	SYSENTER_entry
> 	IBRS=1
> 		do_something()
> 	IBRS=0
> <-------------- NMI HERE (set IBRS=1)
> 	SYSRET
> 
> and we would return to userspace with IBRS=1.  Userspace would run
> slowly until we entered and exited the kernel again.
> 
> Instead of those two approaches, we chose a third one where we simply
> save the IBRS value in a scratch register (%r13) and then restore that
> value, verbatim.
> 

What this Changelog fails to address is _WHY_ we need this. What does
this provide that retpoline does not.